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SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate the right to confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS through an 
interdisciplinary lens.   This study indicates that whilst confidentiality is important and should be preserved 
in order to protect persons living with HIV/AIDS against stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation, this 
should be balanced by other equally important interests, such as the protection of public health and 
individual third parties who may be affected by the intentional or negligent infection of others with HIV.  As 
the consideration of the legal issues relating to confidentiality and privacy cannot be divorced from the 
social context in which HIV/AIDS plays out in South African communities, the study will examine, amongst 
others, the victimisation, discrimination and stigmatisation experienced by persons living with HIV/AIDS, 
followed by a critical exploration of the present legal and ethical framework governing privacy and 
confidentiality, including medical confidentiality, as well as the duty to disclose a positive HIV-status, in the 
context of HIV/AIDS. Possible limitations on the right to privacy in this context are also examined, which 
include, amongst others, a consideration of making HIV/AIDS notifiable diseases in South Africa. The study 
suggests that it is imperative that legal interventions aimed at curbing the spread of HIV will need to be 
mindful of the unique social, cultural and economic forces that impact on the duty to disclose a positive 
HIV-status to partners and other affected third parties. Insights gained from philosophical theories relating 
to Africanism, individualism, communitarianism and utilitarianism are valuable tools in facilitating a clearer 
understanding of relevant social and cultural factors that keep South African society locked in the present 
stalemate with regard to the disclosure of HIV status. 
 
 
Key terms: 
HIV/AIDS, the right to confidentiality, the right to privacy, the right to dignity, medical confidentiality, 
limitation clause, stigma, discrimination, victimisation, criminalisation, Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, persons living with HIV/AIDS, individualism, communitarianism, utilitarianism, Africanism, 
notifiability, partner notification. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“It all started as a rumour…Then we found we were dealing with a disease.  Then we realised it was 
an epidemic.  And now we have accepted it as a tragedy.”1 
 
1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
 
1.1.1 Introduction  
The origins of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) are 
traced back by scientists and researchers to as early as 1884.2  Many scholars agree that AIDS was 
recognised as a syndrome of illnesses by scientists in 1981.3  There is also agreement that HIV, the virus 
which causes AIDS, was identified or isolated in 1983.4  This means that AIDS as a disease was 
discovered by scientists in the 1980s, although it had originated much earlier around 1884.5  It is accepted 
                                                          
1  Chief epidemiologist in Kampala, Uganda, New Vision, 4 September 1993, as quoted at http://www.avert.org/history- 
aids-africa.htm (visited 28 July 2010). See also Browne-Marshall GJ “A Cautionary Tale: Black Women, Criminal 
Justice, and HIV” 2012 (19;407) Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 407-429 at 423, who expresses the view that 
HIV had been pronounced an epidemic by most and a pandemic by many.  
2  Worobey et al “Direct Evidence of Extensive Diversity of HIV-1 in Kinshasa by 1960” 2008 (455) Nature 661-664.  
3  See, for instance the following authors: Berer M and Ray S Women and HIV/AIDS-An International Resource Book 
(1993, London: An Imprint of Harper Collins Publishers) 6, Reeves JD and Doms RW Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
Type 2 Journal of General Virology (2002) 83 1253-1265, at http://www.vir.sgmjournals.org/../1253 (visited 17 July 
2010), Waters RC AIDS and Florida Law (1989, Clearwater, Florida: D & S Publishers) 7, Barret-Grant K et al 
HIV/AIDS and the Law - A Resource Manual 2nd ed (2001, The AIDS Law Project and The AIDS Legal Network) 11, 
Levay S and Valente SM Human Sexuality Second Edition (2006, Sunderland, Massachusetts, USA: Sinauer 
Associates, Inc., Publishers) 571, Byer CO and Shainberg LW Dimensions of Human Sexuality (1994, Boston, 
Massachusetts, New York: WCB McGraw-Hill) 162, Squire C HIV in South Africa (2007, London and New York: 
Routledge) 25, Jasper MC AIDS Law-Oceana’s Law of the Layperson Second Edition (2000, United States of America: 
Oceana Publications, Inc.) 2, Macklin ED AIDS and Families (1989, New York-London: Harrington Park Press, Inc.) 4, 
Sloan IJ AIDS Law-Implications for the Individual & Society (1988, London-Rome-New York: Oceana Publications, 
Inc.) 1, Harris D and Haigh R AIDS: A guide to Law (1990, London and New York: Routledge) 1, Osborn JE “The AIDS 
Epidemic: Discovery of A New Disease” in Dalton HL et al (eds) AIDS and The Law-A Guide for the Public (1987, New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press) 18 and Browne-Marshall 2012 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 407.  
4  Berer and Ray 6, Barret-Grant 11, Squire 25, Harris and Haigh 1, and Osborn 22.  
5  Worobey 2008 Nature 661-664. 
2 
 
that AIDS originated from Africa before it spread to other parts of the world.6  This chapter will look at the 
historical background and origins of HIV and AIDS.  It will also include an overview of the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in South Africa.  A thorough overview of the origins of HIV and AIDS, as well as the spread of the 
pandemic in South Africa is necessary, as this will contextualise and inform the discussion of legal and 
social issues relating to confidentiality and the disclosure of a positive HIV-status.  
1.1.2 The Origins of HIV and AIDS 
Reeves and Doms point out that AIDS resulting from HIV-1 infection was recognised in 1981 when a 
common pattern of symptoms was observed among a small number of homosexual men in the USA.7  
Berer and Ray also point out that the earliest cases of people who died of HIV-related illnesses were 
identified in the 1980s from stored samples of tissue and fluids.8  Squire9, however, explains that it is 
probable that HIV has a much longer and more dispersed existence in humans, involving long-term low 
levels of infection.  HIV has been isolated from a 1959 plasma sample, but may have been around in 
humans since the 1930’s within Africa, moving to the US and then Haiti in the late 1970s.10  In fact, as 
Keele points out, there is now conclusive evidence that HIV originated in Africa.11  A 10-year study 
completed in 2005 found a strain of Simian Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV) in a number of chimpanzee 
colonies in south-east Cameroon, the first-mentioned the viral ancestor of HIV-1 that causes AIDS in 
humans.12   
 
During the last few years it has become possible not only to determine whether HIV is present in a blood or 
plasma sample, but also to determine the particular subtype of the virus.13  Studying the subtype of virus of 
some of the earliest known instances of HIV infection can help to provide clues about the time it first 
                                                          
6  Jasper at 3, for instance, points out that: “Because there was such a large concentration of victims in Central Africa,  
the consensus among researchers was that the virus somehow originated in this area.”  See, also, Worobey 661-664, 
who points out that “[t]he authors suggest a long history of the virus in Africa and call Kinshasa the ‘epicentre of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic’ in West Africa.”  See, also, Squire 25, Levay and Valente 571, Waters 20 and Keele BF et al 
Chimpazee Resevoirs of Pandemic and Nonpandemic HIV-1 (2006) Science 313 (28 July) 523-526 at 
http://www.avert.org/history-aids-africa.htm (visited 28 July 2010).  
7  Reeves and Doms 1253-1265. 
8  Berer and Ray 6.  They further point out that these cases include a seafarer from England, who died in 1959; a  
teenage boy from the USA, who died in 1969; a sailor, his wife and their youngest daughter from Norway, who began 
to develop HIV disease in the mid-1960s and had all died by 1976; and a blood donor from Zaire, in 1959. 
9 Squire 25.  
10  Squire 25.  
11  Keele 523-526 
12  Keele 523-526. 
13  Varghese S History of HIV-AIDS at http://www.upublish.info/../141444 (visited 21 July 2010).  
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appeared in humans and its subsequent evolution.14  A 1998 analysis of the plasma sample from 1959 
suggested that HIV-1 was introduced into humans around the 1940s or the early 1950s.15  In January 2000, 
the results of a new study16 suggested that the first HIV-1 infection occurred around 1931 in West Africa.  
This estimate (which had a 15 year margin of error) was based on a complex computer model of HIV’s 
evolution.  However, a study in 200817 dated the origin of HIV to between 1884 and 1924, much earlier than 
previous estimates at that time.  The researchers compared the viral sequence from 1959 (the oldest 
known HIV-1 specimen) to the newly discovered sequence of 1960.  They found a significant genetic 
difference between these, demonstrating that the diversification of HIV-1 occurred long before the AIDS 
pandemic was recognised.18  In May 2003, a group of Belgian researchers led by Dr. Anne-Mieke 
Vandamme, published a report19 in the proceedings of National Academy of Science.  By analysing 
samples of the two different subtypes of HIV-2 (A and B) taken from infected individuals and SIV samples 
taken from sooty mangabeys, Dr Vandamme concluded that subtype A had passed into humans around 
1940 and subtype B in 1945.  Her team of researchers also discovered that the virus had originated in 
Guinea-Bissau and that its spread was most likely precipitated by the independence war that took place in 
the country between 1963 and 1974 (Guinea-Bissau is a former Portuguese colony).20  Her theory was 
backed by the fact that the first European cases of HIV-2 were discovered among Portuguese veterans of 
the war, many of whom had received blood transfusions or unsterile injections following injury, or had 
possibly had relationships with local women.21   
 
In view of the evidence considered above, Africa can indeed be regarded as the continent where the 
transfer of HIV to humans first occurred (monkeys from Asia and South America have never been found 
with SIV’s that could cause HIV in humans).22  This has been confirmed by subsequent studies.23  In May 
2006, the same group of researchers who first identified the Pan troglodytes troglodytes strain of SIVcpz, 
                                                          
14  Varghese at http://www.upublish.info/../141444 (visited 21 July 2010).   
15  Zhu et al An African HIV-1 Sequence from 1959 and Implications for the Origin of the Epidemic (1998:391, Nature)  
594-597, cited at http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30 June 2010).     
16  Korber et al. Timing the ancestor of the HIV-1 Pandemic Strains (2000:288, Science) 1789-1796, accessed at  
http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30 June 2010).     
17  Worobey 2008 Nature 661-664. 
18  Worobey 2008 Nature 661-664. 
19  Vandamme AM et al Tracing the Origin and History of the HIV-2 Epidemic PNAS, Vol. 100, No. 11, 27 May 2003,  
accessed at http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30 June 2010).  
20  Vandamme PNAS, Vol. 100, No. 11, 27 May 2003. 
21 See http://www.aidslibrarian.wordpress.com/2008/07 (visited 24 July 2010).     
22  BBC.co.uk (25 May 2006) HIV origin ‘found in’ chimps, cited at  http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30  
June 2010). 
23  Keele 523-526. 
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announced that they narrowed down the location of this particular strain to wild chimpanzees found in the 
forests of Southern Cameroon.24  By analysing 599 samples of chimpanzee droppings, the researchers 
were able to obtain 34 specimens that reacted to a standard HIV DNA test, 12 of which gave results that 
were virtually indistinguishable from the reactions created by human HIV.  The researchers therefore 
concluded that the chimpanzees found in this area were highly likely the origin of both the pandemic Group 
M of HIV-1 and of far rarer Group N.  The exact origins of Group O, however, remain unknown.25  HIV 
Group N principally affects people living in South-central Cameroon, so it is not difficult to see how this 
outbreak started.26  Group M, is the HIV sequence that the researchers recovered from the Kinshasa 
sample, which is the strain that is responsible for most HIV infection worldwide.  The data point to 1908 as 
the year that group M (which now infects more than 31 million people worldwide) began its assault.  The 
virus may have made the leap to infect people many times, but only at the turn of the century did this viral 
invasion gain a foothold in the population.  Around that time, a hunter seems to have picked up the virus 
from a chimpanzee in the southeast corner of Cameroon and carried the pathogen along the main route out 
of the forest at the time, down the Sangha river, to Leopoldville (modern-day Kinshasa), where the Group M 
epidemic began.   
 
With the increase of global travel, HIV was carried out of Africa and around the world.27  A 2007 study by 
Michael Worobey amd Dr. Arthur Pitchenik, published in the proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, claimed that, based on the results of genetic analysis, HIV probably moved from Africa to Haiti 
and then entered the United States around 1969.28   
 
This research tied in with other facts that pointed to Haiti as the as the missing link in the chain of 
transmission.  Firstly, many Haitian professionals worked for a time in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) after it achieved independence from Belgium in 1960.  The DRC is one of the countries where the 
disease has been established since the 1930s.  In the early days of the US outbreak, the rate of AIDS 
infection among Haitians living in the US was 27 times higher than the broader US population.  Worobey 
and his colleagues also concluded that the virus “jumped” from Haiti to Trinidad and Tobago, causing the 
                                                          
24  BBC at http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30 June 2010).     
25 See http://www.oyibosonline.com/sm2/index.php (visited 27 July 2010).     
26  See http://www.egoimagekenya.com/ (visited 27 July 2010).     
27  See http://www.evolution.berkely.edu/evolulibray/news/081101_hivorigins (visited 27 July 2010).     
28  See http://www.bionity.com/lexikon/e/AIDS_origin (Visited 27 July 2010).     
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predominantly heterosexual outbreak on these Caribbean islands.29   Following the discovery of a number 
of Haitians with Kaposi’s Sarcoma and other AIDS-related conditions, medical journals and books began to 
claim that AIDS had come from Haiti, and that Haitians were responsible for the AIDS epidemic in the 
United States.  These claims, often founded on dubious evidence, fuelled pre-existing racism in the United 
States (US) and many Haitians suffered severe discrimination and stigma as a result.  A large number of 
Haitian immigrants living in US lost their jobs and were evicted from their homes as Haitians were added to 
the list of homosexuals, haemophiliacs and heroin users to make the ‘Four-H Club’ of categories at high 
risks of AIDS.30  It is now clear, therefore, that HIV is not one virus but exists as two major viral species, 
HIV-1 and HIV-2.31  HIV-1 is further divided into three groups, M, N, and O, with M the ‘main’ group, O the 
‘outlier,’ and N filling the alphabetical gap between them.  HIV-2 consists of seven subtypes, A through G, 
with a possible eighth group, H.32  HIV types 1 and 2 do not have a single simian species of origin, but two, 
the chimpanzee and the sooty mangabey.   The three HIV-1 groups and eight HIV-2 groups are different 
enough from one another that they probably arose from 11 separate crossover events, suggesting eight 
sooty mangabeys and three chimpanzees were responsible for all known HIV infections among humans.33  
HIV-2, along with HIV-1 and SIV consist of the subgenus ‘primate lentivirises’.34  The genomic organisation 
of these viruses is similar, although HIV-1 and SIV of chimpanzees (SIVcpz) encode a vpu gene, while the 
HIV-2 and SIV of sooty mangabeys (SIVsm) have a vpx gene.35   
 
                                                          
29  See http://www.caribbeannetnews.com/new-4212-42--42--.html (visited 27 July 2010).     
30  Farmer P AIDS and Accusation; Haiti and Accusation of Blame (1992, University of California Press), cited at  
http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 30 June 2010).     
31  Marx PA “Unsolved Questions over the Origin of HIV and AIDS” 2005 (71;1) ASM News 15. 
32  Marx 15.  But see, also, Reeves and Doms 1253, who seem to agree only with the view that there have been seven  
independent transmissions from sooty mangabeys to humans, resulting in HIV-2 subtypes A-G and not eight as Marx 
seem to suggest. 
33  Marx 15. 
34  Reeves and Doms 1253-1265.  See, also, http://www.aidssupport.aarogya.com/hiv/what-is (visited 23 July 2010),  
where ‘lentiviruses’ are defined as literally meaning ‘slow viruses’ because they take such a long time to produce any 
adverse effects in the body.  They have been found in a number of different animals, including cats, sheep, horses and 
cattle.  However, the most interesting lentivirus in terms of the investigation into the origins of HIV is the Simian 
Immunodeficiency Virus (SIV) that affects monkeys.  It is now generally accepted that HIV is a descendant of a Simian 
Immunodeficiency Virus because certain strains of SIV’s bear a very close resemblance to HIV-1 and HIV-2, the two 
types of HIV.  HIV-2 for example corresponds to SIVsm, a strain of the Simian Immunodeficiency Virus found in the 
sooty mangabey (also known as the green monkey), which is indigenous to western Africa.  The more virulent, 
pandemic strain of HIV, namely HIV-1, was until recently more difficult to place.  Until 1999, the closest counterpart that 
had been identified was SIVcpz, the SIV found in chimpanzees.  However, this virus still had certain significant 
differences from HIV. 
35  Reeves and Doms 1253-1265. 
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The function of Vpx is not clear, although it may play a role in nuclear import and the functions normally 
associated with HIV-1 Vpr may be provided separately in HIV-2 by Vpr (cell cycle arrest G2) and Vpx- or 
Vpr- SIVs can cause AIDS, while double mutant Vpx-/Vpr- SIVs are severely attenuated.36  HIV is thought to 
derive from west and west central African monkey retroviruses that crossed and hybridised in 
chimpanzees, forming Simian Immunodeficiency Virus, or SIV.37  As Squire38 points out, HIV belongs to a 
group of viruses called retroviruses.39  The genetic material of retroviruses is RNA; once they enter a host 
(human) cell, their genes are reproduced in the form of DNA, which is then incorporated into the 
chromosomes of the human cell.  Therefore, it is extremely difficult for the body defences of the infected 
person to eradicate the virus.40  In describing the process in which this group of viruses came to be known 
as retroviruses, Dalton and Burris41 explain as follows: 
 
Conversely, AIDS research has contributed to our understanding of such phenomena as retroviruses.  Until 1980 no 
human retrovirus had been identified, though not for lack of trying.  This was rather puzzling, since retroviruses had 
been found in most other species where their presence, though often innocuous, sometimes was associated with 
tumours or with slow, progressive illnesses affecting the blood, lungs, or nervous system.  The existence of 
retroviruses in animals kept alive the hope that analogous human agents might yet be found to help explain the many 
diseases of unknown cause.  Retroviruses have an unusual molecular structure.  At first they seemed no different from 
other viruses that have ribonucleic acid (RNA) as their genetic material.  Whereas all other organisms have 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as their fundamental genetic material (which is then transcribed into RNA and 
subsequently into protein molecules), some viruses carry only RNA.  These viruses carry enzymes that allow them to 
bypass DNA entirely and create new RNA directly from their original molecular message.  This is a relatively minor 
deviation from the usual sequence of genetic reproduction, from DNA to RNA to protein.  In 1969, however, scientists 
demonstrated that a unique enzyme carried by some RNA viruses could transfer genetic information from the viral 
RNA into DNA, the opposite direction of all known prior reactions.  The DNA thus created could then be inserted 
among the native genes in chromosomes of infected cells, with the result that the viral information was positioned to 
function as a ‘new gene’ for the infected host.  The unique enzyme was called reverse transcriptase, and ultimately the 
group of RNA viruses bearing such enzymes was given the name ‘retroviruses.’42 
 
HIV belongs to this family of viruses called retroviruses, which as Dalton and Burris43 above describe, seem 
to be highly complicated group of viruses.44  This might explain the reason why it is so difficult for scientists 
                                                          
36 Reeves and Doms 1253-1265. 
37  Squire 25. 
38  Squire 25. 
39  Byer and Shainberg 162. 
40  Byer and Shainberg 162.  Levay and Valente at 572 agree and explain that: “Like the hepatitis A virus, HIV is an RNA  
virus, but once inside the host cell, the viral RNA is transcribed into DNA and inserted into the host’s genome.  This 
makes HIV a retrovirus-‘retro’ because the direction of transcription is opposite from the usual DNA-to-RNA direction.” 
41  Dalton HL and Burris S et al AIDS and the Law-A Guide for the Public (1987, New Haven and London: Yale University  
Press) 21. 
42  Dalton and Burris 21. 
43  Dalton and Burris 21. 
44  See Waters 18, who agrees by adding: “In terms of its biological makeup, HIV is a highly unusual virus.  It is  
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to find a vaccine to cure AIDS, which is the disease that is caused by HIV.  Again, as pointed out by Byer 
and Shainberg above, it is extremely difficult for the body defences of the infected person to remove this 
virus.45  The reason is that this virus, once inserted in a human cell, camouflages itself among the 
chromosomes of the infected cells as one of these cells.46  Once inside the human body, HIV starts its job 
of destroying the human immune and nervous systems.47  Waters48 describes this destruction in the 
following manner: 
Once introduced into the human body and activated, the virus does not randomly infect any available cell.  Instead, it 
selectively attacks several kinds of cells crucial to the operation of the human immune and nervous systems.  One 
particular kind of cell, the so-called CD4+ T-lymphocyte helper cell is especially vulnerable to HIV.  The virus is literally 
attracted to special kind of protein that exists on the surface of these T-lymphocytes.  Once the virus couples with this 
protein, it then injects its own genetic material into the human cell.  When the viral particles thereby embedded in the 
human cells later are activated, the human cell literally is transformed into a ‘factory’ that creates more HIV.  Most often 
the cell literally is destroyed as its own material is used up in the creation of more virus[es].  Once these viral particles 
are released into the bloodstream, they can selectively invade and rapidly kill still more T-lymphocytes, resulting in a 
dramatic depletion in their number.  In this trait, HIV also shows itself to be radically different from the only other known 
group of human retroviruses, the human T-lymphotropic virus family.  The ‘HTLV’ family, some of which are 
responsible for types of human leukaemia, do not kill cells but cause them to multiply rapidly and erratically.  The result 
of an activated HIV infection is a virtual crippling of the human immune system, which cannot function properly without 
T-lymphocytes.  As the T-lymphocytes count drops, a critical part of the human immune system effectively is shut 
down, rendering the body unable to detect many commonplace infections.  Thus, the HIV host falls prey to a number of 
common bacteria and parasites that otherwise would be completely harmless.  It also has been discovered that HIV is 
capable of infecting and disrupting certain other cells vital to the immune system, although apparently without killing 
them.  It is not yet clearly understood what effect this secondary infection has on the immune system.  Human nervous 
tissue, including brain cells, also are vulnerable to HIV infection and may be so severely disrupted that dementia 
results.  In fact, the virus may be transported directly into the brain by infected immune cells, which effectively operate 
as ‘Trojan horses’.49  
Waters50 concludes by observing that researchers are of the view that HIV may be either a recently 
mutated virus or one that remained isolated, probably in Central Africa, for centuries without ever being 
communicated to outsiders, who thus have no natural resistance to it.  This is indicated by the fact that the 
virus kills its primary host cells and thus causes a progression of diseases that may invariably be fatal.  In 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not an ordinary virus like the one that causes influenza, but belongs to a much rarer subclass called ‘retroviruses’.  A 
retrovirus reproduces by a peculiar process called ‘reverse transcription’, involving a special enzyme called reverse 
transcriptase.  By use of this enzyme, the virus particle converts its own genetic material into a form that can be 
inserted directly into the genetic material of the host cell of the infected human being.  There the viral genes literally 
become a part of the human host and may lie dormant for long for long periods of time before becoming activated by 
factors not yet clearly understood.  The process has been compared to planting tens of thousands of time bombs 
inside a human body.”  
45  Byer and Shainberg 162. 
46  Dalton and Burris 21. 
47  Waters 18. 
48  Waters 18-19. 
49  Waters 20. 
50  Waters 20. 
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terms of survival, a virus is better suited to its environment if it does not actually kill its host.51  Thus, some 
scientists believe that the present form of HIV is new, at least as far as most of the world’s population is 
concerned, and that the virus has not had time to evolve into a less virulent form, which would logically be 
expected.  In any event, it is clear that HIV is an unusually destructive infection that once inside the human 
body, cannot be eliminated by any method currently known to science.  Given the present state of medical 
technology, HIV literally is an infection that lasts for life.52     
1.1.2.1 AIDS - a zoonotic disease? 
HIV, as, already discussed above, is thought to derive from west central African monkey retroviruses that 
crossed and hybridised in chimpanzees, forming Simian Immunodeficiency Virus.53  This virus was then 
transmitted to other chimpanzees and other species, notably humans.  Such interspecies transmission 
could have happened through blood-to-blood transmission during hunting, much as earlier versions of the 
virus may have from the monkeys to chimpanzees.54  Many viruses, bacteria and other disease-causing 
entities cross species, most notably at present the avian flu.  Some, such as BSE and salmonella, do so 
through meat consumption.  Other monkey viruses are also found in humans where monkeys are eaten.  
When the human body encounters non-human viruses, it is usually unaffected or it fights these viruses off.  
Occasionally, however, SIV would have mutated into a more resistant form, HIV.  Supporting this account, 
contemporary HIV and the related simian virus have many strains and high mutation rates again, like many 
other disease-causing entities such as flu viruses.55    
Ellison, Melissa and Campbell, in agreement with Squire56 above, observe that “[m]utation57 can allow 
micro-parasites to cross species and cause new human infections”.58  Animal diseases may be transmitted 
                                                          
51  Waters 20. 
52  Waters 20. 
53  Squire 25. 
54  Squire 25. 
55   Squire 25. 
56  Squire 25. 
57  See, also Waters at 20, who points out that: “Researchers believe HIV may be either a recently mutated virus or one  
that remained isolated in some part of the world, probably Central Africa, for centuries without ever being 
communicated to outsiders.” 
58 Ellison G, Melissa P and Campbell C Learning from HIV and AIDS (2003, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 47.  
In fact, according to Avert at http://www.avert.org/origin-aids-hiv.htm (visited 21 June 2010), “[i]t has been known for a 
long time that certain viruses can pass between species.  Indeed the very fact that chimpanzees obtained SIV from two 
other species of primate shows just how easily this crossover can occur.  As animals ourselves, humans are just 
susceptible.  When a viral transfer between animals and humans takes place, it is known as zoonosis.” 
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to man under natural conditions (e.g. brucellosis, rabies, etc.) and such transmission is called zoonosis.59  
Examples of zoonotic transmission include a strain of influenza, a virus HSN1, found in Hong Kong that 
emerged from chicken reservoir and swine influenza viruses.  Zoonotic infections such as hantaviruses, the 
rabies virus and HIV are associated with exposure to infected body fluids, animal tissue, excreta or vectors 
(such as mosquitoes and ticks) that have fed on infected species.60  In order for scientists to establish how 
the zoonosis of HIV took place between animals and humans, and because AIDS was similar to a virus 
found in African monkeys, they developed a theory that tribal hunters contracted the disease after being 
exposed to the blood of infected monkeys.61  A zoonotic origin for HIV is supported by similarities in viral 
genome, phylogenetic relatedness, prevalence in the natural host, geographic coincidence and plausible 
routes of transmission.  The molecular genotypes of pathogens suggest a zoonotic origin of HIV-1 from 
chimpanzees and HIV-2 from sooty mangabeys.62   
Reeves and Doms, also, support the idea that HIV is a zoonotic infection.63  They point out, for instance, 
that HIV is thought to have originated from zoonotic transmissions from SIV-infected non-human primates.  
SIVs from chimpanzees cluster phylogenetically with HIV-1; hence, the HIV-1 epidemic is likely to have 
originated from SIVcpz.  In contrast, all criteria identifying HIV-2 as a zoonosis from the sooty mangabey are 
met: i.e. similarity in genomic organisation; phylogenetic relatedness; prevalence in the natural host; 
geographical overlap; and plausible route of transmission.64  Naturally, accordingly, infected sooty 
mangabeys, African green monkeys and chimpanzees do not develop SIV-related disease, even though 
                                                          
59  See Crosby JT and Stregowski J at http://www.exoticpets.about.com/zoonosis.htm (visited 28 June 2010).  Stregowski,  
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60 Ellison, Melissa and Campbell 47. 
61  Jasper 3.  See, also, Dalton and Burris 23, who seem to support this theory by stating that: “Although HIV is indeed a  
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monkeys to man in Central Africa, possibly as recently as 1960.” 
62 Ellison, Melissa and Campbell 47, citing Gao et al “Origin of HIV-1 in the chimpanzee Pan troglodytes troglodytes”  
1999 (397) Nature 436-444, who found that two chimpanzee subspecies in Africa, the eastern Pan troglodyte 
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commonly hunted for food in Africa, especially within the West Equitorial region. 
63  Reeves and Doms 1253. 
64  Reeves and Doms 1253, they further point out that: “From phylogenetic analysis of divergent HIV-2 strains, it appears  
that there have seven independent transmissions from sooty mangabeys to humans, resulting in HIV-2 subtypes A-G.  
Only one member each of subtypes C, E, F and G, and two of members of subtype D, have been identified and it is 
thought that these rare subtypes may be primary zoonotic infections.” 
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high virus loads can sometimes be detected in their plasma.  Disease is only associated with cross-species 
transmission of the virus; that is, from sooty mangabeys into humans (HIV-2) and from chimpanzees into 
humans (HIV-1), hence zoonosis of HIV.65  However, there are writers who dispute the fact that AIDS is a 
zoonotic disease.  Writers such as Marx, Apetrei and Drucker66 argue that the idea that AIDS is a zoonosis 
has never been proved and must be seriously questioned.  They concede and acknowledge the simian 
source of HIV but argue that the emergence of the AIDS epidemic is not understood.67  Marx, Apetrei and 
Drucker68 contest the idea of AIDS as a zoonosis on the following grounds: (i) if AIDS was a zoonosis, 
there must be evidence of AIDS being directly acquired from animals; (ii) Despite long-term and frequent 
human exposure to SIV-infected monkeys in Africa, only 11 cross-species transmission events are known, 
and only four of these have resulted in significant human-to-human transmission, generating HIV-1 groups 
M and O and HIV-2 A and B.  SIV, while capable of cross-species transmission, is thus poorly adapted for 
disease and epidemic spread.  If AIDS was a zoonosis that is capable of significant human-to-human 
spread, there should be a plethora of founder subtypes and groups.  (iii) Human exposure to SIV is 
thousands of years old, but AIDS emerged only in the 20th century.  If AIDS was a zoonosis that spread into 
the human population, it would have spread to the West during slave trade.  (iv) Experimental transmission 
of SIVs to different species of monkeys is often well controlled by the new host, showing that the virus and 
not the disease is transmitted.69  They conclude by pointing out that cross-species transmission of SIV does 
not in itself constitute the basis for a zoonosis.  Transmission per se is not the major requirement for the 
generation of the AIDS epidemic.  All HIVs do derive from simian species, but AIDS does not qualify as a 
zoonosis and this explanation cannot in itself account for the origin of AIDS epidemic.  Therefore, AIDS is 
not a zoonosis but a human infectious disease of zoonotic origin.  What is meant by zoonosis is a disease 
like rabies, not AIDS.70  There is no evidence that a person can contract AIDS from a monkey or 
chimpanzee.  There is still a missing link.71   
Marx points out that some experts consider this debate, eg of whether AIDS is a zoonosis or not, as 
semantic and thus of little importance.72  Thus, because every case of human AIDS is acquired from 
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another human being, it cannot be a zoonosis and the discussion could end here.  Yet the underlying 
question of what launches new diseases among humans, including not only AIDS but also avian flu, Ebola 
virus, and severe acquired respiratory syndrome (SARS), is critical to address because it remains 
unanswered.73  While the origin of HIV and the avian influenza virus and some leads on the Ebola and 
SARS viruses are known, the shocking fact is that the factors that launch animal viruses into epidemics, 
pandemics, or result in dead-end infections, are not known.  Further, the ecological events that led SIV to 
become HIV with epidemic potential remain completely unknown.74  It is submitted, in agreement with Marx, 
Apetrei and Drucker above, that AIDS as a disease is not a zoonosis but a human infectious disease of 
zoonotic origin.  This means that it is SIV, the virus that crosses species from monkeys to humans and 
mutates into HIV once in a human body and not AIDS the disease.  As the writers above correctly point out, 
the simian origin of HIV is not disputed, meaning that there is agreement and evidence that HIV originated 
from animals, eg from chimpanzees and monkeys, and that it crossed to humans as SIV.75  However, there 
seems to be no conclusive evidence that AIDS as a disease crossed species from animals to humans and 
therefore, AIDS is not a zoonotic disease.76 
1.1.3 Historical Background from 1981 
The accepted chronology of the pandemic begins in 1981, when the United States Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) published the first reports of unusually high incidences of rare kinds of pneumonia, skin 
cancer and cytomegalovirus infection, all pointing to problems in immune system functioning among gay 
men in California and New York.77  This ‘Gay Related Immune Deficiency Syndrome’ or ‘Grids’ was 
renamed ‘AIDS’ the next year, and the HIV virus underlying the symptoms isolated in 1983.78  In 1981, 
doctors first started to see signs of a new illness amongst gay men in the United States of America.  These 
men had developed unusual conditions, such as a rare chest infection and skin disorders, and special tests 
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showed that their immune systems were damaged.79  By 1982, the Centers for Disease Control established 
the term ‘Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome’ (AIDS).80  
In 1983, French researchers identified a new virus, now known as HIV, as the cause of AIDS.  This type of 
HIV also became known as ‘HIV-1’.81  The researchers who isolated the new retrovirus (which was later 
known as Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) and the cause of AIDS) were Dr. Luc Montagnier in France 
and Dr. Robert Gallo in the United States.82  In 1985, a second type of HIV was identified in sex workers 
from Senegal.  This virus, called ‘HIV-2’, is found mostly in West Africa, and seems to be less easily 
transmitted (passed on) and less harmful than HIV-1.  Scientists have since found out that there are also 
many different strains or subtypes of HIV.  In South Africa, subtype C is most common.  The early cases of 
AIDS were observed in gay men.  After that, major epidemics were seen in another marginalised group, 
injecting drug users, in Western Europe, South East Asia, China and India.83 
1.1.4 Overview of the Pandemic in South Africa 
The first recorded AIDS deaths in South Africa were in 1982, among white gay men.  There were certainly 
cases in the heterosexual population during the 1980s, somewhat later than in East and Central Africa.84 
But at this time, HIV was seen largely as a disease of westerners, white gay men and drug users, non-
African, sexually transgressive ‘others’, though sometimes ‘other’ Africans were also thought responsible.  
AIDS deaths also tended to, as in the early stages of other countries’ epidemics, to be attributed to 
something ‘other’, such as TB, malaria or hunger.85   
In 1992, former president, Nelson Mandela, formed the National AIDS Convention of South Africa, with 
both the two post-apartheid health ministers, Dr Nkosazana Zuma and the late Dr Manto Tshabalala-
Msimang, as members.  By now, heterosexual cases had overtaken those among homosexual men.  In 
1994, the year of the first democratic elections, South Africa’s first community-based HIV organisation, the 
National Association of People Living with AIDS (NAPWA), was formed to fight discrimination and 
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stigmatisation.86 A major shift towards public acceptance of HIV in South Africa happened with the death of 
Gugu Dlamini.  In late 1998, this Durban NAPWA activist was beaten to death by a group of local people, 
including some of her neighbours, shortly after disclosing, on World AIDS Day, that she was HIV positive.  
This murder was nationally and internationally decried.  The former president, Thabo Mbeki stated in 
response the following: ‘It is a terrible story.  We have to treat people who have HIV with care and support, 
and not as if they have an illness that is evil’.87  Just before Dlamini’s murder, Simon Nkoli, a prominent HIV 
activist who had a long history of anti-apartheid and gay and lesbian activism, and was one of the openly 
gay members of the ANC (African National Congress), had died of AIDS.  These two events were followed 
by the establishment at the end of 1998 of the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC).  The TAC, probably the 
most effective HIV organisation in South Africa, was formed by a group including Zackie Achmat, another 
long-term anti-apartheid and lesbian and gay rights activist and long-time ANC member, and other 
activists.88   
By 2003 it was estimated that HIV had infected 5.1 million South Africans.89  Approximately 21.5% of all 
South African adults were said to be infected.90  Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region most severely 
affected by HIV/AIDS with approximately 3.1 million new infections having occurred in 2004 alone.91  This 
brought to 25.4 million the total number of people living with HIV/AIDS in this region.92  Of this number, 57% 
are women.  It is estimated that 2.2 million Sub-Saharan Africans died of AIDS in 2003.93  In this year, it 
was estimated that there were 12.1 million AIDS orphans in Sub-Saharan Africa.94  By 2006 the number of 
people estimated to be living with HIV in South Africa had risen to 5.4 million, of which a total of 294 000 
were children under the age of fourteen.95  These estimates were consistent with those of the Department 
of Health and UNAIDS, which pointed to 5.5 million people living with HIV or AIDS in 2005, of which 235 
000 were children.96  Based on a wide range of data, including household and antenatal studies, 
UNAIDS/WHO in July 2008 published a report indicating an estimate of a 18.1% prevalence amongst those 
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between the ages of 15 and 49 for the end of 2007.97  This implies that by the end of 2007, around 5.7 
million South Africans were living with HIV, which included 280,000 children under the age of fifteen.98   
According to Higher Education HIV and AIDS Programme (HEAIDS),99 HIV and AIDS is a severe national 
problem in South Africa with 5,2 million adults and children estimated to be living with HIV in 2008, 
representing 10,6% of the total population of 47,8 million in 2008.  Of the total population aged 15 years 
and older in 2007 (approximately 32,6 million), 5,4 million people were estimated to be living with HIV, a 
prevalence of 16,5%.100  This falls within the UNAIDS definition of a hyperendemic HIV epidemic.101  It is, 
however, interesting to observe that according to the recent study conducted by HEAIDS in the higher 
education institutions (HEIs), there seems to be a big difference between HIV prevalence at HEIs and the 
general population in South Africa.102  HEAIDS pointed out that:  
 
The most striking finding arising from the HIV prevalence results in this study is that the measured prevalence in the 
combined HEI sector population is substantially lower than found among the general population in South Africa.  While 
the distribution of HIV follows national patterns in terms of sex, race, age group and education, the HIV prevalence is 
lower in higher education population within all these demographic categories.  In summary, the HIV prevalence results 
in the higher education sector are lower than in the general community but the patterns of infection are consistent with 
what has previously been reported.103  All major, community-based HIV prevalence studies conducted in South Africa 
(HSRC and RHRU) have found that overall, more females are HIV positive than males.104   
 
The HIV prevalence of this study were as follows:  Academic staff had the lowest overall HIV prevalence at 
1,5% [CI: 0,9%-2,3%], followed by students at 3,4% [CI: 2,7%-3,4%], administrative staff at 4,4% [CI: 3,2%-
6,0%] and service staff at 12,20% [CI: 9,9%-14,9%].105  It is encouraging to observe that according to, the 
above mentioned, recent study findings of HEAIDS conducted at HEI sector, HIV prevalence is much lower 
than that found in the general population in South Africa.106  It is submitted, however, that the reason for 
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Stud-South Africa 2008-2009 (2010, Pretoria: Higher Education HIV and AIDS Programme) 1. 
100  HEAIDS 1. 
101  See UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS epidemic (2008, Geneva: UNAIDS) 100 cited by HEAIDS at 1, which defines  
a hyperendemic epidemic as a situation where 15% or more ‘adults’ aged 15 years and older are living with HIV. 
102  HEAIDS xviii and 105. 
103  HEAIDS xviii. 
104  HEAIDS 103. 
105  HEAIDS 105. 
106  HEAIDS xviii and 105. 
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this big difference might be attributed to the resources people in the HEIs have as compared to those of the 
general population, especially those in the rural areas.  People in the HEIs have more access to HIV/AIDS 
information and therefore are much better informed about HIV/AIDS than those in the general population.  
As a result they are more knowledgeable about issues of HIV/AIDS prevention, testing, transmission, 
informed consent, etc., and they are more likely to use preventative measures such as, safe sex with the 
use of condoms, than the general population.  In the HEIs, for instance, there are computers (internet 
access), newspapers, workshops, conferences, and regular seminars on HIV/AIDS.  This view is further 
strengthened by the fact that academic staff has the lowest overall prevalence, followed by students and 
the administrative staff.107  Of the four categories, service staff has the highest HIV prevalence.108   
It may be argued that the prevalence for service staff in this study may be a better reflection of the situation 
amongst the general population (especially in the rural communities), that is, of persons with little or no 
access to resources and information regarding HIV/AIDS.  This study points to the meaningful impact of 
service-learning and outreach programmes addressing HIV/AIDs, eg Street Law programmes.109 These 
programmes need to be rolled out in a consistent manner across all HEIs in order to benefit the general 
population and assist in curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS in South Africa.   
It is estimated that in 2010, there were around 1.8 million orphans under the age of 15 in South Africa and 
this number is predicted to rise to over 2.5 million by 2015.110  As HIV/AIDS mainly infects sexually active 
young adults, the people who are dying are primarily the parents of young children.  Approximately 1000 
people die each day of HIV/AIDS-related illnesses, thus creating approximately 450 new orphans daily.111  
South Africa currently holds the position of the country with the highest number of AIDS cases.  If more 
children are orphaned by AIDS, it will create a humanitarian challenge on a scale that no nation has ever 
faced.112  These statistics of AIDS prevalence and the high number of orphans in South Africa are truly 
devastating.  It is for this reason, it will be proposed in this thesis that interventions aimed at reducing the 
spread of HIV be reconsidered.    
                                                          
107  HEAIDS 105. 
108  HEAIDS 105. 
109  Institutions such as for instance the following: University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN), Walter Sisulu University (WSU),  
University of South Africa (UNISA), Fort Hare University (UFH), University of Cape Town (UCT) and others, use Street  
Law and other service-learning and outreach programmes (such as Population Medicine (WSU)), to educate people 
about HIV/AIDS. 
110  Van Vuuren X Making Dreams come True-Noah Currently provides support and care for more than 30 000 AIDS  
orphans in Gauteng and KwaZulu-Natal 1, at http://www.noahorphans.org.za/wp-content/u (visited 05 August 2010). 
111  Van Vuuren 1. 
112  Van Vuuren 1. 
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The review of the origins and history of HIV and AIDS indicate that HIV and AIDS originated from African 
monkeys (chimpanzees and sooty mangabeys) and that these spread from Africa to the rest of the world.113  
HIV has originated a long time ago, as early as 1884,114 much earlier than it was identified in 1980s.115  
This period of silence between 1884 and 1980 might have led to the silent spread of this virus all over the 
world.  However, in South Africa and other countries there are many factors that facilitate the continued 
spread of HIV and AIDS, such as ignorance, stereotypes,116 discrimination, victimisation, stigmatisation, 
amongst others.  In some societies, HIV positive people are treated as outcasts and many die in silence.  In 
the meantime ‘the silent war that kills 1000 a day’ continues.117  For this reason, measures such as making 
HIV and AIDS notifiable diseases, as is the case in Canada,118 for instance, should be considered.   
At present HIV and AIDS are not notifiable119 diseases in South Africa, although in September 1997, the 
then Minister of Health had indicated her intention to make AIDS a notifiable disease. This attempt failed, 
however.120  Indeed, some writers, notably, Karim,121 feel that making AIDS notifiable is inappropriate for 
South Africa.  This topic about whether HIV/AIDS should be made a notifiable disease or not in South 
Africa will be discussed in full detail in chapter 5, below.  South Africa can also learn from other sister 
countries in Africa, such as Uganda.  In 2002 it was reported that Uganda has achieved success in bringing 
the AIDS infection rate down from 30% in 1986 to 6.1% in 2002.122  President, Yoweri Museveni, was 
praised for being the driving force behind the success and in March 2002 he received an award from 
                                                          
113  Jasper 3, Worobey 2008 Nature 661-664, Squire 25, Levay and Valente 571 and Waters 20. 
114  Worobey 2008 Nature 661-664. 
115  Berer and Ray 6, Barret-Grant 11, Squire 25, Harris and Haigh 1, and Osborn 22.  
116   For instance, people who sleep with virgin babies thinking that they will be cured of the disease if they do so.     
117  City Press, 24 August 2008 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “The Silent war that kills 1000 a day”). See, also, Van  
Vuuren 1. 
118  See, Public Health Agency of Canada at http//:wwwpublichealth.gc.ca or http//:www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/../r-eng.php  
(visited 05 August 2010), which states that: “In Canada, AIDS is a notifiable disease.  AIDS is legally notifiable in all 
Canadian provinces and territories.  AIDS is legally notifiable at the provincial or territorial levels.  HIV infection is 
legally notifiable at the provincial and territorial levels in all Canadian provinces and territories, except British Columbia.  
AIDS and HIV data are shared with the Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention Control (CIDPC) at the federal level 
by provinces and territories.”   
119  See, National Health Act 61 of 2003, Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases (No R 27 GG 25 January 2008)  
that do not list HIV or AIDS as Annexure 1 communicable diseases.  See, also Van Rensburg HCJ, Fourie A and 
Pretorius E Health Care in South Africa: Structure and Dynamics (1992, Pretoria: Academica) 177, who also do not list 
HIV or AIDS as compulsory notifiable medical conditions. 
120  Karim SSA “Making AIDS a Notifiable Disease-Is it an Appropriate Policy for South Africa?” 1999 (89;6) SAMJ 609. 
121  Karim 1999 SAMJ 611. 
122  See, Crisp T “Uganda’s AIDS Success” 2002 Nursing Update 31.   
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Commonwealth for his leadership role in this achievement.  A multi-tiered approach has been adopted by 
the president.123  South Africa can certainly learn from Uganda’s success in this regard.  
1.1.5 Definition of HIV and AIDS 
1.1.5.1 HIV 
HIV has been defined in many ways but what seems to be clear is that it is the virus that causes AIDS.  
Barret-Grant124 defines HIV as: 
HIV is a virus that is only found in human beings, and attacks and slowly damages the body’s immune system (its 
defence against infections and diseases).  HIV causes AIDS.  HIV severely damages a person’s immune system, so 
that the body can no longer fight off infections and other diseases.  When this happens, you get a group of particular 
medical conditions called ‘AIDS-defining conditions or illnesses’ and we say that you have developed Acquired 
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).   
 
There was once confusion in South Africa whether HIV causes AIDS and that confusion was made worse 
by the fact that the former president, Thabo Mbeki, also publicly questioned the link between HIV and 
AIDS.125  Today, however, it seems to be clear to every South African that HIV causes AIDS. 
1.1.5.2 AIDS 
AIDS refers to the acquired immune deficiency syndrome.126  An immune deficiency syndrome means that 
the immune system is being prevented from functioning.  A syndrome is a group of symptoms or illnesses 
originating from one cause, in this case HIV.127  If HIV reduces immune function to a certain level, and or 
                                                          
123  Crisp 2002 Nursing Update 31.  Crisp states that: “The first is to acknowledge the enemy.  The second is to sound the  
alarm and to give all leaders, from all walks of life in Uganda a direction and understanding of the causes and effects 
so that all speak with one voice.  No contradictions.  The next step is to identify and address pre-conceived notions 
about the scourge.  It is not divine punishment? It is not anger from ancestral gods? It is not witchcraft?  They then 
embarked on action to dispel these myths.  Prominent persons who suffer were encouraged to talk about how they 
became infected.  The president identified the problem in 1986.  The awareness process was started, and the decline 
in infection was noticed in 1997.  At the end of July 2002 the Americans announced their intention to follow the Uganda 
example”.  If Americans would like to follow this example, South Africa should follow suit.  
124  Barret-Grant 10.  See, also McQuoid-Mason 1, who states that: “The word ‘HIV’ means the ‘Human Immunodeficiency  
Virus’ that attacks the immune system of human beings.  The immune system is the part of the body that protects 
humans against infections and diseases.  Once the immune system is attacked the body is gradually weakened and 
becomes easily infected with other viruses, bacteria and diseases”. 
125  Barret-Grant 37.  Today there is a debate which has been started by the Young Communist League that ‘Thabo Mbeki  
and his health minister should be charged with genocide’.  See, Daily Dispatch, Wednesday, November 25, 2009 page 
9, that has an article by Frans Cronje, “Mbeki and the charges of genocide”.  Cronje argues that: “The former President 
is morally but perhaps not criminally liable for AIDS deaths”.  In fact, as Cronje puts it: “It was presumably not Mbeki’s 
intent to kill hundreds of thousands of people but in this case the absence of intent does not alter the fact that the 
consequences of his negligence and indifference were foreseeable”.   
126  Berer and Ray 8. 
127  Berer and Ray 8. 
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when one or more serious illnesses related to HIV occurs, a person is said to have AIDS.  Immune function 
can be measured by testing for the number of T4 cells (also called CD4+ lymphocytes) in the blood.128  
Immune function is considered to be at an advanced stage of impairment when this count goes below 200 
per cubic millimetres of blood.129  Foreman130 defines AIDS as the term which is used to refer to the 
physical condition resulting from infection by HIV.  HIV slowly disables an important part of the body’s 
immune system by invading T-helper lymphocytes and macrophages cells in the bloodstream which 
normally help protect the body from attack from infection.131  AIDS, therefore, can be said to be a collection 
of diseases which explains why it is referred to as a ‘syndrome’.  When a person dies of AIDS, one of these 
opportunistic diseases will be responsible for his or her death.       
 
1.2 PURPOSE, PROBLEM STATEMENT AND MOTIVATION 
 
This thesis seeks to explore the right to confidentiality132 in the context of HIV/AIDS through an 
interdisciplinary lens.  This study indicates that whilst the right to confidentiality is important and indeed 
should be preserved in order to protect persons living with HIV/AIDS against stigmatisation, discrimination 
and victimisation, the protection of public health requires specific interventions to curb the further spread of 
the disease, which may include partner notification and criminalising the intentional infection others with 
HIV.   
As the consideration of the legal issues cannot be divorced from the social context in which HIV/AIDS plays 
out in South African communities, the study will examine the difficulties faced by persons living with 
HIV/AIDS, such as discrimination, stigmatisation and victimisation.133   The study also traces some of the 
                                                          
128  Berer and Ray 8. 
129  Berer and Ray 8.  See, also, Byer and Shainberg 164, who concur with this by stating that ‘an HIV infection is defined  
as a case of AIDS when the count of T4 lymphocytes, destroyed by HIV, drops below 200 per microliter (cubic 
millimeter) of blood.  McQuoid-Mason 1, also, defines AIDS as standing for the acquired immune deficiency syndrome.  
This occurs where the HIV has so weakened the body that it can no longer defend itself against certain infections and 
diseases that are known as ‘AIDS-defining conditions or illnesses’ (e.g. severe diarrhoea, severe weight loss, severe 
pneumonia, brain infections, confusion and memory loss, severe skin rashes and pain and difficulty in swallowing).  
When a person suffers from this group of infections and diseases he or she is said to have developed AIDS.   
130  Foreman M, et. al Panos Dossier, The Third Epidemic, Repercussions of the Fear of Aids (1990, Budapest-London- 
Paris-Washington: The Panos Institute) 1. 
131  Foreman 1. 
132  The right to confidentiality is derived from the right to privacy that is granted by section 14 of the Constitution of 1996.   
This right will be discussed in detail in following chapters. 
133  See, Gostin 8, who states that: “Two ‘rights’ issues were especially important in the civil rights and human rights  
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difficulties faced by families caring for a person living with HIV.  According to the American Psychiatric 
Association,134 “[t]he AIDS epidemic presents potential conflicts between the rights of infected individuals 
and public interest in containing HIV disease.”  The duty to preserve patient confidentiality may conflict with 
the need to inform past and present contacts of an HIV-infected patient of possible exposure to the virus”.   
The study aims to show that any legal interventions aimed at curbing the spread of HIV will need to be 
mindful of intricate social and economic forces that impact on the duty to disclose a positive HIV-status. 
Insights gained from philosophical theories relating to Africanism, individualism, communitarianism and 
utilitarianism are valuable in facilitating a clearer understanding of these social and related factors that keep 
South African society locked in the present stalemate with regard to the disclosure of a positive HIV-status. 
In order to achieve the above aim, the starting point of this study will be a review of the current legal 
framework relating to confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. Relevant international and 
foreign law comparisons will be drawn. The aim will also be to identify the challenges relating to the right to 
confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS and how this right may be justifiably limited in order to protect 
public health.  The thesis will conclude by proposing recommendations and solutions that will seek to 
ensure that whilst confidentiality is respected, culturally and socially responsible legal interventions are 
made to address the spread of HIV. The right to confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS has many 
implications for persons living with the disease. 135  It means, for instance, that a person diagnosed with HIV 
or AIDS has a right to disclose or refuse to disclose his or her HIV-status. The classical liberal notion of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
movements, privacy and antidiscrimination.  Because persons living with HIV/AIDS experienced stigma and ostracism, 
they strove to keep their health status private.  Unauthorised disclosures not only revealed the person’s health status 
but also generated speculation as to his sexual orientation or use of injection drugs.  Invasions of privacy could have 
serious and enduring consequences, alienation from family or friends, loss of care or support and discrimination in 
employment, housing and public accommodation.”  See, also, The World Bank Averting AIDS Crises in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia-A Regional Support Strategy (2003, Washington DC: The World Bank) 127, which states that: 
“The problem is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of people affected by HIV/AIDS belong to groups that are 
marginalised.  The primary groups affected by HIV/AIDS, injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and inmates 
have limited access to community service infrastructure.” See also the following cases: Jansen van Vuuren and 
Another v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (A), Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) and NM v Smith 
2007 JDR 0231 (CC).  These cases will be fully discussed under chapters 2 and 3 below.  
134   See, American Psychiatric Association, Confidentiality, Disclosure and Protection of Others: Position Statement (2003:  
APA Document Reference No. 200302) 1. 
135  Cameron E Confidentiality (Revised Second 2nd Draft) (1999, Lawyers Collective HIV/AIDS Unit: Judges’ Workshop 
Mumbai 7-8 January 1999) 51.  Cameron highlighted some of the problems created by the right to confidentiality by 
saying that: “Despite the apparent strength of the doctrine in South Africa, the very concept of confidentiality has come 
under attack for a second reason, less directly related to the dispute about its practical application in relation to 
another's 'right to know'.  The second line of controversy concerns the cultural origins of the concept and the 
appropriateness of applying it in South Africa in the midst of an epidemic which has taken a very different form, in 
much less affluent social circumstances to that in North America and Western Europe....This has led to calls for a 
'shared confidentiality', as opposed to rigidly, individualised confidentiality, to be applied in Africa.” 
20 
 
confidentiality and privacy from an individualised perspective should also be reviewed in the context of HIV 
and AIDS. 
As stated, one possible limitation is to introduce legislative measure to make HIV and AIDS notifiable 
diseases as is the case in Canada and the United States of America. Other limitations are the compulsory 
HIV testing; pre-marital HIV testing and partner notification laws in order to protect health of spouses and 
partners.136  In this regard, the study will briefly turn to disclosure and confidentiality in consensual sexual 
relationships, including traditional African marriages.  Mswela137 correctly observes that the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic in South Africa is mainly regarded a heterosexual epidemic.  There are many factors, therefore, 
that put women at increased risk of becoming infected with HIV, such as domestic violence, biological, 
psychological, economical and cultural practices (such as polygamy).138  Therefore, a discussion of socio-
cultural issues, such as traditional attitudes, including a discussion of the role of women and their ability to 
insist on, for example, fidelity and condom use will be made.139   
The right to confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS is closely interwoven with other fundamental rights.  
These rights include, but are not limited to the following rights: human dignity, life, equality, freedom and 
security of the person, labour relations, environment, health care, food, water and social security, and 
education.  If a person’s right to confidentiality is violated by an unauthorised disclosure, for instance, his or 
her rights to human dignity, life, equality, health care and freedom and security of the person are possibly 
violated. This study will not focus on these related fundamental rights. 
 There is a wealth of literature on the right to privacy and the protection of confidentiality generally.140  The 
context of HIV/AIDS is unique in South Africa, as the protection of these legal interests has to be explained 
and examined against the background of relevant cultural and socio-economic factors. Questions that 
arise, for example, are why some infected individuals continue to spread the disease by sleeping around 
                                                          
136  Bobinski MA and LeMaistre WS “HIV Testing and Confidentiality” in Strama BT (ed) AIDS and Governmental Liability 
(1993, United States of America: American Bar Association) 29.   
137  Mswela MM HIV/AIDS and The Role of Gender Inequality and Violence in South African Law (Unpublished LLM  
dissertation Unisa 2009) 9.   
138  Mswela LLM dissertation 10-11. 
139  Mswela LLM dissertation 11. 
140  See, for instance, the following authors who have written extensively about the right to confidentiality, privacy and 
HIV/AIDS: Cameron 51, Jasper 2, Edwards P. Richards III “HIV Testing, Screening and Confidentiality: An American 
Perspective” in Bennet R and Erin CA (eds) HIV and AIDS Testing, Screening, and Confidentiality (1999, Oxford; New 
York: Oxford University Press), American Medical Association Patient Confidentiality (1998, American Medical 
Association) found at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/4610.html (visited 08 November 2009), Bobinski and 
LeMaistre 29.    
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whilst knowing that they may infect other parties.141  Others rape infants or girl children by claiming that 
they will be cured of the disease if they sleep with virgins.142  Others rape their own daughters and 
students, infecting them with HIV in the process.143   
Nelson Mandela once wrote: “Aids today in Africa is claiming more lives than the sum total of all wars, 
famines and floods and the ravages of such deadly diseases as malaria.  We must act now for the sake of 
the world….AIDS is no longer a disease, it is a human rights issue”.144   
 
1.3 HYPOTHESIS 
 
The right to privacy (and corollary confidentiality) are important in protecting persons who live with HIV and 
AIDS against discrimination, violence, victimisation and stigmatisation.  It will be argued and submitted that 
whilst this right must be protected, however, there appears to be an overemphasis on confidentiality at the 
cost of other equally important interests.  The consequences of keeping one’s HIV-status undisclosed are 
obvious. Disclosure on the other hand, which may have the positive effect of protecting third parties from 
potential infection, is unfortunately associated with cruel stereotypes, myths, stigma, victimisation and 
discrimination.145  A report by the World Bank points out that it is difficult to raise awareness or build 
consensus on an issue that cannot be discussed openly.146  In African states, including South Africa, 
confidentiality about a person's HIV status, even after the death of the person, perpetuates beliefs of 
                                                          
141  The story of the councillor which is reported in the Sunday Times of 15 April 2007 page 1 is an example of how  
confidentiality of HIV-positive status may facilitate the spread of HIV/AIDS further in South Africa.  (The paper depicted 
this as “HIV-positive councillor in hot water”).   The paper reported that the woman who was allegedly deliberately 
infected by her lover with HIV said she went to the police to stop him from spreading the virus, after he allegedly told 
her that he would infect other women because it was a woman who had infected him.  She said she got confirmation of 
his HIV status in June last year, after stumbling upon a document that showed his test results.  She claimed that when 
she confronted him he initially told her he had withheld this information out of fear that she would dump him.  See also 
Mswela LLM dissertation 10-11. 
142  See, Daily Dispatch, September 15, 2005 page 15.   (This paper depicted this as “Dispelling the virgin rape myth”).  It  
reported that: “In February 2003, an HIV positive Potchefstroom man was sentenced to life imprisonment.  He was 
perhaps the first person to have admitted raping a child to cleanse himself of HIV”. 
143  See, Daily Sun, Thursday 7 December 2006 page 1 that depicted that: “Deadly Dad! HIV man who raped and infected  
his own daughter may be up for attempted murder”.  See, also, Daily Dispatch, Wednesday September 2 2009 page 1  
that stated that: “Teacher held for pupil’s rape”. 
144  See, http://www.southafrica.info/mandela/mandel...(25 November 2009).  See also Mtunuse TP “HIV/AIDS as a  
Human Rights Issue” 2009 WSU Law Journal 60.  (This is not an accredited journal). 
145  The World Bank 127, states that: “One reason societies are slow to come to grips with the HIV/AIDS crisis is that many  
aspects of the problem are considered taboo or are frowned on by the large segments of the population.” 
146  The World Bank 127. 
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witchcraft amongst Africans, since people do not know the real cause of the death of the person. In the 
absence of clear facts, they speculate that he or she may have been bewitched and this sometimes leads 
to the killing of innocent people who are accused to be witches.   
It will, therefore, be proposed that emphasis on the right to privacy (and confidentiality) should be balanced 
by encouraging disclosure of HIV status so as to lessen the stigma and myths about AIDS.  The more 
people are willing to disclose their HIV status, the better and more effective AIDS awareness will become 
and this will eventually lead to less stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation of persons living with 
HIV/AIDS. However, in order to reach the position where HIV disclosure may be made without fear, difficult 
social and cultural obstacles (such as erroneous perceptions or myths) will need to be overcome. 
Legislative measures aimed at reducing the spread of HIV should hence be cognisant of these cultural and 
socio-economic forces that reinforce the present unsatisfactory status quo regarding disclosure of a 
positive HIV-status.  
This thesis draws on appropriate philosophical theories that will assist in providing a better understanding 
of confidentiality from an African point of view, one which is more aligned with African thoughts and 
practices generally. 
 
1.4 CHOICE OF LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
Where relevant, the thesis will draw comparisons to relevant foreign legal systems, particularly those who 
are frequently consulted when fundamental rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
are interpreted.  These legal systems, in addition, have unique ways of dealing with specific issues, such as 
partner notification and the criminalisation of intentional HIV transmission. 
1.4.1 South Africa 
This thesis will review current legislation case law and other relevant materials relating to the right to 
confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS.  The purpose of this review will be to identify the weaknesses 
relating to the protection of the right to privacy (and confidentiality) in the context of HIV and AIDS.  The 
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South African Constitution147 entrenches the right to privacy which is contained in section 14 of the 
Constitution. This section provides that everyone has the right to privacy.148  The South African 
Constitution, like the United States Constitution, guarantees everyone, including persons living with 
HIV/AIDS, the constitutional right to privacy.149  Implied in the right to privacy is the right to confidentiality.  
The right to confidentiality is further entrenched in the National Health Act.150  The right to privacy, including 
confidentiality, will be examined and compared to foreign provisions in order to determine which inferences 
may be drawn for the South African context relating to HIV and AIDS. 
1.4.2 Canada 
Canada is one of a number of countries where HIV and AIDS are notifiable diseases.  AIDS, for instance, is 
legally notifiable in all Canadian provinces and territories.  HIV infection is legally notifiable at the provincial 
and territorial levels in all Canadian provinces and territories, (except British Columbia).  AIDS and HIV data 
are shared with the Centre for Infectious Disease Prevention Control (CIDPC) at the federal level by 
provinces and territories.151  Canada’s experience will briefly be considered in the discussion on whether 
HIV and AIDS should be made notifiable diseases in South Africa. 
1.4.3 United States 
The legal system of the United States of America is another legal system that endorses the legal 
notification of HIV/AIDS. According to Bobinski and LeMaistre:152  
Statutes governing AIDS/HIV information, including requirements for reporting information about the person infected to 
health authorities, vary from state to state.  Florida requires full reporting information (name, address, sex, age and 
race) of AIDS or AIDS-related complex, an AIDS-like syndrome, but prohibits the reporting of HIV infection by name, 
address or identifying numbers or symbols.  Colorado requires attending physicians and laboratories to report fully to 
the state or local health departments any ‘diagnosis of AIDS, HIV-related illness, or HIV infection, including death from 
HIV infection’.  Other States go beyond requiring the reporting of HIV/AIDS.  Minnesota extends the requirements to 
the reporting of any person who may be a ‘health threat to others’ and Georgia requires the reporting of any other 
person the physician or administrator reasonably believes to be at risk of being infected.   
                                                          
147  The Constitution of 1996. 
148    Which includes the right not to have (a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their 
possessions seized; or the privacy their communications infringed. 
149  Which is entrenched, as above mentioned, by section 14 of the Constitution.  See Tshabalala-Msimang and Another v  
Makhanya and Others (18656/07) [2007] ZAGPHC 161 (WLD) (herafter referred to as the Tshabalala-Msimang case) 
paragraph [27], where the  right to confidentiality  was emphasized by the court. 
150  National Health Act 61 of 2003. Where section 14 provides that: (1) all information concerning a user, including  
information relating to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment, is confidential.   
151  See, Public Health Agency of Canada at http//:wwwpublichealth.gc.ca or http//:www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/../r-eng.php  
(Visited 5 August 2010). 
152  Bobinski and LeMaistre 24. 
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Both Canada and the United States provide an interesting point of comparison for South Africa with regard 
to making HIV and AIDS notifiable diseases. Care should be taken, however, not to make 
recommendations, based on foreign inferences, which will not be socially and culturally appropriate or 
relevant for South Africa. 
 
1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Historical Background 
Chapter one will trace the origins and spreading of HIV and AIDS around the world.  It will also include an 
overview of HIV/AIDS epidemic in South Africa.  The purpose, problem statement and motivation are 
described, as well as the research approach and the methodology. 
Chapter 2 
Stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation of persons living with HIV/AIDS and the emphasis 
on confidentiality 
This chapter focuses on the discrimination, stigmatisation and victimisation of persons living with HIV/AIDS 
and the emphasis on confidentiality.  The discussion on discrimination considers discrimination in the 
family, by the family, at school, in the employment context; health context; restrictions on travel and finally, 
discrimination by insurance companies and government. This chapter outlines the reasons that prevent 
persons living with HIV/AIDS from disclosing their HIV-status.   
Chapter 3 
The right to privacy and confidentiality 
The right to privacy, which includes confidentiality, as accorded by section 14 of the Constitution153 and 
section 14 of the National Health Act154, in so far as they pertain to persons living with HIV and AIDS, will 
                                                          
153    The Constitution of 1996. 
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be discussed in this chapter.  The protection of privacy in terms of the common law will also be discussed.  
Confidentiality as protected by ethical guidelines (eg the SAHPC and SAMA newest 2007 versions), the 
Oath of Hippocrates and other relevant instruments will be discussed in this chapter.  This chapter will also 
review the effectiveness of these measures on the management of HIV and AIDS generally, as well as in 
consensual sexual relations. The protection of confidentiality after death is also explored. 
Chapter 4 
The limitation of the right to privacy and medical confidentiality 
This chapter addresses the limitations of the right to privacy (and confidentiality) in terms of section 36 of 
the Constitution. Relevant provisions of the National Health Act and regulations, Children’s Act, as well as 
other statutes that relate to HIV and AIDS, are discussed in this chapter. The duty to inform third parties of 
a person’s HIV status is discussed. The question whether the duty to disclose is an ethical or legal one, is 
also canvassed. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the criminalisation of intentional HIV 
transmission.  
Chapter 5 
Individualism versus utilitarianism and communitarianism 
Chapter five will examine some of the philosophical theories relating to Africanism, individualism, 
utilitarianism and communitarianism in the context of privacy and confidentiality. It is proposed that a 
consideration of these theories is relevant to counter the focus on the individualistic and Western notion of 
privacy. Chapter five also explores the issue of HIV and AIDs notification and whether this is viable in the 
South African context. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
In this final chapter, certain conclusions and recommendations are made, based on observations and 
interpretations that were made in the preceding chapters.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
154    National Health Act 61 of 2003, which states at s14(1), that: ‘All information concerning a user, including  
information to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment, is confidential’. 
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1.6 RESEARCH APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.6.1 Research methodology 
The research method of this thesis is a literature study, which will be a critical review of existing literature 
concerning the topic.  The literature study to be undertaken will be a review of books, legislations, cases, 
journals, newspapers and relevant internet sources.   The study will include a comparative component, 
which will examine the right to confidentiality from the perspective of the United States and Canada.  
1.6.2 Explanatory note on source referencing and bibliography 
 The first textbook reference is cited in full: e.g. Author, Initial(s), Title of source (publishing date, 
place of publishing: Publisher’s name) page number, for example Squire C HIV in South Africa 
(2007, London and New York: Routledge) 25.  Thereafter, only the author’s name and page 
number are stated in the subsequent citing, for example, Squire 25.  In some publications, 
however, the place of publishing is not specified, in such instances therefore only the publishers 
name will be mentioned.   
 In the Bibliography at the end of the thesis, a full citation of the textbooks will be given, but it will 
end with the year of publication, for example Squire C HIV in South Africa (Routledge London and 
New York 2007).   
 In the footnotes and in the bibliography, the name of a single author will be listed as it is with 
initials, for two or three authors all their names will be listed, but for more than three authors only 
the name of the first author will be listed, followed by et al.  For example Squire C HIV in South 
Africa (2007, London and New York: Routledge) 25 (single author), Ellison G, Melissa P and 
Campbell C Learning from HIV and AIDS (2003, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 47 (two 
or three authors) and Barret-Grant K et al HIV/AIDS and the Law - A Resource Manual (2001, 
The AIDS Law Project and The AIDS Legal Network) 11 (more than three authors).  
 The title of reference of textbooks both in the footnotes and bibliography is written in italics, for 
example Squire C HIV in South Africa (Routledge London and New York 2007). 
 The title of reference of journals, both in the footnotes and in the bibliography, will not be in italics, 
however, it will be placed between double inverted comas and the title of the journal, which will 
either be a full name or abbreviations, will be provided in italics both in the footnotes and in the 
bibliography, for example, Bayer R and Fairchild AL “Changing the paradigm for HIV testing-end of 
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exceptionalism” 2006 (355;7) N Engl J Med 647-649.  Where abbreviations have been used, the 
full names of the journal will be provided in the table of contents.  
 Case names in the main text and footnotes are written in italics, e.g. Tshabalala-Msimang and 
Another v Makhanya and Others (full citation for the first time).  The Tshabalala-Msimang case 
(short citation for the second time). 
 In the internet references, the full web address is given and the date when the website was visited. 
 The citation of sources are given as follows: 
 Textbook, for the first time citation: Squire C HIV in South Africa (2007, London and New York: 
Routledge) 25.  Second citation:  Squire 25. 
 Publication in an edited book, citation for the first time: Campbell C and Gibbs A “Stigma, Gender 
and HIV: Case Studies Inter-sectionality” in Boesten J and Poku NK (eds) Gender and HIV/AIDS-
Critical Perspectives from the Developing World (2009, England and USA: ASHGATE) 30.  Second 
citation:   Campbell and Gibbs in Gender and HIV/AIDS-Critical Perspectives from the Developing 
World 30. 
 Theses and dissertations, first time citation: Terblanche-Smit M The Impact of Fear Appeal 
Advertising on Disposition Formation in HIV/AIDS Related Communication (Unpublished PhD 
dissertation, Stellenbosch University 2008) 165.  Second time citation: Terblanche-Smit PhD 
dissertation 165. 
 Journal article citation for the first time: Bayer R and Fairchild AL “Changing the paradigm for HIV 
testing-end of exceptionalism” 2006 (355;7) N Engl J Med 647-649, 648 (Reference in brackets is 
for the volume and issue).  Citation for the second time: Bayer and Fairchild 2006 N ENGL J MED 
648. 
 South African cases, first time citation:  Jansen van Vuuren and Another v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 
842F-G (AD).  Second time citation: The Van Vuuren case at 848A.  First time citation of a South 
African case which has paragraphs: Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) 
(hereafter) paragraph [28].  Second citation of a case with paragraphs: The Hoffman case, 
paragraph [29]. 
 Foreign cases, first citation:  C v C (1946) 1 ALL ER 562.  Second citation: The C v C case.   
Foreign cases with paragraphs, first citation:  Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) 
paragraph [1].  Second citation: The Griswold case, paragraph [2]. 
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 South African statutes, cited for the first time: The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 
108 of 1996.  Second citation: The Constitution of 1996. 
 International instruments, citation for the first time: United Nations Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights Resolution 217 of 1948.  Second time citation: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. 
 Citation of websites, for the first time: DeCew J Privacy http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 
August 2011).  Second time citation: DeCew http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 
2011).  
 The bibliography will be a compilation of all the sources cited in full in the footnotes.  Cases and 
statutes, however, will be listed separately.    
 Short quotations in the main text and in the footnotes are placed between double inverted commas.  
Single quotations are use only to highlight certain terms and where the citation was taken from 
another source.  Long quotations of more than three sentences are indented and inverted commas 
are not used. 
  
1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The right to privacy (and impliedly confidentiality) is of crucial importance to persons living with HIV and 
AIDS.  Violence, stigma, discrimination, victimisation and ostracism characterise the lives of many South 
Africans living with HIV and AIDS.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
STIGMATISATION, DISCRIMINATION AND VICTIMISATION OF PEOPLE LIVING WITH HIV/AIDS AND THE 
EMPHASIS ON CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
HIV/AIDS has a stigma attached to it.1  In fact, HIV/AIDS may be described as the most stigmatised medical 
condition in the world.2  This stigma often leads to discrimination and victimisation of persons living with 
HIV/AIDS by the society.  The causes of this stigma have mainly being attributed to ignorance about HIV/AIDS 
and prejudice.3  Prejudice regarding AIDS directly and indirectly contributed in making a very challenging 
                                                          
1  Inoue Y et al “Sexual activities and social relationships of people with HIV in Japan” 2004 (16;3) AIDS Care 349- 
363 at 349 point out that HIV infection has social aspects such as stigma and these may greatly affect the social 
relationships of people with HIV.  For example, expectation of, and anxiety over, discrimination leads to hiding of the disease 
as a stigma-coping response, increased cautiousness and wariness, and prevention of the formation of support networks, 
and these in turn reinforce internalisation of stigma, development of felt-stigma and self-restriction of daily activities.  In 
addition, these aspects of the illness experience have been suggested to have major effects on quality of life.  Timberg C In 
South Africa, Stigma Magnifies Pain of AIDS: Many Still see Disease as Fatal, Shameful http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A7822-2005Jan13.html (visited 19 May 2010), relates the story of Sibusiso Mlangeni, who the very moment he 
learned he had contracted HIV, claimed he experienced his first taste of the stigma associated with HIV.  Mlangeni was 
scolded by the nurse at the AIDS clinic: ‘You’ve been messing around and you are HIV-positive.’  See also Paxton et al 
“AIDS-related discrimination in Asia” 2005 (17;4) AIDS Care 413-424, 413, Hamra M et al “The relationship between 
expressed HIV/AIDS-related stigma and beliefs and knowledge about care and support of people living with AIDS in families 
caring for HIV-infected children in Kenya” 2005 (17;7) AIDS Care 911-922, 912, Fife BL and Wright ER “The dimensionality 
of stigma: A comparison of its impact on the self of persons with HIV/AIDS and cancer” 2000 (41) Journal of Health and 
Social Behaviour 50-67, 50, Kalichman SC and Simbayi L “Traditional beliefs about the cause of AIDS and AIDS-related 
stigma in South Africa” 2004 (16;5) AIDS Care 572-580, 572, Burkholder GJ et al “Social stigma, HIV/AIDS knowledge, and 
sexual risk” 1999 (4;1) Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research 27-44, 28, Mbilinyi AJ Protection Against Unfair Dismissal 
of Employees Living with HIV/AIDS in the Workplace: A Comparative Study (Unpublished LLM dissertation UNISA 2009) 5, 
Terblanche-Smit M The Impact of Fear Appeal Advertising on Disposition Formation in HIV/AIDS Related Communication 
(unpublished PhD dissertation Stellenbosch University 2008) 165 and Green G “Stigma and Social Relationships of People 
with HIV: Does Gender Make a Difference?” in Sherr L, Hankins C and Bennet L (eds) AIDS as a Gender Issue: 
Psychological Perspectives (1996, London: Taylor & Francis) 46.   
2  Leickness C et al “Internalised stigma, discrimination, and depression among men and women living with  
HIV/AIDS in Cape Town, South Africa” 2007 (64) Social Science & Medicine 1823-1831, 1823 and Bootes v Eagle Ink 
Systems KZ Natal (Pty) Limited [2007] ZALC 52 (LC) (herafter referred to as the Bootes case) paragraph [71].  
3  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 section 1(1.4) of the Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS  
and Employment, recognises that: “HIV/AIDS is still a disease surrounded by ignorance, prejudice, discrimination and 
stigma”.  See also Mbonu NC, Van den Borne B and De Vries NK “Stigma of people with HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa: A 
literature review” 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 1-14, 2, Okechukwu K “The impact of stigma on the prevention of 
HIV/AIDS” 2007 (9;1) Benin Journal of Postgraduate medicine 64-66, 64, Herek GM “Thinking about AIDS and stigma: A 
psychologist’s perspective” 2002 (30) HeinOnline J.L. Med. & Ethics 594-607, 594, Hamra 2005 AIDS Care 912, Kalichman 
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situation truly catastrophic.4  In many societies, especially in the rural areas and townships, people are still 
ignorant about how HIV is transmitted from one person to another, and as a result people do not understand that 
a person cannot get HIV by touching, hugging or using a bath that was used by someone who is HIV positive.5   
The association of HIV/AIDS with sexual behaviour and with the previously ostracised groups such as 
homosexuals, pre-and extramarital sex, sex workers and injecting drug users has also perpetrated stigma and 
discrimination.6  This means that education and awareness about HIV/AIDS still remains an important issue.  
Stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation have driven many persons living with HIV and AIDS to keep their 
HIV status confidential in fear of the social consequences if they disclose their status.7  This chapter will, 
therefore, discuss in detail about stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation of people living with HIV/AIDS 
with the emphasis on confidentiality.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
and Simbayi 2004 AIDS Care 573, Visser MJ et al “HIV/AIDS stigma in a South African community” 2009 (21;2) AIDS Care 
197-206, 197, Terblanche-Smit PhD dissertation 154 and Hoffman v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA 1 (CC) (herafter the 
Hoffman case) paragraphs [28-29]. 
4  Mugyenyi P Genocide by Denial: How Profiteering from HIV/AIDS Killed Millions (2008, Kampala: Fountain  
Publishers) 113. 
5  See Timberg http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7822-2005Jan13.html (visited 19 May 2010), who  
tells the story of Sibusiso Mlangeni of Soweto, South Africa, who soon after being diagnosed of HIV was given his own set of 
dishes, a crude but common reaction from families under the false impression that HIV can spread through casual contact.  
Mlangeni, a volunteer at a hospice in the sprawling township outside Johannesburg said: “I had my own special plate, my 
own special cup, my own special blanket, everything.” 
6  Greene et al Privacy and Disclosure of HIV in Interpersonal Relationships: A Source Book for Researchers and  
Practitioners (2003, Mahwah, New Jersey and London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers) 38, state that: “[i]n the 
minds of many people in North America, HIV is strongly associated with homosexuality and drug use.  Negative attitudes 
about homosexuality may lead those not infected with HIV to see the disease as a by-product of socially unacceptable 
behaviour or as ‘God’s punishment’ for homosexuality.” Zaccagnini M Stigma, discrimination and attitudes to HIV & AIDS 
http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010) also points out that AIDS stigma and discrimination occur 
alongside other forms of stigma and discrimination, such as racism, homophobia, or misogyny and can be directed towards 
those involved in what are considered socially unacceptable activities such as prostitution or drug use.  See also Khoat DV et 
al “A situational analysis of HIV/AIDS-related discrimination in Hanoi, Vietnam” 2005 (17;2) AIDS Care S181-S193, S181, 
Leickness 2007 Social Science & Medicine 1823-24, Burkholder 1999 Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research 27-8, 
Visser 2009 AIDS Care 197, Patterson D & London L “International law, human rights and HIV/AIDS” 2002 (80;12) Bulletin of 
the World Health Organisation 964-969, 964, Vasquez J Human Rights & Health: Persons Living with HIV/AIDS (2008, Pan 
American Organisation) 2, Gostin LO and Webber DW “Discrimination based on HIV/AIDS and other conditions: ‘Disability’ 
as defined under Federal and state law” 2000 (3) HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 266-329, 270,  HIV/AIDS and the 
World of Work (Report IV(1) of the International Labour Conference, International Labour Office Geneva, 98th Session, Article 
108 (2009)) (hereafter referred to as International Labour Conference 2009), Green 47 and Kiyutin v Russia (Application No. 
2700/10) 10 March 2011 (herafter referred to as the Kiyutin case), paragraph [69]. 
7  Terblanche-Smit 2008 PhD dissertation 165. 
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2.2 STIGMATISATION 
 
Stigma has been defined in many ways and seems to have been as old as mankind.  Etymologically, the 
concept of ‘stigma’ derives from a Greek word referring to a tattoo mark.8  It generally has two meanings, of 
which the first one originated from Christianity, meaning bodily marks which resemble those of the crucifixion of 
Jesus Christ and which are attributed to divine favour.9  The second meaning is secular, namely marks of 
disgrace, discredit, or infamy.10  In these days, stigma is applied more to refer to social disgrace than to any 
bodily signs.11  Stigma, therefore, is generally recognised as an attribute that is deeply discrediting that reduces 
the bearer from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one.12   
Stigma is also used to set the affected persons or groups apart from the normalised social order and this 
separation implies devaluation.  The HIV stigma, itself, is shaped not only by individual perceptions and 
interpretations of micro-level interactions but also by larger social and economic forces.13  It is a social construct, 
which has significant impact on the life experiences of individuals both infected and affected by HIV.  Stigma 
includes prejudice and can lead to active discrimination directed toward persons either perceived to be or 
actually infected with HIV and the social groups and persons with whom they are associated.14  Stigma can be 
                                                          
8  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine  2.  Herek 2002 HeinOnline J.L. Med. &  
Ethics 594, points out that the English usage of ‘stigma’ dates back at least to the 1300s.  The term derives from the same 
Greek roots as the verb ‘to stick,’ that is, to pierce or tattoo.  See also The Southern Africa HIV & AIDS Information 
Dissemination (SAfAIDS) http://www.safaids.net (visited 09 March 2010), which observed that stigma has prehistoric roots, 
for instance, in ancient Greece, slaves or criminals would be branded or physically marked to show that they were outcasts 
and this is where the term “stigma” originated.   
9  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2.  See also Herek 2002 HeinOnline J.L.  
Med. & Ethics 594-607 who points out that the earliest recorded English usage of stigma referred to the cluster of wounds 
manifested by Catholic saints, which corresponded to the wounds of the crucified Jesus.  These stigmata were said to 
appear regularly, sometimes bleeding, in conjunction with important religious feast days.  Religious stigmata signified 
holiness, but stigma more commonly had a thoroughly negative connotation.  Literally, therefore, stigma refers to a visible 
marking on the body, usually made by a branding iron or pointed instrument.  But the ‘mark’ could also be a nonphysical 
condition or attribute. 
10  See Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2 and Greene 37 who points out  
that stigma has also been described as referring to an attribute that is deeply discrediting, spoiling, tainting, or making 
someone seem inferior in the eyes of others partly because he or she may fail to live up to others’ expectations.  See also 
Okechukwu 2007 Benin Journal of Postgraduate medicine 64, and Fife and Wright 2000 Journal of Health and Social 
Behaviour 51.    
11  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2.  Though it may be argued that some  
people even today still view tattoos as stigma and people who have them as disgrace. 
12  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2, Greene 37, Okechukwu 2007 Benin  
Journal of Postgraduate Medicine 64, Herek 2002 HeinOnline J.L. Med. & Ethics 595 and Leickness 2007 Social Science & 
Medicine 1823. 
13  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2. 
14  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 2, Okechukwu 2007 Benin Journal of  
Postgraduate medicine 64 and Herek 2002 HeinOnline J.L. Med. & Ethics 594. 
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external or internal.15  External stigma refers to the actual experience of discrimination, whereas, internal stigma 
(felt or imagined stigma) is the shame associated with HIV/AIDS and persons living with HIV/AIDS fear of being 
discriminated against.16  Internal stigma can be described as a powerful survival mechanism aimed at protecting 
oneself from external stigma and often results in thoughts or behaviour such as the refusal or reluctance to 
disclose a positive HIV status, denial of HIV/AIDS and unwillingness to accept help.17  This collective public 
denial in societies is reflected by avoidance of mentioning any terminal illness including HIV/AIDS, a need to 
keep hope alive for therapeutic success, stigma attached to HIV/AIDS, and unwillingness to confront matters 
related to sexuality.18   
Stigma, therefore, may be described as a strong, negative feeling against a person due to his certain 
characteristic or certain condition such as disability, mental-illness or HIV/AIDS disease.19  People who had 
certain conditions such as disability and those who suffered from certain diseases had long being stigmatised by 
the society even before HIV and AIDS were known.  People, for instance, stigmatised and continue to stigmatise 
people who are physical disabled, mentally ill, or those who have incurable diseases such as Ebola or Congo 
fever, and recently multi-drug resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB), extreme resistant tuberculosis (XDR-TB) and 
HIV/AIDS, itself.  In the rural areas and townships, people who are suspected to be witches are also stigmatised 
and normally regarded as outcasts who deserve to die.  However, if efforts to fight the spread of HIV/AIDS are to 
be successful, this stigma against this disease has to be carefully examined and addressed.  The reason, as it 
                                                          
15  Inoue 2004 AIDS Care 349, and Fife and Wright 2000 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 51.   
16  Fife and Wright 2000 Journal of Health and Social Behaviour 51, point out that due to the reactions of others as to  
internalised self-feelings, stigmatised people’s life chances and opportunities are lessened, they are set apart from others, 
and they are considered to be inferior and to represent a danger to society, all of which lead to social rejection and social 
isolation. 
17  Leickness 2007 Social Science & Medicine 1824. 
18  Mbonu, Van den Borne and De Vries 2009 Journal of Tropical Medicine 3. 
19  See Campbell C and Gibbs A “Stigma, Gender and HIV: Case Studies Inter-sectionality” in Boesten J and Poku  
NK (eds) Gender and HIV/AIDS-Critical Perspectives from the Developing World (2009, England and USA: ASHGATE) 30, 
who define stigma as any negative thoughts, feelings or actions against people infected with or affected by HIV/AIDS.  See 
also Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010) who defines AIDS-related stigma and 
discrimination as referring to prejudice, negative attitudes abuse and maltreatment directed at people living with HIV and 
AIDS.  They can result in being shunned by family, peers and the wider community; treatment in healthcare and education 
settings; erosion of rights, psychological damage and can negatively affect the success of testing and treatment.   Stigma 
involves negative thoughts or prejudices about people from particular groups or with certain characteristics.  Self-stigma, 
involving feelings of shame, guilt and fear among infected persons, is the basis of all forms of stigma.  Stigma and 
discrimination associated with HIV and AIDS are the great barriers to preventing further infections and providing adequate 
care, support and treatment, and are found in every country and region of the world.  SAfAIDS http://www.safaids.net (visited 
09 March 2010) also observed that much of the stigma, faced by PLWHA, builds on existing prejudices related to race, 
gender, socio-economic status, culture and other similar categories in society.  See also Fife and Wright 2000 Journal of 
Health and Social Behaviour 51. 
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will be shown below, being that stigma undermines public health and perpetrates the spread of HIV/AIDS. This 
chapter will also consider the issue of HIV exceptionalism. 
2.2.1 Why is there stigma related to HIV and AIDS? 
The causes of stigma related to HIV and AIDS, as mentioned above, are usually due to ignorance and 
misconceptions about this disease.20  Foreman21 observes that: 
Despite the best efforts of campaigns to prove the contrary, the misconceptions persists in both North and South that HIV 
can be transmitted from one person to another through casual contact.  Time and again such fear emerges:  in 1987, 
Washington DC police wore rubber gloves to arrest demonstrators at the International Conference on AIDS; in 1989 cleaning 
staff at York University in the UK caused a conference of people with HIV to be cancelled because they believed they were 
at risk.  Also in 1989, a Brazilian official became extremely irritated when it was suggested that a child with the virus might sit 
in his chair.  ‘Not in my chair,’ he shouted, adding: ‘Now we’re going to have to clean everything.’  In Pakistan, a woman who 
was HIV-positive had her home surrounded by policemen wearing gloves and masks who then whisked her away to prison; 
there she was isolated in a room which was sprayed daily with disinfectant.  And in Uruguay in 1989, when a family with an 
HIV-positive member moved house, the new occupants disinfected the entire place and burned everything they left behind.  
In several countries, ‘spacemen’ suits have sometimes been worn by ambulance staff or others whose work brings them into 
contact with people who are seropositive.22 
 
These are some of the examples that show that ignorance and misconceptions about HIV and AIDS are the 
ones that perpetuate the stigma about this disease.  This ignorance about this disease has driven people to be 
afraid of people living with HIV/AIDS.  Even in church people become afraid of hugging or drinking from a cup 
which was used by an HIV/AIDS-positive person.23  Socially, people become afraid to be associated with people 
living with HIV/AIDS.  They are even afraid to use utensils such as bath, shower, dishes and spoons that are 
used by people living with HIV/AIDS.24  This fear of the contagion coupled with negative, value-based 
assumptions about people who are infected leads to high levels of stigma surrounding HIV and AIDS.25  There 
are many factors that contribute to HIV/AIDS-related stigma, of which some are following:  HIV/AIDS is a life-
                                                          
20  Terblanche-Smit 2008 PhD dissertation 154 and Timberg C http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/articles/A7822-2005Jan13.html (visited 19 May 2010). 
21  Foreman M et al Panos Dossier: The Third Epidemic, Repercussions of the Fear of Aids (1990, Budapest- 
London-Paris-Washington: The Panos Institute) 20.  
22  Foreman 20. 
23  Salmon K Fighting against Stigma, Culture and Discrimination SHAAN online IPS e-zine on Gender and Human  
Rights http://www.ipsnews.net/hivaids/section3_1.shtml (visited 20 March 2011), cites Patricia Asero, a 33 year-old mother, 
widow and HIV/AIDS counselor as saying: “People point figures at me in the street and in the Church.  They whisper.  
Neighbours tell my visitors: ‘You know she has AIDS, she’ll give it to you’.”  Asero was just 22 when she found out that she 
was HIV positive.    
24  Timberg C http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7822-2005Jan13.html (visited 19 May 2010). 
25  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010).  See also Parker R and Aggleton P et  
al HIV/AIDS-related Stigma and Discrimination: A Conceptual Framework and an Agenda for Action Horizons Program 
(2002, New York: The Population Council Inc.) 3. 
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threatening disease and therefore people react to it in strong ways.26  HIV infection is associated with 
behaviours (such as homosexuality, drug addiction, prostitution or promiscuity that are already stigmatised in 
many societies.27  Most people become infected with HIV through sex which often carries moral baggage.  
Religious or moral beliefs lead some people to believe that being infected with HIV/AIDS is the result of moral 
fault (such as promiscuity, ‘deviant sex’ or homosexuality) that deserve to be punished.28  HIV is often thought to 
be the result of personal irresponsibility.29 
Foreman observes that all of these factors, fear, hostility, denial and condemnation add up to the stigma of 
AIDS.30  People with HIV are seen in some way as a disgrace to society, although the reason for the disdain 
varies from culture to culture.  In some societies, the disease may be associated with homosexuality or illegal 
drug use, both patterns of behaviour which are normally condemned.31  In others, where transmission is 
predominantly heterosexual, AIDS may be seen less as a mark of “perversion” than of irresponsibility.  In yet 
other societies, it may be felt that by contracting the disease, an individual is letting the people down.  In 
countries such as Tanzania, for instance, having AIDS somehow means a person has failed to be a good 
citizen; it is believed that by falling ill in this way a person is not contributing to the good of the country and to 
other Tanzanians.32  Stigma and discrimination fuel the HIV/AIDS epidemic by creating a culture of secrecy, 
silence, ignorance, blame, shame and victimisation and this has an effect on persons living with HIV/AIDS as 
individuals, and on their illnesses, behavior and perception of the health care they receive.33  This fear of 
hostility, ostracism and isolation by the family and the community often cause many people living with HIV/AIDS 
to conceal their HIV/AIDS positive status.  Many of them, therefore, keep their health status confidential and 
may die not knowing what the real cause of their deaths was.  This will be discussed further in the following 
chapter 3, below. 
                                                          
26  See Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010) and Parker and Aggleton 3. 
27  Parker and Aggleton 3, Foreman 26, Greene 38, Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27  
February 2010), Khoat  2005 AIDS Care S181, Leickness 2007 Social Science & Medicine 1823-24, Burkholder 1999 
Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research 27-8, Visser 2009 AIDS Care 197, Patterson & London 2002 Bulletin of the World 
Health Organisation  964, Vasquez 2, Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y  270 and International 
Labour Conference 2009. 
28  Parker and Aggleton 7, and Foreman 27. 
29  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
30  Foreman 30 and Hamra 2005 AIDS Care 912. 
31  Foreman 30. 
32  Foreman 30. 
33  Ganczak M “Stigma and discrimination for HIV/AIDS in the Health Sector: A Polish Perspective” 2007 (41;1) R.  
interam. Psicol./Interamerican Journal of Psychology 57-66, 57, People at Work: Addressing Stigma and Discrimination 
(ILO/UNAIDS Meeting on AIDS and the World of Work in Latin America and the Caribbean, Brasilia (2006)) and Terblanche-
Smit 2008 PhD dissertation 165.  
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2.2.2 The effects of stigma 
The stigma related to HIV has many effects for those living with HIV/AIDS.  The stigma, for instance, serves to 
deprive people with AIDS of the confidence and agency they need to access treatment, participate in programs 
and increase self-efficacy, all of which have positive health outcomes.34  The impact of the AIDS-related stigma 
and discrimination can be subtle, and can result in individuals hiding their secret and thus becoming withdrawn 
and isolated.35  This HIV/AIDS stigma has also been increasingly described as major driver of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic through limiting people’s access to prevention, formal and informal care and more recently anti-
retroviral treatment.  Stigma inhibits many women from learning their HIV status for fear of abandonment or 
violence by their partners.  Men who associate their ability to conceive children as a central and prized 
dimension of their masculinity may also deny or hide their status for fear that this will hinder the likelihood of 
them conceiving children, leaving them to die without having fulfilled their masculine life destiny of “leaving 
behind people who bear names.”36  This stigma has also been accused of hindering, in no small way, efforts 
stemming the epidemic.  It complicates decisions about testing, disclosure of status and ability to negotiate 
prevention behaviours, including use of family planning services.  The stigma around HIV/AIDS has had a 
profound effect on the epidemic’s course.   
The World Health Organisation (WHO), for instance, cites fear of stigma and discrimination as the main reason 
why people are reluctant to be tested, to disclose HIV status or to take anti-retroviral drugs.37  All these factors, 
directly or indirectly, contribute to the expansion of the epidemic, as reluctance to determine HIV status or to 
discuss or practice safe sex means that people are more likely to infect others, as well as a higher number of 
AIDS-related deaths.38  This situation is exacerbated by the fact that it is culturally a taboo to speak about issues 
of sex.39  As a result and in addition to the stigma, therefore, many people living with HIV/AIDS are afraid to talk 
about sex to their partners, families or community members.  This may partly explain why it is so difficult to curb 
the spreading of HIV/AIDS in Africa, compared to other countries, for instance, the United States of America, 
where the virus was first recognised.  The fear of becoming stigmatised is the main reason why many people 
prefer to remain silent and confidential about their HIV/AIDS positive status.40  As a result, from the beginning of 
                                                          
34  Campbell & Gibbs 29. 
35  Paxton 2005 AIDS Care 414.   
36  Campbell & Gibbs 30. 
37  Jewkes R “Beyond stigma: social responses to HIV in South Africa” 2006 (368) The Lancet 430-431, 431 and  
Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
38  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
39  Parker and Aggleton 2. 
40  See Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010), who cites UN Secretary-General  
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this pandemic, it has always been clear that if persons living with HIV/AIDS fear the personal, social and 
economic consequences of being diagnosed with HIV/AIDS, they would forego testing, fail to discuss their 
health and risk behaviours with counselours or health care professionals, and eventually refrain from entering 
the health care system for treatment.41   
This fear of being stigmatised, ostracised and isolated by the society often causes people living with HIV/AIDS 
to commit suicide rather than to live after their status has been disclosed or when they are suspected by 
community members to be HIV-positive.42  The stigma against persons living with HIV/AIDS is the main reason 
why people choose the safety net of confidentiality as opposed to disclosure.  HIV/AIDS stigma, therefore, has a 
direct contributory impact on the spreading of HIV/AIDS in the world and this is the reason why it will be 
recommended, in chapter 6 below, that serious efforts must be directed towards addressing and ending this 
stigmatisation.  Persons who fear social consequences if they disclose their HIV-positive status forego testing 
and do not discuss risk behaviours with health workers and do not access medical treatment which easily 
available at health centres.  All of these undermine public health efforts to fight against the HIV/AIDS pandemic.    
 
2.3 DISCRIMINATION 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
The stigma against people living with HIV/AIDS goes hand in hand with discrimination, such as negative 
treatment and denied opportunities on the basis of their HIV status.  Discrimination is bad enough without AIDS, 
but much worse with it.43  The discrimination that persons living with HIV/AIDS suffer may occur in all levels of a 
person’s daily life, for example, when people wish to travel, use healthcare facilities, seek employment, in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Ban Ki Moon saying: “Stigma remains the single most important barrier to public action.  It is the main reason why too many 
people are afraid to see a doctor to determine whether they have the disease, or to seek treatment if so.  It helps make AIDS 
the silent killer, because people fear the social disgrace of speaking about it, or taking easily available precautions.  Stigma 
is a chief reason why the AIDS epidemic continues to devastate societies around the world.” 
41  Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y  270. 
42  See City Press of 24 August 2008 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “The silent war kills 1000 a day”).   
In this paper it is observed that: “And although virtually every South African is affected by Aids, there remains a huge stigma 
about the disease.  Only two weeks ago an Eastern Cape woman, Nokuzola Mfiki, distraught over rumours that she was HIV-
positive, killed her four children before committing suicide.  In a suicide note, Mfiki said she committed the killings because 
community members believed she was HIV-positive and were gossiping about her.” 
43  Mugyenyi 113. 
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family, in the church, at school or at a community level.44  However, as it will also be shown below, fair 
discrimination is allowed by the Constitution and only unfair discrimination is prohibited.45  
2.3.1.1 Differences between fair and unfair discrimination  
Currie and De Waal46 define discrimination as a particular form of differentiation.47  Unlike ‘mere differentiation’, 
discrimination is differentiation on illegitimate grounds and there is a list of illegitimate grounds of differentiation in 
section 9(3) of the Constitution.48  However, the equality clause does not prohibit discrimination but unfair 
discrimination.49  Indeed, sections 9(3) and (4) prohibit ‘unfair discrimination’ and that clearly implies that ‘fair 
discrimination’ is allowed by the Constitution.50  The important implication of this terminology is that not all 
discrimination is unfair and fairness is a moral concept that distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate.51  What this 
means is that fair discrimination, such as affirmative action, is allowed by the Constitution.  Affirmative action, for 
instance (often described as reverse discrimination) is considered fair in order to address the imbalances of the past.52  
This is emphasised by section 6(2) of the Employment Equity Act,53 which provides that it not unfair discrimination to:  
(a) take affirmative action measures consistent with the purpose of this Act; or (b) distinguish, exclude or prefer any 
                                                          
44  Parker and Aggleton 3, and Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
45  See section 9(3) and (4) of The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (herafter referred  
to as The Constitution of 1996), which prohibits unfair discrimination by the state or person against anyone on one or more 
grounds in terms of subsection (3). 
46  Currie I and De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005, Cape Town: Juta & Company Ltd) 243.  See  
also Mubangizi JC The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide (2004, Lansdowne: Juta and 
Company Ltd) 75, Cheadle MH, Davis DM and Haysom NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002, 
Durban: Butterworths) 85 and Vrancken P and Stone L “Equality” in Govindjee A and Vrancken P (eds) et al Introduction to 
Human Rights Law (2009, Durban: LexisNexis) 74.  
47  Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) paragraph [53] (herafter the Harksen case).  Gutto SBO Equality  
and Non-Discrimination in South Africa-The political economy of law and law making (2001, Cape Town: New Africa Books 
(NAE) (Pty) Ltd) 129, also points out that: “There is a growing understanding among African lawyers who deal with 
constitutional, human rights, labour and corporate laws that ‘discrimination’ is synonymous with ‘differentiation’, and the 
Equality Act reflects this.”  Grogan J Dismissal, Discrmination and unfair Labour Practices 2nd ed (2007, Cape Town: Juta & 
Co, Ltd) 109, also points out that discrimination normally involves treating some people less favourably than others.  See 
also Krieger N Pan American Health Organization “A Glossary for social epidemiology” 2002 (23;1) Epidemiological 
Bulletin/PAHO 1-16, 7.    
48  Currie and De Waal 243. 
49  Currie and De Waal 244, Albertyn C “Constitutional Equality in South Africa” in Dupper O and Garbers C (eds)  
Equality in the Workplace: Reflections from South Africa and Beyond (2009, Cape Town: Juta & Co, Ltd) 78 and Mubangizi 
76. 
50  The Constitution of 1996.  See Devenish GE The South African Constitution (2005, Durban: LexisNexis  
Butterworths) 47, who states that: “Since section 8(2) of the interim Constitution proscribed 'unfair discrimination' this clearly 
implied that 'fair discrimination' is permissible.”   
51  Currie and De Waal 244, and Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 105.  See also Albertyn 79 who points out that it is  
generally understood that fairness in s 9 is a moral enquiry and a value judgment that distinguishes permissible from 
impermissible discrimination. 
52  Mubangizi 74 and Grogan 117. 
53  The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
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person on the basis of an inherent requirement of the job.  However, Currie and De Waal54 argue and submit that it 
seems puzzling that not all discrimination is unfair.  This is because, in everyday speech, the word discrimination 
carries pejorative associations.  Most people say that it is wrong to discriminate and would be hard pressed to 
understand someone who said that sometimes discrimination is not wrong, or that only unfair discrimination is wrong.55  
Unfair discrimination is discrimination with an unfair impact.  It has this impact where it imposes burdens on people 
who have been victims of past patterns of discrimination, such as women or black people, where it impairs to a 
significant extent the fundamental dignity of the complainant.56  Where the discriminating law or action is designed to 
achieve a worthy and important societal goal, it makes fair what would otherwise be unfair discrimination.57   
2.3.2 Discrimination in the family 
Families are the primary caregivers when a person falls ill.  Many families, of course, play an important role in 
providing support and care for people living with HIV and AIDS.  In fact, in most developing countries around the 
world, families are the main source of care and support for persons living with HIV/AIDS.58  However, not all 
family responses are positive and HIV-infected members of the family often find themselves  tigmatized and 
discriminated against within their own homes.59  There is concern that women and non-heterosexual family 
members are more likely than children and men to be mistreated.60 
2.3.3 Discrimination by the community 
Persons living with HIV/AIDS are often discriminated against by their communities.  The causes of this 
discrimination, as mentioned above, are usually attributed to ignorance about HIV/AIDS and prejudice.  
Discrimination by communities often depends on the societal beliefs such as individualism or collectivism.61  In 
societies, for instance, with cultural systems that place greater emphasis on individualism, HIV/AIDS may be 
perceived as the result of personal irresponsibility, and thus individuals are blamed for contracting the infection.  
In contrast, in societies where cultural systems place greater emphasis on collectivism, HIV/AIDS maybe 
                                                          
54  Currie and De Waal 245. 
55  Currie and De Waal 245. 
56  Currie and De Waal 246. 
57  Currie and De Waal 246. 
58  Parker and Aggleton 8. 
59  Parker and Aggleton 8.  Timberg http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7822-2005Jan13.html  
(visited 19 May 2010), relates the story of an HIV-positive Sibusiso Mlangeni whose father, a retired security guard who had 
badgered him about losing too much weight, declared to Mlangeni that: ‘You are going to die.’  Mlangeni’s sister, a nurse, 
asked him not to stand near her. 
60  Parker and Aggleton 3.  See also Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010) cites  
an HIV-positive woman from Zimbabwe as saying: “When I was in hospital, my father came once.  Then he shouted that I 
had AIDS.  Everyone could hear.  He said: this is AIDS, she is the victim.  With my brother and his wife I wasn’t allowed to 
eat from the same plates, I got a plastic cup and plates and I had to sleep in the kitchen.  I was not even allowed to play with 
the kids.” 
61  Parker and Aggleton 7. 
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perceived as bringing shame on the family and community.62  Furthermore, in societies where illness is believed 
to be the result of ‘immoral’ or ‘improper’ behaviour, HIV/AIDS may reinforce pre-existing stigma against those 
whose behaviour is considered to be ‘deviant’ such as homosexuals, drug users and prostitutes.63   
Discrimination of persons living with HIV/AIDS at a community level is found all over the world.  It is commonly 
manifested in communities in the form of blame, scapegoating and punishment.64  A community’s reaction to 
somebody living with HIV/AIDS can have a huge effect on that person’s life.  If the reaction is hostile, a person 
may be ostracised and discriminated against and be forced to leave their home, or change their daily activities 
such as shopping, socialising or schooling.65  However, in more extreme cases, it has taken the form of violence 
which has been reported in many countries such as attacks on men or women who are assumed to be gay or 
lesbian, violence against sex workers and street children in Brazil, and of HIV/AIDS-related murders in 
Colombia, India, Ethiopia, South Africa and Thailand.66  To fight this stigma and discrimination against persons 
living with HIV/AIDS, therefore, education of the communities about HIV/AIDS and how it is transmitted becomes 
of paramount importance.   
Government, media and the society at large have to work together to make people aware of the impact the 
discrimination and stigma have on people who live with HIV/AIDS.  The support of families and the community is 
very important to persons who are living with HIV/AIDS, as sick people who are supported by their families and 
communities live much longer.  Stigmatisation and discrimination of persons living with HIV/AIDS, even by their 
own families and communities, often hasten their deaths.  
2.3.4 Discrimination at school 
Discrimination of HIV positive persons also occurs at a school level.67  This discrimination of children who are 
HIV positive, just like the others, is also fuelled by ignorance about how the disease is transmitted.  
                                                          
62  Parker and Aggleton 7. 
63  Parker and Aggleton 7, Foreman 26, Greene 38, Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27  
February 2010), Khoat  2005 AIDS Care S181, Leickness 2007 Social Science & Medicine 1823-24, Burkholder 1999 
Journal of Applied Biobehavioral Research 27-8, Visser 2009 AIDS Care 197, Patterson & London 2002 Bulletin of the World 
Health Organisation  964, Vasquez 2, Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y  270 and International 
Labour Conference 2009.  See also Gostin LO The AIDS Pandemic-Complacency, Injustice and Unfulfilled expectations 
(2004, Chapel Hill and London: University of Carolina Press) 48 who points out that people who are living with HIV/AIDS 
have to endure moral disapproval of their behaviour and archaic attitudes that they present a health hazard. The public’s 
association of the disease with traditionally disfavoured groups, such as gays, injection drug users and sex workers only 
compounds the prejudice.   
64  Parker and Aggleton 7. 
65  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010).   
66  Parker and Aggleton 7. 
67  Parker and Aggleton 5. 
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Discrimination and stigma have led to teasing and name-calling by classmates of HIV-positive school children or 
children associated with HIV.68  The well-known story of a South African child who was discriminated against 
and expelled at his school due to his HIV infection, is that of Nkosi Johnson.  Nkosi Johnson was born HIV-
positive in 1989, having contracted the illness from his mother, Nonthlanthla Nkosi.69  She died of AIDS in April 
1997.  Nkosi was initially given nine months to live.  He surpassed this prediction and at the age of three, he was 
adopted by Gail Johnson.   He became a national figure after a school refused to admit him because he suffered 
from AIDS.  He fought his exclusion, eloquently bringing his case and a demand for children’s rights to South 
Africa’s Parliament and during a meeting with Nelson Mandela.70   
Discrimination of children who are HIV positive constitutes a violation of their constitutional rights to equality, 
dignity and basic education and is an unfair discrimination.71  Children have a right to receive education 
irrespective of whether they are HIV positive or not.72 
2.3.5 Discrimination in the employment context  
People living with HIV/AIDS are also discriminated against in the workplace.73  International documents74 and 
South African legislation such as the South African Constitution75, Promotion of Equality and Prevention of 
Unfair Discrimination Act76 and labour laws,77 protect HIV/AIDS positive employees against discrimination in the 
                                                          
68  Parker and Aggleton 5. 
69  Smith A Champion of Resistance Nkosi Johnson http://www.teacherlink.ed.usu.edu/../Nkosi.pdf (visited 11 September 2010). 
70  Smith A Champion of Resistance Nkosi Johnson at http://www.teacherlink.ed.usu.edu/../Nkosi.pdf (visited 11  
September 2010).  Nkosi addressed the myth that AIDS can be acquired through casual contact by pointing out that: “You 
can’t get AIDS by hugging, kissing, holding hands.  We are normal human beings, we can walk, we can talk.”   
71  See section 9 Equality, section 10 Human dignity and section 29 Education of the Constitution of 1996.  
72  See section 29(1)(a)and(b) of the Constitution of 1996 which state that:  
Everyone has the right to a basic education including adult basic education; and to further education, which the state, 
through reasonable measures, must make available and accessible.      . 
73  Dupper OC et al Essential Employment Discrimination Law (eds) (2004, Lansdowne: Juta & Co) 205, notes that  
HIV/AIDS is an important matter for employers, employees and the society at large.  For employees, it is important as the 
rights of employees who live with HIV/AIDS are often adversely affected by irrational and unfair HIV/AIDS-related 
employment discrimination.  The problem is equally important for employers as they are increasingly expected to ensure that 
the workplace is free from discrimination against employees with HIV/AIDS and that workers work in a safe working 
environment.  See also Parker and Aggleton 6.   
74  Such as an ILO code of practice on HIV/AIDS and the world of work of the International Labour Organisation  
2001 (herafter referred to as the ILO Code) found at http://www.ilo.org (visited 06 April 2011), C111 Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation) Convention (1958 (1(1)) (herafter referred to as Discrimination Convention) and International 
Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (UNAIDS 2006 (149)) which state that everyone has the right to work and to just 
and favourable conditions of work. 
75  The Constitution of 1996, sections 9 and 23. 
76  The Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (herafter referred to as the  
Equality Act), the schedule to this Act (which is attached to section 29) lists unfair practices in certain sectors such as labour 
and employment as follows:  (a) Creating artificial barriers to equal access to employment opportunities by using certain 
recruitment and selection procedures.  (b) Applying human resource utilisation, development, promotion and retention 
practices which unfairly discriminate against persons from groups identified by the prohibited grounds.  (c) Failing to respect 
the principle of equal pay for equal payment work.  (d) Perpetuating disproportionate income differentials deriving from past 
unfair discrimination.  See also Bonthuys E “Counting flying pigs: psychometric testing and the law” 2002 (23) ILJ 1175, who 
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workplace.  Article 4.2 of the ILO Code of practice and the world of work78 states it clearly that in the spirit of 
decent work and respect for the human rights and dignity of persons infected by HIV/AIDS, there should be no 
discrimination against workers on the basis of real or perceived HIV status.  Discrimination and stigmatisation of 
people living with HIV/AIDS inhibit efforts aimed at promoting HIV/AIDS prevention.79  Section 9 of the 
Constitution80 also protects all the employees in the workplace against any unfair discrimination.81  Furthermore, 
the Labour Relations Act82 also protects employees against unfair discrimination in the workplace.  However, 
both section 9 of the Constitution and section 187 of the Labour Relations Act83 do not specifically mention HIV 
as a listed ground, though it may be argued that it could be recognised as unfair discrimination on an analogous 
ground.84  The Employment Equity Act,85 however, goes further in protecting employees against discrimination 
at the workplace by being the first law in South Africa to specifically list HIV status as a ground against 
discrimination.86  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
emphasises the fact that [t]he Equality Act, which applies both to the state and individuals or companies now forbids 
discrimination on several bases, including race, gender, culture, language and social or ethnic origin. 
77  Labour laws such as the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (herafter referred to as the Labour Relations Act  
1995 or LRA) and Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (herafter referred to as the Employment Equity Act or EEA).  
78  The ILO Code.  See Hodges J InFocus Programme on Social Dialogue, Labour Law and Labour Administration:  
guidelines on addressing HIV/AIDS in the workplace through employment and labour law (International Labour Office 
Geneva (2004 (20)), who notes that one of the pillars of the ILO Code is the right not to be discriminated against on the basis 
of real or perceived HIV/AIDS status.   
79  Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y  270. 
80  The Constitution of 1996. 
81  Section 9 of the constitution states that:  (1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and 
benefit of the law. (2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To promote the achievement 
of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination may be taken. (3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one 
or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, 
age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. (4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or 
indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted to prevent 
or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
82  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995,  Section 187(1)(f) provides that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason  
for the dismissal is that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on any arbitrary 
ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language marital status or family responsibility.    
83  Labour Relations Act 1995. 
84  Currie and De Waal 259. 
85  Employment Equity Act. 
86  See Basson AC et al Essential Labour Law 4th ed (2005, Centurion: Labour Law Publications) 144, who points out  
that: “In other countries equity and discrimination issues surrounding HIV/AIDS fall within the ambit of the disability 
legislation.  In South Africa, however, the HIV/AIDS status of a worker is specifically protected in section 6(1) of the EEA.”  
See also Christianson M “Incapacity and Disability: A Retrospective and Prospective overview of the past 25 years” 2004 
(25) ILJ 879, who concurs with this by stating that: “In many international jurisdictions HIV/AIDS falls within legislation 
protecting employees against unfair discrimination of people with disabilities.  South African legislation has chosen to treat 
HIV status as a separate ground of unfair discrimination in s 6(1) of the EEA.”  See Mauro v Borgess Medical Center, 137 
F.3d 398 (6th Cir. 1998), where Mauro, who was denied his work as a surgical technician due to his HIV-positive status, 
brought claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  See also Bragdon v Abbot 118 Sct 2196 (1998), 
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Section 5 provides that every employer must take steps to promote equal opportunity in the workplace by 
eliminating unfair discrimination in any employment policy or practice.  Section 6(1) provides that no person may 
unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on one or 
more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, 
language and birth.  
However, unfair discrimination at the workplace persists, despite the protection afforded in international 
documents and South African legislation, referred to above.  The Employment Equity Act,87 in particular, is a 
very important piece of legislation in protecting HIV positive employees against any discrimination in the 
workplace.  Its Code of Good practice on key aspects of HIV/AIDS and employment88 strengthens this protection 
by declaring that no person may unfairly discriminate against an employee, or an applicant for employment, on 
the basis of his or her HIV status.  In analysing section 7 of the Employment Equity Act,89 Rodgers AJ, in Irvin & 
Johnson Ltd v Trawler & Line Fishing Union & Others90 observed that “[s]ection 7 forms part of a chapter dealing 
with the prohibition of unfair discrimination.  One of the main purposes of the Act is to achieve equity in the 
workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the elimination of unfair 
discrimination.  In this context, the purpose of s 7 seems to me to be clear.  An employer should not unfairly 
discriminate against an employee on the basis that the latter suffers from some or other medical condition.” 91 
However, under certain circumstances, such as dismissal for incapacity by the employer of an employee with 
HIV/AIDS who is no longer able to perform to the required standard, or is too ill to continue working,92 or 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
where the United States Supreme affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals that the respondent’s HIV infection was a 
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C.    
87  Employment Equity Act. 
88  See Code of Good practice on key aspects of HIV/AIDS and employment (GN R390 in GG 21089 of 25 April  
2000) Code of Good practice: key aspects of HIV/AIDS and employment (GN R1298 in GG 21815 of 1 December 2000) 
contained in the Labour Relations Act of 1995 and item 10 of the Code of Good practice contained in Schedule 8 to the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995. 
89  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
90  Irvin & Johnson Ltd v Trawler & Line Fishing Union & Others (2003) 24 ILJ 565 (LC). 
91  See PFG Building Glass (Pty) Ltd v Chemical Engineering Pulp Paper Wood and Allied Workers’ Union  
(CEPPAWU) and others (2003) 24 ILJ 974 (LC) [paragraph 34], where the court observed that: “It emerges that the primary 
purpose of prohibiting HIV testing, unless authorised by the Labour Court, is to prevent unfair discrimination.  This 
interpretation is fortified by the fact that section 7 falls under the heading ‘Prohibition of Unfair Discrimination’ in chapter 2 of 
the EEA.”  See also Joy Mining Machinery, A Division of Harnischfeger (SA) (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers of SA 
& others (2002) 23 ILJ 391 (LC).   
92  Christianson 2004 ILJ 879.  Basson 145, also points that a dismissal based on incapacity may be fair if the  
employer has a valid and fair reason for the dismissal and has followed a fair procedure.  See item 10 of the Code of Good 
practice contained in Schedule 8 to the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and Article 4 of C111 Discrimination (Employment 
and Occupation) Convention, 1958.  See also International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (UNAIDS 2006 (149)) 
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termination of the employment contract of the employee by the employer due to the fact that employee is a 
health risk to the patients, the court may regard such a dismissal to be a fair discrimination on the part of the 
employer.93  Similarly, an inherent requirement of a particular employment may also be held to be a fair 
discrimination especially if the employee may not carry out the employment without endangering the safety of 
other employees.94   
Persons living with HIV/AIDS are normally discriminated against by employers and their employees respectively, 
and may suffer stigma such as social isolation and ridicule, or experience discriminatory practices, such as 
termination or refusal of employment.  Fear of an employer’s reaction can cause a person living with HIV 
anxiety.95  This fear will in many cases drive many workers who are living with HIV/AIDS to remain silent and 
confidential about their HIV status in fear of prejudice, discrimination and victimisation by their employers.  The 
other vulnerable group that has suffered a double burden in the employment workplace, is women.96  Women, 
especially young women, bear the brunt of the HIV/AIDS epidemic.  Women’s low social status, deriving from 
legal, economic and social inferiority, is the driving force of women’s greater risk of contracting HIV.  Despite 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
which provides that states should ensure that persons with HIV are allowed to work as long as they can carry out functions of 
the job.  See also The Hoffman case, paragraphs [30-32].     
93  See Doe v University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, et al 50 F.3d 1261, where the court found that Dr.  
Doe, who was a carrier of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV), was not a ‘qualified individual’ with a disability under 
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 794 (West Supp. 1994) and the Americans with Disability Act (ADA) 
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1994).  The court held that a hospital does not violate Sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or Title II of 
the ADA when it terminates an HIV-positive neurosurgical resident based upon the risk of transmission of the disease during 
performance of exposure-prone procedures.  Such individuals pose a significant risk to the health or safety of their patients 
that cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.  This means, therefore, that the court held the termination of Dr. 
Doe’s employment to be a fair discrimination on the part of the hospital in order to protect the patients from infection of HIV. 
The court had the view that it was better for the hospital to err on the side of caution in protecting its patients.       
94  See X v The Commonwealth [1999] HCA 63 paragraphs [30] and [73], where X, who was a soldier in the  
Australian Regular Army was discharged from the army because he had tested positive to HIV.  The court observed that 
although the dismissal of X was prima facie unlawful, it was open to the Commission on the facts of the case to find that the 
discrimination was not unlawful because the discharge of X fell within the provisions of s 15(4) of the Disability Discrimination 
Act 1992 (Cth).  Given the findings of risk to fellow soldiers made by the Commission, it was open to the Commission to find 
that, without assistance, X could not carry out the ‘inherent requirements’ of his employment and ‘would in order to carry out 
those requirements, require services or facilities which would impose an unjustifiable hardship’ on the Commonwealth.  
However, the court reasoned further by noting that even if the Commission finds that, without assistance, X poses a real risk 
to soldiers and other persons, his dismissal will be unlawful unless the Commission also finds that the risk cannot be 
eliminated or appropriately nullified by the provision of services or facilities which can be provided without unjustifiable 
hardship. 
95  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010), cites a head of Human Resource  
Development, in India, stating that: “Though we do have a policy so far, I can say that if at the time of recruitment there is a 
person with HIV, I will not take him.  I’ll certainly not buy a problem for the company.  I see recruitment as buying-selling 
relationship.  If I don’t find the product attractive, I’ll not buy it” and an HIV positive woman from United Kingdom (UK) saying: 
“It is always in the back of your mind, if I get the job, should I tell my employer about my HIV status?  There is fear of how 
they will react to it.  It may cost your job; it may make you so uncomfortable it changes relationships.  Yet you would want to 
explain about why you are absent, and going to the doctors.” 
96  See HIV/AIDS + Work: A Handbook on HIV/AIDS for Labour and Factory inspectors (ILO/AIDS) at  
http//:www.ilo.org/aids (herafter referred to as ILO/AIDS HIV/AIDS + Work) (Visited 06 April 2011) 
44 
 
many constitutional guarantees, women are still being discriminated against in the labour market, are paid less 
than men and more frequently perform work with no or little security or benefits.97     
In South Africa, indeed, there are many cases of employees who were denied employment or dismissed by their 
employers once they were found to be HIV positive.  Many of these cases had ended up in the courts,98 
including the Constitutional Court.  It is encouraging to note that in most of these cases the courts have 
protected persons living with HIV/AIDS against discrimination.  In the case of Hoffman v South African 
Airways,99 Hoffman, the applicant, who was HIV-positive, was refused employment as a cabin attendant by 
South African Airways (SAA) because of his HIV-positive status. He unsuccessfully challenged the 
constitutionality of the refusal to employ him in the Witwatersrand High Court (the High Court), on various 
constitutional grounds.  The High Court issued a positive certificate and the Constitutional Court granted him 
leave to appeal directly to it.  In making his judgment Ngcobo J observed that: 
The appellant is living with HIV.  People who are living with HIV constitute a minority.  Society has responded to their plight 
with intense prejudice.  They have been subjected to systemic disadvantage and discrimination.  They have been 
stigmatised and marginalised.  As the present case demonstrates, they have been denied employment because of their HIV 
positive status without regard to their ability to perform the duties of the position from which they have been excluded.  
Society’s response to them has forced many of them not to reveal their HIV status for fear of prejudice.  This in turn has 
deprived them of the help they would otherwise have received.  People who are living with HIV/AIDS are one of the most 
vulnerable groups in our society.  Notwithstanding the availability of compelling medical evidence as to how this disease is 
transmitted, the prejudices and stereotypes against HIV positive people still persist.  In view of the prevailing prejudice 
against HIV positive people, any discrimination against them can, to my mind, be interpreted as a fresh instance of 
stigmatisation and I consider this to be an assault on their dignity.  The impact of discrimination on HIV positive people is 
devastating.  It is even more so when it occurs in the context of employment.  It denies them the right to earn a living.  For 
this reason, they enjoy special protection in our law.  There can be no doubt that SAA discriminated against the appellant 
because of his HIV status.  Neither the purpose of the discrimination nor the objective medical evidence justifies such 
discrimination.100 
 
Ngcobo J concluded by holding that the denial of employment to the appellant (because he was living with HIV) 
impaired his dignity and constituted unfair discrimination, and that the refusal by SAA to employ the appellant as 
a cabin attendant because of his HIV-status violated his right to equality guaranteed by section 9 of the 
Constitution.101  The court furthermore ordered SAA to employ the appellant as a cabin attendant with effect 
from the date of the court order.  This judgment of Ngcobo J is welcomed, especially because he emphasised 
                                                          
97  ILO/AIDS HIV/AIDS + Work. 
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that due to the stigma and discrimination which is suffered by people who are living with HIV/AIDS and which 
have a devastating impact, “they enjoy special protection in our law.”102   
In Bootes v Eagle Ink Systems KZ Natal (Pty) Limited,103 the court had to determine whether the employee was 
dismissed for misconduct, his HIV status, or both.  The employee, Brian Thomas Bootes, the applicant, was 
employed by the respondent, Eagle Ink Systems KZN (Pty) LTD, as a technical sales representative from 1 
October 1999 to 16 May 2005.  The court sought first to establish whether the employee committed 
misconduct.104  The employee was charged of misconduct on three counts.  Firstly, he was charged for gross 
dishonesty in that he misused the company petrol card in November 2004 by utilising it for a motor vehicle other 
than his.  Secondly, for buying and selling, in the first quarter of 2005, used printing blankets during company 
hours to clients of the company without prior permission or agreement with the management.  Thirdly, that due 
to the above, a serious breach of the trust relationship with his employer resulted, leading to the irreparable 
breakdown of the employment relationship.  The hearing proceeded on 10 May 2005.  On 16 May 2005 Eagle 
dismissed the employee on the second and third charges.  The court found that the allegations against the 
employee constituted an offence that resulted in a breach of trust.  He was therefore guilty of the misconduct for 
which he was charged in the second and third paragraphs of the disciplinary notice.105  Having established that 
the employee was guilty of the misconduct, the court then proceeded to look at the employee’s HIV-positive 
status.  The employee was hospitalised on 10 January 2005.  On 21 January 2005 he was diagnosed with full-
blown AIDS.  His managers Gandy and Rose visited him in hospital.  He had informed Gandy of his status.  
Gandy was concerned about the customers that the employee served.  The employee testified that if, as Gandy 
surmised, his status was likely to impair the deal being negotiated with Nampak, Gandy should disclose his 
status to Nampak.  On Gandy’s version, even though the employee requested him to disclose his status to all 
the customers he served, Gandy informed only a few customers who needed to know.106   
The employee returned to work on the 14 February 2005.  He sought and was granted permission to address 
the staff about his status.  On his return, the employer offered him an internal position at the same package he 
was receiving in the capacity as a technical sales representative.  His manager, Gandy, informed him that he 
and the directors of Eagle felt that Nampak, amongst other customers of Eagle, would be uncomfortable working 
with a sales representative who had AIDS.  He was hence placed in desk-bound position.  The employee 
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rejected this desk-bound position and wanted to continue with his normal position of sales representative, but 
was subsequently placed on an involuntary paid leave “until it was all over”.  On 5 May 2005 the employee was 
summoned to work and served with the notice to attend the disciplinary inquiry on 10 May 2005.  The inquiry 
concluded with the dismissal of the employee.107   
The court found that Eagle had dismissed the employee because it did not want to employ an HIV-positive 
technical sales representative.108  The court, further, observed and found that: 
Today many jurisdictions prohibit discrimination based on a person’s HIV status.  Dismissal of employees because of their 
HIV status is widely acknowledged as discrimination unless the employer can show that being free of HIV is an inherent 
requirement of the job.  Some jurisdictions elevate the protection of persons with HIV to constitutional or statutory law, whilst 
for others it remains soft law in codes and policy.109  Despite these formal advances in South Africa internationally, in reality, 
dismissal remains a major side effect of HIV infection.  The pressure to dismiss may be external e.g. from customers or 
internal e.g. when other employees in the enterprise demand the dismissal of an infected employee.  Often these demands 
stem from fear that is either rational or irrational.110  Camouflaging discrimination under the cloak of misconduct is one of the 
insidious forms of unfair labour practices.  Quick to perceive the unfairness, employees struggle to prove it.  As Eagle denied 
that the reason for dismissing the employee was his HIV positive status, it bore the onus of proving the true reason for 
dismissing the employee to justify its fairness.  It failed to prove that misconduct was the real reason for dismissing the 
employee.  Eagle’s management created a pattern of conduct that leads to only one reasonable conclusion: Eagle’s 
dismissal of the employee on account of his HIV status.  As it denied that that was its reason for the dismissal, questions of 
rationality and justification do not arise.  In the circumstances, Eagle failed to discharge the constitutional and statutory onus 
of proving that the dismissal was not discriminatory.111  HIV remains a highly stigmatised infection that continues to 
marginalise its weak and vulnerable victims.  Employers must be deterred from discriminating against employees on the 
basis of their HIV positive status.112 
 
The court, therefore, ordered that the dismissal of the applicant was automatically unfair.  The employee was 
awarded compensation being the equivalent amount of sixteen months’ remuneration, plus costs.113  It is 
encouraging to observe that the courts have taken such a proactive stance in protecting people who are living 
with HIV/AIDS against unfair dismissal and discrimination due to their HIV positive status.  It is realities like the 
one presented in the case above that make many employees who are infected with HIV reluctant to disclose 
their status to their employers and other employees for the fear that they would be dismissed or discriminated 
against if the employers and employees, respectively, find out about their HIV status.114  This is a fatal blow to 
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114  This was the case with Lydia Majola, whose story is reported in the Move of 6 February 2008 at 18.  (The  
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the head of the school where she was teaching.  She, thereafter, expressed regret for disclosing her status.  She stated that: 
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efforts to prevent the spreading of HIV/AIDS.  It is hoped that future court decisions will be similarly aware of and 
sensitive to the subtle and hidden nature that discrimination against persons who are living with HIV/AIDS may 
take, this will deter employers from discriminating against them and enhance the fight against AIDS.  It will also 
go a long way to end the stigma and discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS in South Africa.   
2.3.6 Discrimination in the healthcare context 
People living with HIV/AIDS are sometimes discriminated by the very same people who are supposed to take 
care of their health, that is, healthcare workers in the healthcare facilities such as clinics and hospitals.  They 
can experience stigma and discrimination such as being refused medicines or access to facilities, receiving HIV 
testing without consent, and lack of confidentiality.115  Such responses are often fuelled by ignorance of HIV 
transmission routes amongst doctors, midwives, nurses and hospital staff.116  That medical staff should perhaps 
have a better understanding of HIV makes discrimination in healthcare settings all the more damaging.117  Many 
people living with HIV/AIDS do not get to choose how, when and to whom to disclose their HIV status.  Studies 
by WHO in India, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand found that 34% of respondents reported breaches of 
confidentiality by health workers.118  Medical confidentiality, as will be discussed in detail in chapter 3 below, is 
very important if patients are to trust healthcare workers and sign up for treatment.  It is even more important in 
the fight against HIV/AIDS.  If patients do not trust healthcare workers such as doctors and nurses, it would 
mean they will not go to hospitals and clinics for testing and treatment of HIV/AIDS.119  This underlines the 
importance of ensuring that healthcare workers are aware of patients’ rights and the consequences that may 
follow if they do not respect those rights.  The patients’ fundamental rights are contained in the Constitution120 
and they include rights such as the right to equality, dignity and privacy.121  
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
thanked me for my time and service.  I thought I was doing the right thing but it seems I was only placing myself in a ring of 
fire.  I felt I had to tell the head of school that I was ill because I was often absent from school.”  See also Sunday Sun of 6 
July 2008, at 1.  (The paper depicted this as “My deadly secret”).  The paper reports about an HIV-positive man who was 
suffering heavy guilt, because HIV has cost him his job, and because he had not told his wife about his HIV-status.  He was 
reported as having said that “After the test, my life became a living hell at work.  They called me names and I was unfairly 
dismissed.”  He lodged a complaint with the CCMA.  But he claimed that “they didn’t help as I was granted a mere R13 200 
as a settlement. I was discriminated against and my rights were violated.” 
115  Parker and Aggleton 6, and Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
116  See Salmon SHAAN online http://www.ipsnews.net/hivaids/section3_1.shtml (visited 20 March 2011), who notes  
that however the stigma and resulting discrimination that people with HIV or AIDS meet is not just the result of ignorance.   
117  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
118  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
119  Barret-Grant K et al HIV/AIDS and the Law: A Resource Manual (2001, The AIDS Law Project and the AIDS Legal  
Network) 123. 
120  The Constitution of 1996. 
121  Section 9 (equality), section 10 (dignity), section 14 (privacy), section 24 (environment) and section 27 (health and  
medical treatment). 
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A violation of patients’ rights may lead to litigation, as was the case in Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger.122 In this 
case, the patient Van Vuuren, sued his doctor for the breach of confidentiality.  Though the doctor of Van 
Vuuren had disclosed his HIV positive status to two other medical practitioners, the court found that that the 
communication was unreasonable and therefore unjustified and wrongful because his doctor had no moral duty 
to transfer the information.123  The court then awarded the estate of Van Vuuren with a sum of R5 000 plus 
costs, as he was already deceased by the time the case was concluded.124  It is important, therefore for the 
healthcare workers to uphold the rights of their patients, especially those of persons living HIV/AIDS.   
The Van Vuuren case and other relevant cases, such as the case of NM v Smith,125 will be discussed in detail in 
chapter 3, below. The Health Professions Council of South Africa’s National Patients’ Rights Charter126 refers to 
persons with HIV as those with special needs.127  
2.3.7 Restrictions on travel and stay 
Persons living with HIV are normally restricted by laws that limit their entry, stay and residence.128  Many 
countries impose restrictions on people living with HIV/AIDS entering their country.129  These restrictions may 
apply to short-term visitors (travelers or tourists) or long-term (students, workers, refugees, immigrants).  
Protection of the public from communicable diseases is a traditional excuse to deny would-be visitors or 
immigrants entrance to countries.130  In general, national governments have the legal authority and discretion to 
restrict entry into their countries, so long as these restrictions do not contradict international treaties to which 
they are members or violate domestic laws.  A common approach used by these countries requires those 
seeking to enter the country to declare their HIV status or submit to an HIV test and they normally target long-
term residents, usually six months or more or permanent residency for HIV-positive people.  However, a few 
countries, including the United States of America, prevent any person who declares that he or she is HIV-
positive from entering the country, usually with the opportunity to apply for a waiver.131  There are approximately 
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sixty countries, territories and areas that have restrictions that specifically apply to HIV or AIDS, based on 
positive status alone.132  This number does not include those countries where the legislation uses language 
such as: “contagious” or “transmissible diseases” if HIV and AIDS are mentioned specifically.  UNAIDS has 
identified around a dozen restrictions applying to HIV-positive people regarding entry, stay and residence.133 
Six countries, including China, require a declaration of HIV status which can result in HIV-positive people denied 
entry or stay, or need for discretionary approval.134  Twenty-six countries, including Egypt, Russia, China, Korea 
and the United States (US) deport foreigners based on their positive status alone.135  Some countries have 
policies that could violate confidentiality of status if, for example, a stamp is required on a waiver or passport in 
order to gain entry or stay.  Students living with HIV are barred from applying to study in certain countries, 
including Malaysia, the United States and Syria.136   Most of the laws that restrict persons living with HIV are 
unnecessary and they might also be influenced by ignorance of the manner in which HIV is transmitted and are 
tantamount to discrimination persons living with HIV/AIDS.   
The countries that use these entry restrictions based on the HIV status generally justify them on public health 
grounds.137  They argue that by testing and screening persons with HIV, a country could prevent the introduction 
and spreading of the disease within the country.  Furthermore, because many people with HIV are 
asymptomatic, testing may provide early detection and the ability to seek treatment earlier in the course of the 
disease.  A second justification is that limiting entry of HIV-positive persons will reduce the cost of treatment and 
care for HIV and AIDS that long-term visitors or immigrants will incur within the health system.138  
However, it can be argued on the other hand that entry restrictions and requirements are particularly unhelpful 
from a public health view.139  Unlike many other communicable diseases that may justify entry restrictions, HIV 
cannot be transmitted through casual contact.  There is also no evidence that entry restrictions have a 
significant effect on the prevention of HIV transmission.  Most countries do not screen or exclude returning 
nationals for HIV.  Furthermore, testing may produce false positive or negatives and may not detect persons 
recently infected with HIV because they have not yet produced HIV antibodies.  While long-term visitors and 
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immigrants who are HIV positive may indeed require public health care services and therefore add to the 
charges on the state’s public health budget, such a financial argument to justify the entry exclusion would be 
discriminatory as there are no entry exclusions for people with other high-cost diseases such as, for example, 
cancer.140    
 
In the case of Kiyutin v Russia,141 the applicant, Mr Viktor Viktorovich Kiyutin, born in the Uzbek SSR of the 
Soviet Union in 1971, acquired citizenship of Uzbekistan upon the collapse of the USSR.  In October 2002, his 
brother bought a house with a plot of land in the village of Lesnoy in the Oryol Region of Russia.  In 2003 the 
applicant, his half-brother and their mother arrived from Uzbekistan to live there.  On 18 July 2003 the applicant 
married a Russian national and they had a daughter in January 2004.  In the meantime, in August 2003, the 
applicant applied for a residence permit.  He was required to undergo a medical examination during which he 
tested positive for HIV.  On account of that circumstance, his application for a residence permit was refused.  
The refusal was upheld at final instance by the Oryol Regional Court on 13 October 2004.142  In April 2009 the 
applicant filed a new application for a temporary residence permit.  Following his application, on 6 May 2009 the 
Federal Migration Service determined that he had been unlawfully resident in Russia and imposed a fine of 
2,500 Russian roubles.  By a decision of 26 June 2009, the Oryol Region Federal Migration Service rejected his 
application for a residence permit by reference to section 7 § 1 (13) of the Foreign Nationals Act, which 
restricted the issue of residence permit to foreign nationals who could not show their HIV-negative status.  The 
decision indicated that the applicant was to leave Russia within three days or be subject to deportation.  The 
applicant challenged the refusal in court.143   
On 13 August 2009 the Severnity District Court of Oryol rejected his complaint due to the fact that he was HIV-
positive.  The applicant lodged an appeal, relying on the Constitutional Court’s decision of 12 May 2006 and the 
UN documents on AIDS prevention.  On 16 September 2009 the Oryol Regional Court rejected his appeal in a 
summary fashion.  On 20 October 2009 the applicant underwent a medical examination at the Oryol Regional 
Centre for AIDS Prevention.  He was diagnosed with the progressive phase of HIV, Hepatitis B and C, and 
prescribed highly active antiretroviral therapy (HAART) for life saving indications.  On 25 November 2009 the 
Oryol Regional Court refused to institute supervisory review proceedings and upheld the previous judgments as 
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lawful and justified.144  The applicant complained to the European Court of Human Rights under Articles 8, 13, 
14 and 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights145 that the decision to refuse him authorisation to 
reside in Russia had be disproportionate to the legitimate aim of the protection of public health and had 
disrupted his right to live with his family.146  The applicant, therefore, alleged, in particular, that he had been 
victim of discrimination on account of his health status in his application for a Russian residence permit.147   
The Court noted that the focal point of the present application was the difference of treatment to which the 
applicant was subjected on account of his health status when applying for a residence permit.  Having regard to 
the circumstances of the case and bearing in mind that it is master of the characterisation to be given in law to 
the facts of the case, the Court considered it appropriate to examine the applicant’s grievances from the 
standpoint of Article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 8.148  The Court noted that from the 
onset of the epidemic in the 1980’s, people living with HIV/AIDS have suffered from widespread stigma and 
exclusion, including within the Council of Europe region.  In the early years of the epidemic when HIV/AIDS 
diagnosis was nearly always a lethal condition and very little was known about the risk of transmission, people 
were scared of those infected due to the fear of contagion.  Ignorance about how the diseases spread has bred 
prejudice which, in turn, has stigmatised or marginalised those who carry the virus.  As the information on ways 
of transmission accumulated, HIV infection has been traced back to behaviours, such as same-sex intercourse, 
drug injection, prostitution or promiscuity, that were already stigmatised in many societies, creating a false nexus 
between infection and personal irresponsibility and reinforcing other forms of stigma and discrimination, such as 
racism, homophobia or misogyny.149   
In recent times, despite considerable progress in HIV prevention and better access to HIV treatment, stigma and 
related discrimination against people living with HIV has remained a subject of great concern for all international 
organisations active in the field of HIV/AIDS.  The Court therefore considered that people living with HIV are a 
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vulnerable group with a history of prejudice and stigmatisation and that the state should be afforded only a 
narrow margin of appreciation in choosing measures that single out this group for differential treatment on the 
basis of their HIV status.150   
The Court, further, noted that admittedly, travel restrictions are instrumental for the protection of public health 
against highly contagious diseases with a short incubation period, such as cholera or yellow fever or, to take 
more recent examples, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and ‘bird flu’ (H5N1).  Entry restrictions 
relating to such conditions can help to prevent their spread by excluding travellers who may transmit these 
diseases by their presence in a country through casual contact or airborne particles.  However, the mere 
presence of a HIV-positive individual in a country is not in itself a threat to public health: HIV is not transmitted 
casually but through specific behaviours that include sexual intercourse and sharing of syringes as the main 
routes of transmission.  This does not put prevention exclusively within the control of the HIV-infected non-
national but rather enables HIV-negative persons to take steps to protect themselves against infection.151 
Furthermore, it appeared that Russia did not apply HIV-related travel restrictions to tourists or short-term visitors.  
Nor does it impose HIV tests on Russian nationals leaving and returning to the country.  Taking into account that 
the methods of HIV transmission remain the same irrespective of the duration of a person’s presence in the 
Russian territory and his or her nationality, the Court saw no explanation for a selective enforcement of HIV-
related restrictions against foreigners who apply for residence in Russia but not against the above-mentioned 
categories, who actually represent the great majority of travellers and migrants.  There was no reason to 
assume that they were less likely to engage in unsafe behaviour than settled migrants.  It followed that the 
application of HIV-related restrictions only in the case of prospective long-term residents was not an effective 
approach in the prevention of HIV by HIV-positive migrants.152  The differential treatment of HIV-positive long-
term settlers as opposed to short-term visitors may be objectively justified by the risk that the former could 
potentially become a public burden and place an excessive demand on the public-funded health care system, 
whereas the latter would seek treatment elsewhere.  However, this was not the case in Russia as non-Russian 
nationals had no entitlement to free medical assistance, except emergency treatment, and had to pay 
themselves for all medical services.  Thus, irrespective of whether or not the applicant obtained a residence 
permit in Russia, he would not be eligible to draw on Russia’s public health care system.  Accordingly, the risk 
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that he would represent a financial burden on Russian health care funds was not convincingly established.153  
The Court, therefore, correctly found that in the light of the foregoing, although the protection of public health 
was indeed a legitimate aim, the Government was unable to adduce compelling and objective arguments to 
show that this aim could be attained by the applicant’s exclusion from residence on account of his health 
status.154   
Furthermore, that taking into account that the applicant belonged to a particularly vulnerable group, that his 
exclusion has not been shown to have a reasonable and objective justification, and that the contested legislative 
provisions did not make room for an individualised evaluation, the Court found that the Government overstepped 
the narrow margin of appreciation afforded to them in the instant case.  The applicant has therefore been a 
victim of discrimination on account of his health status, in violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken together 
with Article 8.155  The Court therefore declared the complaint concerning the refusal of a residence permit 
admissible and held that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with 
Article 8.156   
This judgment by the European Court, indeed, has to lauded, because it was clear to the court that there was no 
justified refusal of residence to Kiyutin, except for the prejudice, ignorance, stigmatisation and discrimination 
against people living with HIV/AIDS.  As the court correctly, indicated HIV is not transmitted through casual 
contact and there is absolutely no reason why long-term residents should be excluded, if the other categories 
such as tourists and returning nationals are not screened for HIV.  It is only hoped that other courts will follow 
the example set out by this European Court case in protecting people living with HIV/AIDS against unreasonable 
restrictions when they seek permanent residence in other countries.157   
Fortunately, there are few countries, however, which do not have entry restrictions against people who are living 
with HIV/AIDS.  Iceland is one of the countries that has one of the most progressive and accommodating 
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programs for travelers and immigrants with HIV.158  There are no travel restrictions for people with HIV, and 
neither a declaration nor a test is required.  A health examination is required when a person applies for a permit 
to become a permanent resident.  However, if health authorities determine that someone has tested positive for 
HIV during this process, he or she is not restricted from obtaining permanent resident status.  Instead, he or she 
is immediately enrolled in the national health care services and the usual six months residency requirement for 
entry into the health services is waived.159  Cambodia, also, does not restrict residency or travel on the basis of 
HIV.160     
Countries such as Iceland and Cambodia are to be commended for their fair treatment of people living with 
HIV/AIDS.  Furthermore, international instruments such as the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human 
Rights161 protect persons living with HIV/AIDS against discrimination when they seek asylum from other 
countries.  Article 131 of the Guidelines provides that the Human Rights Committee has confirmed that the right 
to equal protection of the law prohibits discrimination in law or in practice in any field regulated and protected by 
public authorities.  These would include travel regulations, entry requirements, immigration and asylum 
procedures.  Therefore, although there is no right of aliens to enter a foreign country or to be granted asylum in 
any particular country, discrimination on the grounds of HIV status in the context of travel regulations, entry 
requirements, immigration and asylum procedures would violate the right to equality before the law.  Countries, 
therefore, should put an end to the practice of having unjustifiable restrictions and requirements for persons 
living with HIV/AIDS.  
2.3.8 Discrimination by insurance companies 
People living with HIV/AIDS are sometimes discriminated against when they apply for an insurance policy by 
insurance companies.  Insurance companies usually require their potential clients to take an HIV test when they 
apply for insurance policies.162    If a person refuses to take an HIV test, he or she will probably be refused 
                                                          
158  Gable 70. 
159  Gable 70. 
160  Gable 70. 
161  International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights of the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS  
(UNAIDS 2006 (129-131)). 
162  See Life Offices’ Association (LOA) (an association of life insurance companies), Code of Conduct HIV Testing  
Protocol, 22 November 2006, which is binding on all member offices.  According to LOA Code of Conduct-HIV Testing 
Protocol-HIV Testing Information Sheet (Annexure 2) 29 May 2008, you have the following rights: 1. Not to be tested for the 
AIDS virus without your free and informed consent.  2.  To be given all relevant information on the harms, risks and benefits 
of taking, or not taking, the AIDS test.  3.  To refuse to take the test.  If you do this, your application for insurance may be 
denied.  4.  To receive pre-test counseling which is private and confidential, and which will inform you more about the test 
and its implications before you give consent.  5. To have your test results treated confidentially.  6.  To post-test counseling if 
the test is positive.   
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insurance.  Every year, over a million people agree to have HIV tests at the request of the insurance industry.163  
For many people, this is when they first find out about their HIV status.164  Often, persons are refused life 
insurance when they test HIV-positive, and for many, this is just the start of their problems.165  They may find 
that there has been a breach of their privacy when their HIV status is disclosed without their permission,166 or 
that they are not able to get a home loan because they cannot get life insurance.167  Faced with these problems, 
the question that arises is whether it is fair for the insurance industry to exclude people with HIV, and what their 
rights are under these circumstances.168   
Insurance companies claim that they test for the AIDS virus because underwriting is the basis of assurance to 
ensure that applicant pays a premium appropriate to the risk.  The insurance company therefore requires 
information from the applicant to assist it in assessing the risk of granting the insurance and to establish an 
appropriate premium.  Insurance companies screen applicants for serious diseases or habits that may affect 
their state of health.  This may be done through questionnaires, medical examinations and other tests including 
a test for the AIDS virus.169  Medical impairments such as HIV/AIDS, blindness, cancer, kidney failure, account 
the substantial risks, that means with higher-than-average mortality and shorter life expectancy, and are 
therefore declined, hence the distinction between insurable and non-insurable risks.170   
Risk is the foundation of insurance.  Insurance companies consider HIV/AIDS as a catastrophic risk because 
persons suffering from AIDS are likely to die shortly after they have been infected.171  Though, it may be argued 
that this is no longer the case in all HIV/AIDS patients, because of the life-prolonging effect of anti-retrovirals 
(ARVs), many patients live much longer than they would without treatment.  In South Africa, life expectancy for 
HIV-positive persons is estimated between eight to ten years.  This means that even if the cost of insurance for 
                                                          
163  See the Van Vuuren case, paragraph [3], where reference is made to the plaintiff, Van Vuuren, who applied for a  
life insurance policy from Liberty Life Insurance company.  He was informed by the insurance company that he had to take 
an HIV test.  He agreed to take the test and went to his doctor to have the test done.  He was then informed by his doctor 
that his results showed that he was HIV-positive. 
164  Barret-Grant 294. 
165  Barret-Grant 294.  Though, Barret-Grant also points out at 299, that “[F]ew companies offer special policies for  
people with HIV.  Most insurers charge high premiums and often limit the amount that a person’s life can be insured for.” 
166  See the Van Vuuren case, paragraph [38], where Van Vuuren’s doctor violated his privacy by informing two other  
medical doctors. 
167  Barret-Grant 294. 
168  Barret-Grant 294. 
169  See LOA Code of Conduct-HIV Testing Protocol-HIV Testing Information Sheet (Annexure 2) 29 May 2008. 
170  Ramaroson M The human right of HIV positive persons to non-discrimination in getting life insurance in South  
Africa (Unpublished LLM dissertation University of Pretoria 2003) 11. 
171  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 13.  Furthermore, Barret-Grant at 299, also points out that insurance companies claim  
that they screen for HIV because people with HIV will probably die or become incapacitated at a younger age and that the 
risk of insuring this category is too great. 
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HIV-positive persons can be calculated, insurance is not practical because the premium that is determined by 
the insurer would be too high and consequently the individual will not be able or willing to pay for it.172  This 
seems to be a dilemma for persons living with HIV/AIDS, as it could be argued that instead of insurance 
companies excluding them from being covered by their insurance policies, the companies should rather increase 
their premiums in order to include HIV/AIDS positive people. Sadly, the majority of persons living with HIV/AIDS 
are poor and many survive on social grants. They would not be able to afford high premiums that are charged by 
insurance companies.   
This problem is also exacerbated by the fact that, as Ramaroson points out,173 it seems clear that it is neither in 
the interest of insurance companies to issue a life insurance policy to an individual who seems likely to pay only 
a few premiums, nor is it in their interest to insure an individual whose benefits are likely to be paid out soon 
after the policy has been issued.  It is rather in the interest of insurance companies to insure only individuals 
whose life expectancy is high.  Moreover, insurance companies are under no obligation to accept proposals for 
insurance, be it life insurance or any other type.  They rather have to ensure that their policies are actuarially 
sound and that the premiums distinctions are actuarially justified.174  However, as Ramaroson argues,175 refusal 
of the benefits of a life cover to persons living with HIV/AIDS and their family amounts to unfair discrimination on 
the part of the insurance companies mainly because of its impact176 on them and their families.  Such a refusal 
is very likely to lead them to their financial ruin and deny financial security to their families.  Such practice 
unfairly discriminates against persons living with HIV/AIDS and it is all the more discriminatory as the insurance 
industry seems to only put forward financial and economic motivations while the persons living with HIV/AIDS 
merely claim their human rights.177  It is also regarded as one of unfair practices listed by the Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act.178   
Discrimination by insurance companies of persons living with HIV/AIDS due to their HIV status can be said to be 
an unfair discrimination.179  Such discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS may only lead to many of 
                                                          
172  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 13. 
173  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 13. 
174  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 15. 
175  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 33. 
176  See the Hoffmann case, paragaraph [28], where Ngcobo J observed that: “The impact of discrimination on HIV  
positive people is devastating.” 
177  Ramaroson LLM dissertation 33. 
178  See Section 29 Schedule to the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 which  
provides at 5(c) that it is unfair practice to unfairly disadvantage a person or persons, including unfairly and unreasonably 
refusing to grant services, to persons solely on the basis of HIV/AIDS status. 
179  See International Labour Conference 2009 Article 160. 
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them being afraid to go for HIV testing and also for them not to benefit from insurance cover.  It may be 
understandable that insurance companies need to be financially competitive like all other businesses, hence 
they will put their financial interests first, rather than human rights of persons living with HIV/AIDS.180  However, 
HIV/AIDS is one of the most devastating illnesses in the history of South Africa. In view of this, insurance 
companies should balance their financial interests with the contribution to society that they can make in the fight 
against this pandemic and to lessen the stigma and discrimination against this disease.  This will happen if they 
start providing cover for people living with HIV/AIDS.  It is encouraging that there are few insurance companies, 
such Old Mutual and Metropolitan Life, which already grant life cover to HIV-positive individuals.181   
It is hoped that other insurance companies will in future review their policies on exclusion of persons living with 
HIV/AIDS and follow the example of the two insurance companies by granting life cover to one of the most 
vulnerable groups in society.182 
2.3.9 Discrimination by the government 
Government laws and policies, as was the case with apartheid laws, may have the effect to discriminate against 
its own citizens.  This is evident in countries where laws are promulgated to discriminate against people who are 
living with HIV AIDS.183  Indeed, there are many ways that the government may directly or indirectly discriminate 
against people or communities with (or suspected of having) HIV/AIDS.  Examples of discriminatory measures 
include compulsory screening and testing; compulsory notification of AIDS cases; restrictions of the right to 
anonymity; prohibition of persons living with HIV/AIDs from certain occupations, as well as medical examination, 
isolation, detention and compulsory treatment of infected persons.184  Compulsory testing, for example, will not 
be necessary in a society where no stigma is attached to a specific condition, as individuals would not be 
unwilling or hesitant to be tested out of fear for ostracism or unfair discrimination. As discussed above, there is a 
difference between fair and unfair discrimination and other laws may discriminate in a fair manner against 
                                                          
180  As Ramaroson 33, states above. 
181  Ramaroson 19. 
182  In fact according to International Labour Conference 2009 Article 167, African Life lifted HIV/AIDS exclusions on  
life insurance policies in 2004.  In addition, the 36 member companies of the South African Life Offices Association have 
scrapped HIV exclusion clauses for clients applying for new policies, removed HIV exclusion clauses from existing and new 
life policies.  
183  Parker and Aggleton 5. 
184  Parker and Aggleton 5. 
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persons living with HIV/AIDS.  Many of these laws may sometimes be justified on the grounds that AIDS poses a 
public health risk.185   
2.3.10 Legal opinions regarding discrimination 
The South African government is bound by the Bill of Rights which is entrenched in the Constitution.186  The 
government is required to make laws that comply with the Constitution187 and any law that is inconsistent with it, 
will be invalid.188  Section 9 of the Constitution is the Equality Clause.  Section 9 states that:  
(1) Everyone is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.   
(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms.  To promote the achievement of equality, 
legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged 
by unfair discrimination may be taken. 
(3) The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, 
religion, conscience, belief, culture, language and birth. 
(4) No person may unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds in terms of 
subsection (3).  National legislation must be enacted to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. 
 
What this section means to people who are living with HIV and AIDS, is that they are equal with anyone in South 
Africa before the law and have the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.  It also means that they may 
not be unfairly discriminated against by either the government or anyone due to their HIV status.  Regrettably, 
HIV/AIDS is not listed as one of the grounds for non-discrimination.  The equality clause furthermore stipulates 
that no person may discriminate against someone using other grounds not listed in section 9.189  The idea is to 
prohibit unfair discrimination based on “other” grounds that may not be specifically listed, but that are used to 
unfairly discriminate, such as HIV infection.190  Whether there is discrimination on an unlisted ground depends 
upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to 
                                                          
185  Zaccagnini http://www.avert.org/aidsstigma.htm (visited 27 February 2010). 
186  The Constitution of 1996, chapter 2. 
187  See Section 2 of the Constitution of 1996 which declares that: “This Constitution is the supreme law of the  
Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.”  
188  See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) paragraph [146], where the Constitutional Court declared the death  
sentence to be inconsistent with section 11(2) of the interim Constitution and S v Williams 1995 (7) BCLR 861 (CC) 
paragraph [96], where the Constitutional Court declared corporal punishment to be invalid and of no force and effect.  See 
also the Namibian case of Ex Parte Attorney-General, Namibia: in re Corporal Punishment by Organs of State 1991 (3) 76 
(NmSC), where the Namibian Supreme Court held that the imposition of any sentence by any judicial or quasi-judicial 
authority, or directing any corporal punishment upon any person is unlawful and in conflict with art 8 of the Namibian 
Constitution.  
189  Section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996.    
190  Currie and De Waal 243, Barret-Grant 67 and Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 96. 
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impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or affect them adversely in a comparably 
serious manner.191    
The equality clause also compelled the government to promulgate national legislation to prevent or prohibit 
unfair discrimination and such legislation was subsequently made in the form of the Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (herafter the Equality Act).192  However, the Equality Act also does not 
list HIV status separately from disability as a ground for non-discrimination.193  The Equality Act recognises the 
fact that in view of the overwhelming evidence of the importance, impact on society and link to systemic 
disadvantage and discrimination on the grounds of HIV/AIDS status, socio-economic status, nationality, family 
responsibility and family status, the Minister must give special consideration to adding HIV/AIDS and these other 
grounds to the list of prohibited grounds.194  The legislation that seems to be specific on prohibition of unfair 
discrimination based on the ground of HIV, albeit only in the work environment, is the Employment Equity Act.195  
Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act states that: 
No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, 
colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and 
birth. 
 
Although the Employment Equity Act should be praised for recognising HIV/AIDS as a ground for non-
discrimination in the workplace, it is, however, disappointing that a country such as South Africa that is one of 
the countries with the highest number of HIV-infected persons, omitted to have HIV listed as a ground for non-
discrimination in both the Constitution and the Equality Act.196   
                                                          
191  Govindjee A et al Introduction to Human Rights Law (2009, Durban: LexisNexis) 79. 
192  Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, of 2000 (hereafter referred to as the Equality  
Act). 
193  Barret-Grant 69.  See The Hoffman case, paragraph [40], where the Constitutional Court having declared that the  
denial of employment to the appellant because he was living with HIV impaired his dignity and constituted unfair 
discrimination, however avoided to consider whether the appellant was discriminated against on a listed ground of disability.  
194  Section 34(1)(a) of the Equality Act. 
195  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 section 6(1).  See also the Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects  
of HIV/AIDS and Employment Section 6(1) of the Employment Equity Act which states that “[n]o person with HIV or AIDS 
shall be unfairly discriminated against within the employment relationship or any employment policies or practices.”  See also 
Grogan 135. 
196  Barret-Grant 69.  Barret-Grant argues that there are strong reasons for HIV to be treated as a separate  
listed ground for non-discrimination under the Equality Act: 
 HIV/AIDS is a national epidemic that affects an increasingly large number of people in South Africa. 
 People living with or affected by HIV or AIDS face a wide range of unfair discrimination and stigmatisation in all aspects of 
life, and the Equality Act should recognise this to ensure non-discrimination on the basis of HIV/AIDS. 
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It is recognised in the Employment Equity Act, Code of Good Practice on Key Aspects of HIV/AIDS and 
Employment, in section 1(1.1), that HIV and AIDS are serious public health problems which have socio-
economic, employment and human rights implications.197  This means that HIV and AIDS also need a more 
stern approach from the law-makers if the spread of this epidemic is to be curbed.  If HIV status is made a 
separate prohibited ground, it would be easier for a person living with HIV or AIDS to show in a court of law that 
they were unfairly discriminated against.  They would only need to prove that there was discrimination, and the 
person accused of discrimination would need to prove that it was not unfair discrimination.198   
 
One of the reasons why HIV/AIDS is not listed separately as a ground of non-discrimination could have been 
influenced by the debate regarding HIV/AIDS ‘exceptionalism’.  Some authors argue that with regard to the 
prevention of HIV, South Africa took its lead from Europe and North America where so-called HIV 
‘exceptionalism’ had taken root.199  Listing HIV/AIDS as a ground for non-discrimination, for instance, would be 
regarded by some as treating the disease in an exceptional manner compared to other diseases, which may 
perpetuate the stigma of AIDS instead of ending it.200  There are authors who believe HIV/AIDS should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 By making HIV status a separate prohibited ground, it is easier for a person living with HIV or AIDS to show in a court of law 
that they were unfairly discriminated against.  They would just need to prove that there was discrimination, and the person 
accused of discrimination would need to prove that it was not unfair discrimination.  A person living with HIV or AIDS can 
then claim that they were unfairly discriminated against on: The ground of HIV status or on the ground of disability. 
197  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
198  Barret-Grant 69. 
199  See Spencer D “Medical ethics and the politics of the South African HIV/AIDS epidemic” 2006 The Southern  
African Journal of HIV Medicine 47-52, who at 51 points out that case isolation, quarantine, contact identification, notification 
and the provision of treatment underpin the effective public health response to a serious communicable disease.   However, 
South with regard to HIV prevention took its lead from Europe and North America where HIV exceptionalism had taken root.  
Notification and identification were deemed to be an infringement of individual’s rights and likely to drive the epidemic 
underground.  See also Richter M, Francois WD and Gray A “Issues in public health: Home self-testing for HIV: Aids 
Exceptionalism gone wrong” 2010 (100;10) SAMJ 636-642, 636. 
200  De Cock KM, Mbori-Ngacha D and Marum E “Shadow on the continent: public health and HIV/AIDS in Africa in the  
21st century” 2002 (360) The Lancet 67-72, 69, for instance, point out that paradoxically, treating HIV/AIDS as being different 
from other infectious diseases probably enhances stigma rather than reduces it. 
61 
 
treated exceptional to other diseases and there are those who are against exceptionalism.201  AIDS 
exceptionalism will be discussed in detail below.202       
In Harksen v Lane NO,203 the Constitutional Court clearly tabulated the stages of constitutional enquiry when an 
allegation of an infringement of section 8 (the predecessor of section 9 of the present Constitution) of the interim 
Constitution is made.  These are the following:  
(a) Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does differentiation bear a rational 
connection to a legitimate government purpose? If it does not, then there is violation of s 8(1).  Even if it does bear a 
rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination. 
(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two stage analysis: 
(b)(i) Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’?  If it is on a specified ground, then 
discrimination will have been established.  If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is 
discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and 
characteristics that have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human 
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
(b)(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to ‘unfair discrimination’? If it has been 
found to have been on a specified ground, then unfairness will be presumed.  If on an unspecified 
ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant.  The test of unfairness focuses 
primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation.  If at 
the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no 
violation of s 8(2). 
(c) If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can 
be justified under the limitation clause (section 33 of the interim Constitution).204 
 
Looking at the Harksen’s test, above, it becomes clear why it may be argued and submitted that HIV/AIDS 
should have been made a specified ground in the Constitution and the Equality Act.  It is easier for a 
complainant to prove discrimination or unfair discrimination if the differentiation is on a specified ground than 
when it is on an unspecified ground.  On a specified ground, the complainant only has to allege differentiation 
and discrimination is established and it will also be presumed to be unfair discrimination.205  However, on an 
                                                          
201  See the following writers who will be discussed in detail at 2.3.9.1, below: Smith JH and Whiteside A “The history  
of AIDS exceptionalism” 2010 (13) Journal of the International AIDS Society 47, Whiteside A “Is AIDS exceptional?” 
AIDS2031 Working Paper No. 25 HEARD 1-25, Richter, Francois and Gray 2010 SAMJ 636-642, Bayer R and Fairchild AL 
“Changing the Paradigm for HIV Testing-The End of Exceptionalism” 2006 (355;7) N ENGL J MED 647-649, 648, De Cock 
KM and Johnson AM “From exceptionalism to normalisation: a reappraisal of attitudes and practice around HIV testing” 1998 
(316;7127) BMJ 290, Spencer 2006 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 51, April MD “Rethinking HIV 
exceptionalism: the ethics of opt-out HIV testing in sub-Saharan Africa” 2010 (88) Bull World Health Organ 703-708, Burr C 
“The AIDS exception: privacy vs. public health” 1997 The Atlantic online, De Cock, Mbori-Ngacha and Marum 2002 The 
Lancet 67-72 and Alcorn K AIDS exceptionalism a defensible concept http://www.aidsmap.com/print/AIDS-exceptionalism-a-
defensible-concept-says-Stephen-Le... (visited 8 March 2011).            
202  See AIDS exceptionalism at 2.3.9.1. below. 
203  The Harksen case, paragraph [53].  See also Currie & De Waal 235. 
204  The Harksen case paragraph [53]. 
205  See President of the Republic of South Africa and Another v Hugo 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) paragraph [33]  
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unspecified ground, the complainant has to establish that there was discrimination and that it was unfair.  In 
President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo,206 the Constitutional Court correctly held that: 
The prohibition on unfair discrimination in the interim Constitution seeks not only to avoid discrimination against people who 
are members of disadvantaged groups.  It seeks more than that.  At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a 
recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the establishment of a society in which all 
human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups.  The 
achievement of such a society in the context of our deeply inegalitarian past will not be easy, but that that is the goal of the 
Constitution should not be forgotten or overlooked.   
  
The society in which all human beings are accorded equal dignity and respect also include persons living with 
HIV/AIDS.  People should not be unfairly discriminated against as a result of their health status.  As Gostin 
points out: 
Every major governmental, medical, public health organization to issue a report on the HIV epidemic has condemned 
discrimination because it violates basic tenets of individual justice and is detrimental to public health.  Discrimination based 
on an infectious condition is just as inequitable as discrimination based on race, gender or disability.  People are treated 
inequitably not because they lack inherent ability, but solely because of a health status.  As a result, complex and often 
pernicious mythologies develop about the nature, cause and transmission of disease.207  Discrimination also undermines 
public health.  If individuals fear social and economic repercussions, they may forego testing or fail to discuss their health 
and risk behaviours with counselors or health care professionals and, even more importantly, with their sex or needle-sharing 
partners.208 
 
Gostin correctly concludes that discrimination based on an infectious condition is just as inequitable as 
discrimination based on race, gender, disability or other health conditions.209  In each case, people are treated 
inequitably not because they lack inherent ability, but solely because of a status over which they have no 
control.210  Discriminating against people based on conditions or status that they do not have control over, such 
as illness and disability, therefore, is unfair discrimination and it must be addressed.  Discrimination based on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
(herafter the Hugo case) where the Constitutional Court held that the Presidential Act prima facie discriminates on one of the 
grounds listed in section 8(2).  As such, section 8(4) requires us to presume that the discrimination is unfair, until the contrary 
is proved.”  See, also, the Brink case, paragraph [43], where the Constitutional Court held that it is sufficient if the 
discrimination is substantially based on one of the listed grounds in section 8(2).  See, also, Pretoria City Council v Walker 
1998 (2) SA 363 (CC) paragraph [36], where the Constitutional Court held that since the differentiation was on one of the 
grounds specified in s 8(2) of the Constitution, the applicant bore the burden of rebutting the presumption of ‘unfair 
discrimination’. 
206  The Hugo case, paragraph [41]. 
207  Gostin 48. 
208  Gostin 48-9. 
209  Gostin 48, Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y 270 and AIDS Law Project  
Discrimination http://www.aidslawproject.org/issues/Discrimination (visited 30 May 2011).   
210  Gostin and Webber 2000 HeinOnline J. Health Care L. & Pol’y  270. 
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person’s status leads to intolerance, violence and increase the stigma that people with HIV face regularly.211  
HIV infection, therefore, must also be treated just like these other specified grounds.212  HIV infection is an even 
more crucial ground than those grounds specified in the Constitution or the Equality Act because AIDS kills 
approximately a thousand persons a day.213   
Discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS also undermines public health.214    As long as there is a 
perception that a HIV-positive status will lead to these persons becoming ostracised, marginalised and isolated, 
people will be reluctant to go for testing and will then not know their status.  The danger of an undiagnosed 
status is that such a person, if already infected, may infect others.  A person who fears discrimination by either 
his or her family, community or employer, will in most cases not disclose his or her status to his or her sex 
partner(s) or needle-sharing partners,215  infecting these persons in the process.216  All of these factors, 
therefore, have a direct impact on the spreading of HIV/AIDS in South Africa.  More stringent efforts are required 
by the government and all South African citizens to end discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS.   
2.3.10.1 AIDS exceptionalism 
Since recognition of the first cases of HIV in 1981, AIDS has been treated differently from other infectious 
diseases.217  This exceptional treatment of this disease from other diseases led to what is referred to as ‘aids 
exceptionalism’.218  The word “exception” (noun) is defined by the Oxford Advanced Dictionary of Current 
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212  Gutto 228-30. 
213  Brown LT and Ebert C “The endemic Epidemic: New challenges in the battle against HIV/AIDS in South Africa”  
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was HIV positive.” 
217  De Cock and Johnson 1998 BMJ 290, and De Cock, Mbori-Ngacha and Marum 2002 The Lancet 67-72. 
218  See Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47, Whiteside HEARD 4, Richter,   
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English219 as excepting, which means not including someone or something but it also means to treat someone 
or something as a special case and also something that does not follow the rule.220  To a certain extent, as will 
be shown below, the treatment of AIDS as an exception complied with these definitions.  The word 
‘exceptionalism’ is not found in most dictionaries.221  Exceptionalism means to treat or to give something the 
status of being exceptional and can be positive or negative depending on the context or circumstances.222 
As far as AIDS exceptionalism is concerned, authors seem to agree on its history, that is, on how it came about 
that this disease had to be treated exceptionally from other diseases and also agree that it arose as a Western 
response to the originally terrifying and lethal nature of the virus, which has disproportionately affected specific 
groups, such as homosexuals and intravenous-drug users, and also that it was due to the fear of discrimination 
and stigmatisation of these groups.223  As a result of this fear, therefore, the first activists argued that HIV/AIDS 
required an exceptional response in order to protect the rights of those infected, to generate resources to assist 
them and to curb a then mysterious epidemic.224  The gay rights movement, also, building on the momentum it 
had gained in the preceding decades, began campaigning for HIV/AIDS to be viewed as a human rights 
issue.225  Advocates argued that infection was not the only risk; if found positive, but individuals also faced 
harmful discrimination.  In this they were supported by public health officials, who feared that stigma would 
prevent those at risk from getting tested, and those infected from accessing health services.226  It was critical at 
the time to avoid compulsory measures such as isolation and quarantine, which were so much part of public 
health tradition,227 since the persons with increased risk, that is, gay and bisexual men, drug users and their 
sexual partners, were already socially vulnerable.228  Policies and practices that appeared to threaten such 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Atlantic online and Alcorn at http://www.aidsmap.com/print/AIDS-exceptionalism-a-defensible-concept-says-Stephen-Le... 
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220  Hornby 295. 
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223  See Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47, Whiteside HEARD 1, Burr 1997 The  
Atlantic online, De Cock and Johnson 1998 BMJ 290, Spencer 2006 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 51, April 
2010 Bull World Health Organ 703 and Bayer and Fairchild 2006 N ENG J MED 648.    
224  Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47.  See also Whiteside HEARD 1, who  
points out that fear was amongst the first responses to AIDS. 
225  Bayer R “Public health policy and the AIDS epidemic: An end to HIV exceptionalism?” N Engl J Med 1991  
(324) 1500-1504, 1502. 
226  Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47 and De Cock and Johnson 1998 BMJ  
290. 
227  Spencer 2006 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 51. 
228  Bayer and Fairchild 2006 N Eng J Med 648.  See also Greene 38, Khoat 2005 AIDS Care S181, Leickness 2007  
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persons could only drive the epidemic underground and make it more difficult to work with the population within 
which HIV was spreading.229    
Recognising the unique needs of populations at risk of HIV infection, an exceptionalist alliance, including the gay 
community, liberal and left-wing parties, and healthcare and psychosocial professions, was formed to advocate 
for an exceptional response.230   
Responding to these campaigns, therefore, in the 1980’s public health generally adopted a human rights 
framework that took societal-based vulnerability into consideration and increasingly became involved in societal 
transformation efforts.231  HIV/AIDS was positioned as not only a health condition, but also as a social issue that 
required a political, as well as a medical, response.  As a result, the scientific establishment’s control on the 
public health initiative was called for: one that provided counseling, protected privacy, and empowered the 
patient.232  In South Africa, in particular, an exceptionalist approach to HIV/AIDS led to a novel methodology in 
the diagnosis of HIV: voluntary counseling and testing (VCT), which includes pre- and post-test counseling, 
express and informed consent that an HIV test would be conducted on the patient, and assurances of the 
confidentiality of the test results.233  Exceptionalism, therefore, posited that in the early years of the HIV 
epidemic, HIV was considered so different, so exceptional in comparison to other communicable diseases that 
its advocates and public health officials agreed that HIV policy cater to the uniqueness of the epidemic rather 
than treat it like all other communicable diseases.234  HIV/AIDS in its early years, therefore, was treated as an 
exceptional disease to all other diseases.   
More recently, however, AIDS exceptionalism came to refer to the disease-specific global response.  This 
international response was unprecedented, as the commitment of resources exceeded any other health cause.  
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234  Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47. See also Spencer 2006 The Southern  
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International organisations, such as the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), the Global 
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) and the United States President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), were formed to specifically address HIV/AIDS.235  Whiteside236 argues that 
when AIDS was first identified, it was treated as an exceptional disease for good reasons.  It was not clear how 
the virus was transmitted, or how far it would spread.  There were concerns over the challenge of a new, 
apparently rampant, infectious disease; the sexual nature of transmission; apparently inevitable mortality; and its 
location, primarily among gay men in the west.  However there was also hysteria stoked by the media.237   
However, proponents against HIV exceptionalism dispute the fact that exceptionalism is still relevant nowadays 
where modern treatment in the form of anti-retrovirals and new measures implemented to control the disease 
are available.238  Burr, 239 for instance, argues that however legitimate the civil-liberties it sought to address may 
have been more than a decade ago, the exceptionalist orthodoxy is now fundamentally wrong as a matter of 
good public health and medicine.  In any event, evidence shows that new medical treatments are making HIV 
less infectious than ever before.240  Burr241 concludes by indicating that medical interventions make a palpable 
difference and is all the more reason to start subjecting AIDS, from a public-health perspective, to more-
systematic procedures.  In the end AIDS would be unlikely to prove resistant to good basic public-health 
                                                          
235  Smith and Whiteside 2010 Journal of the International AIDS Society 47. 
236  Whiteside HEARD 4. 
237  Whiteside HEARD 4.  See also Burr 1997 The Atlantic online, who points out that AIDS exceptionalism has been  
justified in the mid-1980s based on four arguments which were regularly heard for exempting AIDS from standard public-
health practices.  These were the following: 1) There had never before been a disease that seemed to constitute a defacto 
marker for homosexuality, with all the social stigma that this label carries.  2) The confidentiality of testing would inevitably be 
violated, precisely because AIDS is more stigmatised than any other disease.  3) Given the large number of sex partners of 
many of those who have become HIV-infected, contact tracing would be ineffectual.  4) Because there is no cure for AIDS, 
and no treatment to render the infected uninfectious, it was pointless to report HIV infection as is done for other infections.    
238  See authors such as Bayer 1991 N Engl J Med  1500-1504, Burr 1997 The Atlantic online,  Spencer 2006  
The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 51, and Bayer and Fairchild 2006 N ENG J MED 648. 
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pointing out that the argument that AIDS is a unique marker for homosexuality is incorrect, and always was so.  Rectal 
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argument on confidentiality has met a serious counter-argument in the form of reality: the experience of Minnesota and 
Colorado, which have since 1985 mandated the confidential reporting by name of both HIV and AIDS.  The argument on 
contact tracing ignores the fact that many of those infected with syphilis and gonorrhoea, other diseases for which gay men 
are at increased risk, have also had large number of sex partners, and yet contact tracing has been standard procedure for 
these diseases for decades.  Finally, the argument on name reporting has always been open to question on a number of 
grounds.  Yes, the statement may have a certain logic from the perspective of a given individual concerned only about his or 
her fate.  But if infected people can be identified, education and counselling may at the very least prompt changes in their 
behaviour which will diminish the risk that they go on to infect others; contact tracing, in turn, extends the possibility of risk-
diminishing behavioural change even more widely.  Knowing who is infected is essential in helping to prevent new infections, 
even if the infected person himself cannot be helped.       
240  Bayer 1991 N Engl J Med 1503. 
241  Burr 1997 The Atlantic online. 
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policies.  It may survive if it can circumvent good sense.242   These proponents against exceptionalism have 
therefore argued that HIV/AIDS should be normalised and treated like other diseases.243 Certain authors have 
suggested that the time has come to end HIV exceptionalism,244 whereas some are convinced that 
exceptionalism has come to an end.245   
Bayer and Fairchild246 point out that the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were poised to issue 
new recommendations for the testing if HIV in adults, adolescents and pregnant women.  In fact, CDC already 
recommended routine testing among high-risk groups and in high-prevalence settings.  This radical departure 
was the extension of routine testing to the entire population and reconceptualisation of the requirements for 
consent.  Patients would be told that HIV testing was a routine part of care and given the opportunity to opt 
out.247  These moves signal the end of the exceptionalism that has distinguished public health policy with regard 
to AIDS from approaches to other communicable and sexually transmitted diseases.248  Bayer points out that as 
AIDS had become less threatening, the claims of those who argued that the exceptional threat would require 
exceptional policies have begun to lose their force and inevitably, HIV exceptionalism will be viewed as a relic of 
the epidemic’s first years.249  Furthermore, according to these advocates of change, the transformation of HIV 
disease into a complex chronic condition requiring long-term, on-going clinical management means that limits 
imposed when medicine had little to offer have outlived their justification.250  They accordingly argue that now 
that there is treatment to treat HIV/AIDS and its patients live much longer than before, HIV exceptionalism has 
come to an end and therefore HIV/AIDS should be normalised and treated like other diseases.251  De Cock, 
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Mbori-Ngacha and Marum, further argue that although human rights instruments and legal interdictions can 
protect HIV-infected people against discrimination, such as in relation to housing, education or employment, 
they cannot protect against stigma, which is social rather than structural.252   
Stigma emerged universally and early on as a powerful, pernicious force that is an important barrier to 
prevention efforts.  Paradoxically, treating HIV/AIDS as being different from other infectious diseases probably 
enhances stigma rather than reduces it.253  This may be said to be one of the strong points of the advocates for 
change, as treating HIV/AIDS so differently from other diseases may instead of eliminating the stigma against 
people living with this disease instead also serve to perpetuate it.  However, in places or countries where there 
is still a high level of ignorance about HIV/AIDS, treating HIV/AIDS differently and preserving the confidentiality 
of people living with HIV/AIDS may still be highly necessary.254  However, for the proponents of HIV/AIDS 
exceptionalism, like Lewis, AIDS exceptionalism is a defensible concept.255   
Lewis is reported as having said that the idea that AIDS is an exceptional response is a perfectly defensible 
concept and accused critics of the levels of AIDS funding of acting from base motives of resentment and 
professional envy.256  Lewis further stresses the view that if AIDS in Africa was not viewed as the most 
exceptional communicable disease of the twentieth century, the word “exceptional” needs to be redefined. It is 
exactly the consequence of that exceptionality and the tremendous campaigning of grassroots advocates, that 
AIDS received generous funding.257  Smith and Whiteside also argue that the shift in policy and international 
priorities do not change the reality of an epidemic that, after decades, is still unfolding.258   
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The argument that the AIDS epidemic is not as big as expected is fallacious and should be treated as such.259  
In Southern Africa, the demographic effects of the generalised epidemic will shape societies for generations.  In 
other parts of the world, HIV/AIDS continues to mark inequalities: one in 40 blacks, one in 10 men who have sex 
with men, and one in eight injection drug users in New York City are HIV positive.260  So, therefore both the 
human rights approach, originally adopted by the HIV/AIDS response, and the recent demands for universal 
access to treatment, remain relevant to the 33 million261 people living with HIV/AIDS and to their communities. 
These issues should also remain pertinent within global health policy.262  New challenges are developing, not 
the least of which is the need to successfully integrate the HIV/AIDS response within the broader public health 
responses to the benefit of all.  As how to best approach such challenge is debated, however, sight must not be 
lost of the approximate 2 million AIDS-related deaths that occur each year and defining these deaths as either 
exceptional or unexceptional seems both callous and arbitrary.263         
Whiteside sums the debate on whether AIDS should be treated as exceptional or not up by answering this 
question from both sides.264  In some settings it must be treated as exceptional, whereas in others not and there 
are three factors, according to Whiteside, that should determine this AIDS exceptionality.265  These are: (1) the 
level of prevalence; (2) the demographic dynamics of the country and (3) availability and domestic affordability 
of treatments.266  Whiteside, however, concludes by pointing out that the debate between normalisation and 
exceptionalism is sterile.267  AIDS is exceptional and needs to be treated as such.  The idea that exceptionalism 
is somehow wrong is an oversimplification of an issue.  Globally UNAIDS has a role in advocating for people 
everywhere.  It needs to ensure global surveillance, especially to monitor the situation in low prevalence 
countries.268  It can be concluded, therefore, by observing that although HIV/AIDS may be normalised in the 
developed countries, it remains an exceptional disease on the continent of Africa and should be treated as 
such.269   
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In Africa, it will take time to have AIDS treated as a normal disease like other diseases, as there is still a high 
death rate due to AIDS. Cameron aptly explains that AIDS will not be ‘normal’ until no one feels inhibited from 
seeking treatment and support.270   
 
2.4 VICTIMISATION 
 
The stigma against people living with HIV may sometimes lead to them being victimised even to the extent that 
they are killed by their societies when they disclose their HIV-positive status.  One such example is that of the 
fate of Gugu Dlamini who was a Durban National Association of People Living with AIDS (NAPWA) activist who 
was beaten to death by a group of local people, including some of her neighbours, shortly after disclosing, on 
World AIDS Day, that she was HIV positive.271  This murder was nationally and internationally decried.  Former 
South African president, Thabo Mbeki himself said: “It is a terrible story.  We have to treat people who have HIV 
with care and support, and not as if they have an illness that is evil”.272  This form of victimisation by killing an 
HIV-positive person was undoubtedly fuelled by stigma, prejudice and ignorance about how the disease is 
transmitted.273   Although it is generally accepted that this extreme form of victimisation no longer occurs in 
South Africa, other forms of victimisation and violence, such as dismissal of HIV-positive persons by 
employers274 are still frequent.  Victimisation in any form, whether it is murder or dismissal of an HIV-positive 
person, should end.  
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2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation of persons living with HIV/AIDS together contribute to perpetuate 
the spreading of HIV.  Those who suspect that they may be HIV-positive will be reluctant to have themselves 
tested for fear that they may be stigmatised, discriminated against or victimised.  These factors may in turn 
enhance silence and concealment in that those who may get tested and subsequently test positive, may in fear 
of the shame that goes with having HIV, prefer to keep their status secret.275  Interventions addressing 
discrimination and stigmatisation have traditionally been reactive in nature, eg after discrimination has taken 
place, instead of proactive. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
lodged a complaint with the CCMA.  But he claimed that “they didn’t help as I was granted a mere R13 200 as a settlement. I 
was discriminated against and my rights were violated. 
275  See Cameron 2006 Stell LR 37, who in this lecture, witnesses to this by stating that: “I experienced that shame  
myself, when I was diagnosed with HIV in the dark days before it could be treated, and during the years when I kept my 
infection a deathly secret.  Even though I was an openly and proudly gay man when diagnosed, I thought that my shame 
related to my homosexual exposure.  That was wrong.  The shame is no less amongst heterosexually transmitted HIV in 
Africa.  I witness it in too many people around me who are too ashamed, to claim help and treatment even where it is offered.  
The fact that AIDS can now be medically managed holds promise of diminishing the effects, since it deals with its one source 
(death and debilitation); but not of eliminating it, since its other source (sexual transmission) remains.  There a considerable 
struggle remains.  AIDS will not be ‘normal’ until no one feels inhibited from seeking treatment and support.”   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The right to confidentiality derives from the right to privacy which in turn is associated with the right to dignity and 
autonomy.1  Cameron points out that from the Anglophone legal tradition, the right to confidentiality is most 
persuasively described as deriving from a right to privacy.2  Privacy has been defined as relating to the right to 
be left alone3 or not be bothered by other people,4  which includes respecting other people’s secrets which they 
would not want to become further known without their consent.5   
The rights to privacy and confidentiality are very important rights to persons living with HIV/AIDS.  Due to the 
protection afforded by these rights, people living with HIV/AIDS are able to control their personal information by 
deciding on their own whether to disclose or not to disclose their HIV status.  Furthermore, if they decide to 
disclose their HIV status, they themselves may decide to whom they want to disclose their status (or not 
disclose).   
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The right to privacy and confidentiality also protects persons living with HIV/AIDS against stigmatisation, 
discrimination and victimisation, as discussed above in chapter 2.  In addition, one finds medical confidentiality 
or professional secrecy,6 which is the relationship between the doctor and the patient. It is often said that the 
origin of this is the oath formulated by Hippocrates in ancient Greece some 2400 years ago.7   
Medical confidentiality is also important to persons living with HIV/AIDS because it ensures that medical 
practitioners and healthcare workers do not disclose the HIV status of their patients without their patients’ 
consent.8  However, protecting confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS, on the other hand, is problematical in 
the sense that whilst it provides protection for persons who are HIV positive, it is relied upon by those who are 
HIV positive and refuse to disclose their status. 
Examples are those persons, who as sexual partners, continue to sleep with their partners without informing 
them of their HIV positive status,9 as well as those who rape others while knowing that they are HIV positive.10  
Husbands, also, in traditional African polygynous marriages may infect all their wives if they continue to sleep 
with them whilst they are HIV positive.  Practices such as these may facilitate the spread of HIV and AIDS even 
further in South Africa.11  This chapter, therefore, will look at some of the factors that impact on the rights to 
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water”).   It reported about a North West councillor who faced an attempted murder charge for allegedly deliberately infecting 
his lover with HIV.  See Sunday Sun of 6 July 2008 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “My Deadly Secret”).  This paper 
carried the report of a man, who four years ago tested for HIV, but never told his wife.  He continued having sex with her 
whilst he knew that he was HIV positive. 
10  See, Daily Sun, of Thursday 7 December 2006 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “Deadly Dad!”).  It  
reported about an HIV man who raped and infected his own daughter.  See, also, Daily Dispatch, of Wednesday 2 
September 2009 page 1.  (The report was entitled, “Teacher held for pupil’s rape”).  It reported the story of the teacher who 
raped his pupil.  The girl, thereafter, committed suicide when she found out that the teacher was HIV-positive.   
11  The story of the councilor, reported in the Sunday Times of 15 April 2007 page 1, is one example of how secrecy and non-
disclosure of HIV-positive status may facilitate the spread of HIV/AIDS further in South Africa. The paper reported that the 
woman, who was allegedly deliberately infected by her lover with HIV, said she went to the police to stop him from spreading 
the virus, after he allegedly told her that he would infect other women because it was a woman who had infected him.  She 
said she received confirmation of his HIV status in June last year, after stumbling upon a document that showed his test 
results.  She claimed that when she confronted him, he initially told her he had withheld this information out of fear that she 
would leave him. 
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privacy, confidentiality (and medical confidentiality) in the context of HIV/AIDS.  The discussion will first turn to a 
contextual historical background of privacy, confidentiality and medical confidentiality in paragraph 3.1.1, in 
order to provide a perspective on where these rights come from.  Privacy and confidentiality will also be defined 
in paragraph 3.1.1.2 below. 
3.1.1 Contextual background to the rights to privacy, confidentiality and medical confidentiality 
3.1.1.1 Historical background 
The right to privacy has broad historical roots which are traced in sociological and anthropological discussions 
about how extensively it is treasured and preserved in various cultures.12  It also has historical origins in well-
known philosophical discussion, most notably Aristotle’s differentiation between the public sphere of politics and 
political activity, the polis, and the private or domestic sphere of family, the oikos, as two separate spheres of 
life, the latter a classic reference to a private domain.13   
Privacy in the early treaties appeared with the development of privacy protection in American law from the 
1890’s onward, and was acceptable mainly on moral grounds.14  Privacy, early on, seems to have been divided 
into two components, namely informational privacy and a constitutional right to privacy.15   Informational privacy 
is considered to include the right to be left alone and to be protected against intrusion upon a person’s seclusion 
or into his private facts, public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, publicity placing one in a false light in 
the public, appropriation of one’s likeness for the disadvantage of another, unwarranted searches, 
eavesdropping, surveillance, and appropriation and misuses of one’s communications.16  
The constitutional right to privacy was recognised by the United States Supreme Court (US Supreme Court) in 
1965 in the case Griswold v Connecticut.17  In this case the appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned 
Parenthood League of Connecticut, and its medical director, a licensed physician, were convicted as 
accessories for providing married persons with information and medical advice on how to prevent conception 
and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife’s use.  A Connecticut 
                                                          
12  DeCew J Privacy http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
13  DeCew http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
14  DeCew http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
15  See DeCew http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011), who also observed that one way of  
understanding the growing literature on privacy was to view it as being divided into two main categories, which may be called 
reductionism and coherentism.  Reductionists are generally critical of privacy, coherentists defend the coherent fundamental 
value of privacy interests. 
16  DeCew http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
17  Griswold v Connecticut 381 US 479 (1965) (hereafter referred to as the Griswold case).  See also Eisenstadt v  
Baird 405 US 438 (1972). 
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statute made it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception.  The statute whose 
constitutionality was involved in the appeal was sections 53-32 and sections 54-196 of the General Statutes of 
Connecticut (1958 rev.).  Sections 53-32 provided that:  “Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or 
instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not 
less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned,” whilst sections 54-196 provided 
that “[a]ny person who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offence may 
be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender.”18   
The appellants claimed that the accessory statute, as applied, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  However, 
despite this claim the appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.  Both the Appellate 
Division of the Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Errors affirmed this decision.  In reversing the convictions 
of the appellants, however, the US Supreme Court held that the right to privacy in the marital relation is 
fundamental and basic personal right ‘retained by the people’ within the meaning of the Ninth Amendment.  
Connecticut cannot constitutionally abridge this fundamental right, which is protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, from infringement by the States.  Justice Douglas described the constitutional right to privacy as 
safeguarding a zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees and that the 
Connecticut statutes involved in this case dealt with a particular important and sensitive area of privacy, namely 
that of the marital relation and the marital home.  The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that 
clearly underlie its specific guarantees, demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy and to the right to marry 
and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected.19   
This constitutional right to privacy was later on cited and applied to protect abortion rights in the case of Roe v 
Wade.20  In this case, Justice Blackmun observed that the right of privacy, whether founded in the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action or in the Ninth Amendment’s 
                                                          
18  The Griswold case [paragraph 2]. 
19  The Griswold case [paragraph 2]. 
20  See Roe v Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) [paragraph VIII] (hereafter referred to as the Roe case).  In this case the  
Texas statutes Articles 1191-1194 of the State’s Penal Code made it a crime to ‘procure an abortion’ as there in [p118] 
defined, or to attempt to do one, except with respect to ‘an abortion procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose 
of saving the life of the mother.’  Similar statutes were in existence in most of the states.  Jane Roe a single woman who was 
residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal legal action in March 1970 against the District Attorney of the county.  
She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face, and an 
injunction restraining the defendant from enforcing the statutes.  The Supreme Court held that a state criminal abortion 
statute of the current Texas type, that excepts from criminality only a lifesaving procedure on behalf of the mother without 
regard to pregnancy stage and without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  It therefore concluded that the fact that Article 1196 was unconstitutional meant that the Texas 
abortion statutes, as a unit, must fall.   
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reservation of the rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to 
terminate her pregnancy.21  There was, however, criticism of this constitutional right to privacy in the standard 
press.22  Then in 1986, in the case of Bowers v Hardwick,23 the Georgia statute which criminalised consensual 
sodomy was held by the United States Supreme court to be constitutional.  This decision was seen by many as 
evidence that the constitutional right to privacy was on the demise.24   
However, recently, in 2003, the Bowers decision was overruled by the very same United States Supreme Court, 
in the case of Lawrence v Texas.25  In this case, the Houston police entered the petitioner’s apartment and saw 
him and another adult man engaging in a private, consensual sexual act.  They were arrested and convicted of 
deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in 
certain intimate sexual conduct.  The Supreme Court held that the Texas statute that criminalises the act of two 
persons of the same sex engaging in certain intimate sexual conduct, violated the Due Process Clause, in that 
the Texas statute advanced no legitimate state interest which could justify its invasion into the individual’s 
personal and private life.26  This Lawrence case, therefore, restored the constitutional right to privacy and 
silenced its critics.  On the other hand, it is interesting to note that legal philosophers have always been and still 
are not always in agreement when it comes to the an interpretation of the right of privacy. As DeCew points out, 
the historical use of this term is not uniform, and there remains a lot of misunderstanding over the meaning, 
value and scope of the notion of privacy.27  Some authors, for instance, argue that there is no right to privacy 
and that there is nothing special about it, because any interest protected as private can be equally well 
explained and protected by other interests or rights, most notably rights to property and bodily security.28  Others 
argue that privacy interests are not distinctive, as the personal interests they protect are economically inefficient, 
whereas some feminist critiques argue that granting special status to privacy is detrimental to women and 
others, because it is used as a shield to dominate and control women, silence them and cover up abuse. 
However, there are those scholars who argue that there is a right to privacy and that it is a meaningful and a 
valuable notion.29  Some defend privacy as focusing on control over information about oneself, whilst others 
defend it as a broader concept which is required for human dignity or crucial for intimacy.  Other proponents of 
                                                          
21  The Roe case [paragraph VIII]. 
22  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
23  Bowers v Hardwick 478 US 186 (1986). 
24  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
25  Lawrence et. al. v Texas 539 US 558 (2003) (herafter referred to as the Lawrence case). 
26  The Lawrence case. 
27  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
28  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
29  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
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privacy defend it as necessary for the development of varied and meaningful interpersonal relationships, or as 
the value that accords people the ability to control the access of others to them, or as a set of norms which are 
necessary to enhance personal expression and choice, or some combinations of these.30   
Discussion of this concept is complicated by the fact that privacy seems to be something that is treasured to 
provide a sphere within which people can be free from interference by others, and yet, it also seems to function 
negatively, as the cloak under which domination, degradation, or physical harm to women and others may be 
hidden.31  Indeed, in agreement with the proponents of the right to privacy, privacy is a valuable and important 
right to the people who live with HIV/AIDS, as it gives them freedom of choice whether to disclose or not 
disclose their HIV status and to whom to disclose or not disclose.  If the right to privacy did not exist, it would not 
have been possible, for example, to protect persons from the violation and infringement of their personal 
information.   
In South Africa, the right to privacy is protected in terms of section 14.32  It is however important to note that the 
right to privacy may be limited by section 36 of the constitution, which will be fully discussed in chapter 4 below.  
In the medical context, confidentiality is often said to find its most ancient reflection in the Oath of Hippocrates 
(to be discussed in full below, under 3.4.2) which was formulated in ancient Greece some 2400 years ago.33  
This requires doctors to treat information attained from a patient in a professional relationship as ‘sacred 
secrets,’ about which they must ‘keep silence.’  However, there is evidence that the concept was formulated 
even earlier, in the Indian sub-continent, nearly 500 years before Hippocrates.34 
3.1.1.2 The right to privacy in international human rights instruments 
The right to privacy, like many other human rights, is also contained in the international human rights 
instruments and other documents such as the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights),35 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)36 and The 
                                                          
30  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
31  DeCew J http://plato.stanford.edu/privacy/ (visited 5 August 2011). 
32  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (herafter referred to as the Constitution of  
1996). 
33  Cameron 3, the Van Vuuren case at 849H, Ouzounakis and Chalkias 2010 International Journal of Caring  
Sciences 1, Ogunbanjo and Van Bogaert 2009 SA Fam Pract 30, Mason and McCall-Smith 115, Herrell 
http://www.utilis.net/hippo.htm (visited 20 July 2011), Rutecki http://cbhd.org/content/christian-hippocratism-confidentiality-
and-managed-care  (20 July 2011). 
34  Cameron 3 and the Van Vuuren case at 849H-J. 
35  United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights Resolution 217 of 1948 (herafter referred to as the  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948). 
36  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 1966 (herafter referred to  
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International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights.37  As Dugard38 points out, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, which was adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 1948 to give substance to the Charter of the 
United Nations,39 proclaims both first generation rights (civil and political rights) and second generation rights 
(economic, social, and cultural rights) in the language of aspiration.  However, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights is not a treaty but a recommendatory resolution of the General Assembly and is therefore not 
legally binding on its member states.40  Although not binding, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has 
undoubdtedly guided the political organs of the United Nations in their interpretation and application of the 
human rights clauses in the Charter, and its influence on the development of human rights has been 
enormous.41  It has been a source of inspiration to many international instruments such as the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and 
several regional human rights conventions; it has served as a model for national Bills of Rights; it has been used 
by the organs of the United Nations as a standard by which to measure the conduct of states; and it was 
invoked by the 1975 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.42  Subsequently, it is 
argued that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights now forms part of customary international law.43   
The South African Bill of Rights, also, derives its inspiration from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
today South African courts may turn to it for the interpretation of the Bill of Rights.44  Article 12 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights declares that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.  Everyone has the right to the 
protection against such interference or attacks.”  It is clear, therefore, that the right to privacy is guaranteed by 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and as said above, many bills, including the South African Bill of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
ICCPR 1966). 
37  UNAIDS International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights 2006 Consolidated Version (Second International  
Consultation on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Geneva, 23-25 September 1996 and Third International Consultation on 
HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Geneva, 25-26 July 2002).  See also AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit Human Rights 
Protected? Nine Southern African Country Reports on HIV, AIDS and the Law (2007, Pretoria: Pretoria University Law Press 
(PULP)) 213, which points out that in 1996 UNAIDS, in collaboration with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, adopted the International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights.  In 1997, the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) approved the International Guidelines and called on the government to 
implement them.   
38  Dugard J International Law-A South African Perspective 2nd ed (2000, Kenwyn: Juta & Co, Ltd) 240. 
39  Mubangizi JC The Protection of Human Rights in South Africa: A Legal and Practical Guide (2004, Lansdowne: Juta  
and Company Ltd) 13.  
40  Dugard 240 and Mubangizi 13. 
41  Dugard 240 and Mubangizi 13. 
42  Dugard 240-241. 
43  Dugard 241 and Mubangizi 13. 
44  See section 39 of the Constitution, as well as Dugard 242.  
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Rights,45 have adopted this right.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR),46 which are two covenants both 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, unlike the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
contained binding obligations.47  They have been ratified by more than 100 states.48  The ICCPR and ICESCR, 
together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are usually regarded and described as the 
‘international bill of rights.’49  Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
echoes the same sentiments as article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and also guarantees 
protection of privacy50 against any unlawful interferences and attacks.51   
The International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights (The Guidelines),52 articles 119-124, also deal with 
the right to privacy.  Article 119 of the Guidelines provides that the right to privacy encompasses obligations to 
respect physical privacy, including the obligation to seek informed consent to HIV testing and privacy of 
information, including the need to respect confidentiality of all information relating to a person’s HIV status.  This 
article 119 of the Guidelines seems indeed to be all encompassing, dealing with the right to privacy, also 
ensuring that informed consent is part of privacy and deals with confidentiality and medical confidentiality.  The 
right to privacy, therefore is protected and provided for by international human rights instruments, and they on 
their own have inspired regional human rights instruments53 and many bills of rights of many countries, including 
South Africa, to entrench this right.        
 3.1.1.3 Definition of privacy, confidentiality and medical confidentiality   
It has often been remarked that the concept of privacy is problematic to define because it is vague and 
ephemeral, or shapeless and elusive, often meaning different things to different people.54  Indeed, as if agreeing 
                                                          
45  See section 14 of Constitution of South Africa of 1996 (herafter referred to as the Constitution of 1996). 
46  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 (herafter referred to as the ICESCR). 
47  Mubangizi 13. 
48  Mubangizi 14. 
49  Mubangizi 14. 
50  Dugard 243. 
51  Article 17 of the ICCPR declares that: 1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interferences with his  
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or reputation.  2. Everyone has the right to 
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks. 
52  UNAIDS International Guidelines on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights 2006 Consolidated Version (Second International  
Consultation on HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Geneva, 23-25 September 1996 and Third International Consultation on 
HIV/AIDS and Human Rights Geneva, 25-26 July 2002). 
53  Such as The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights of 1981, though it is interesting to note that the  
African Charter, though it contains certain rights which are related to privacy such as article 6 that deals with the right to 
liberty and the security of the person and article 18 that deals with the family, seems to be silent on the right to privacy.    
54  Neethling J “The concept of privacy in South African Law” 2005 (122) SALJ 1-957, 18, the Bernstein v Bester  
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with this statement, different authors and judges have provided different definitions of privacy and in some 
circumstances, scholars offer conflicting interpretations on the meaning of privacy.55  Privacy, therefore, has 
been defined as a secrecy or a state of being shielded or away from others, alone and undisturbed.56  It has, 
also, been described as meaning an individual’s claim to control the situations in which personal health 
information is collected, used, kept and transmitted.57  Privacy has also been further described as a condition of 
human life characterised by seclusion from the public and publicity.58   
Confidentiality, on the other hand, is a branch or division of informational privacy which inhibits re-disclosure of 
information that was originally divulged within a confidential relationship, such as doctor-patient, lawyer-client or 
priest-parishioner relationship.59  The word “confidentiality” originates from two Latin roots: con - completeness, 
and fidere - to trust.60  To confide is to trust wholly, to impart knowledge with reliance on secrecy.  A confidence 
is a secret communication.61  Confidentiality, therefore, has been defined as meaning to be kept in secret or 
given in confidence.62  It has also been defined to mean a situation when information revealing that harmful acts 
have been or possibly will be performed, is consciously or voluntarily passed from one rationally competent 
person (confider) to another (confidant), in the understanding that this information shall not be further disclosed 
without the confider’s explicit consent.63  The harm alluded to may be physical, but moral damage alone may 
also be the subject matter of a confidential exchange.  When this sort of communication happens in a medical 
setting, it constitutes medical confidentiality.64  Medical confidentiality, therefore, can described as the 
relationship between the doctor and the patient wherein the patient gives the confidential health information to 
the doctor with the understanding that the information will not be disclosed to other people without clear consent 
from the patient.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
case, paragraph [65] and the NM v Smith case, paragraph [32]. 
55  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [65].  See also the definition by Parent WA “Privacy, morality and  
public affairs” 1983 (12;4) Philosophy & Public Affairs 269-288, 269, who defines privacy as ‘the condition of not having 
undocumented personal knowledge about one possessed by others.  A person’s privacy is diminished exactly to the degree 
that others possess this kind of knowledge about him.’       
56  Hornby 663 and Govindjee 101.  See also Warwick SJ “A vote of no confidence” 1989 (15) Journal of Medical  
Ethics 183-185, 184, who points out that the right of an individual to have secrets is concerned with the notion of privacy.  It 
derives from the ‘right to be left alone’. 
57  Sperling 186. 
58  Neethling 2005 SALJ 19. 
59  Sperling 187. 
60  Warwick 1989 Journal of Medical Ethics 184. 
61  Warwick 1989 Journal of Medical Ethics 184. 
62  Hornby, Cowie and Gimson 177. 
63  Kottow MH “Medical confidentiality: an intransigent and absolute obligation” 1986 (12) Journal of Medical  
Ethics 117-122, 117. 
64  Kottow 1986 Journal of Medical Ethics 117. 
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It follows therefore that confidentiality comes into operation once the information has been given by one person 
and attained by another person or by an agency within a confidential relationship.65  Such a person, therefore, 
who attains that confidential information, is not allowed by law to disclose that information further to other 
people, without the permission of the owner of that information, hence, doctors, lawyers or priests are not 
supposed to disclose confidential information of their patients, clients or parishioners without their permission.  
Failure by doctors, lawyers or priests to keep that confidential information may lead to legal action taken against 
them.66  Confidentiality, by definition is voluntary.67  However, the patient may waive his or her to confidentiality 
and allow the doctor or hospital to pass on the health information to a third party and in such a case there would 
be no violation of privacy or confidentiality which would arise.68  Also, in circumstances, that will be discussed 
below at 3.4, where the doctor will be forced by law to disclose such confidential information, there will also be 
no breach of any confidentiality by the doctor.69   
 
3.2 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS  
 
The South African Constitution,70 in section 14, provides that everyone has the right to privacy,71 which includes 
the right not to have-(a) their person or home searched; (b) their property searched; (c) their possessions 
seized; or (d) the privacy of their communications infringed.  The right to privacy is now entrenched as a 
fundamental right by section 14 of the Constitution72 and is structured into two parts which are, firstly, the 
general right to privacy and secondly, the protection against specific violations of the privacy of 
communications.73  The fact that the right to privacy includes the right not to have one’s person or home 
searched means that physical examination of a person conducted by a healthcare worker, such as the doctor or 
                                                          
65  Sperling 187. 
66  See the Van Vuuren case at 848A, where the doctor of Van Vuuren was sued by his patient for having disclosed  
his HIV positive status without his consent. 
67  Sperling 187. 
68  Sperling 187. See also the case of C v C (1946) 1 ALL ER 562 (herafter referred to as the C v C case). 
69  Parkes v Parkes 1916 CPD 702 (herafter referred to as the Parkes case) and Strauss 104. 
70  The Constitution of 1996. 
71  See Madiba TE and Vawda YA “Compulsory testing of alleged sexual offenders-implications for human rights and  
access to treatment” 2010 (3;1) SAJBL 28-32, 28, who point out that “according to the South Africa Constitution, everyone 
has a right to freedom and security of the person and privacy.” 
72  Neethling J “The right to privacy, HIV/AIDS and media defendants” 2008 (124) SALJ 1-208, 36. 
73  Currie & De Waal 315, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 183, Du Plessis L An Introduction to Law 3rd ed (1999,  
Cape Town: Juta & Co, Ltd) 190 and Govindjee 101. 
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nurse, in health care context, is a violation of his or her privacy.74  Such an examination can only be lawfully 
done if that person waives his or her right to privacy for the purpose of examination.75  Testing a person for HIV, 
for instance, without his or her consent, would be a violation of his or her privacy.76  Similarly, information 
concerning a person’s health status, such as HIV or cancer, is also intricately affected by issues of privacy.77  
The right to privacy, therefore, may be infringed by disclosure of personal facts, especially without the person’s 
consent.78  The South African Constitution therefore guarantees its citizens, including people living with 
HIV/AIDS, a constitutional right to privacy.79  Privacy is also protected in terms of the common law, as will be 
clear from the discussion below. 
 
3.3 NATIONAL HEALTH ACT PROVISIONS 
 
The National Health Act,80 unlike the Constitution81 which deals with the right to privacy, entrenches the right to 
confidentiality.82  Its section 14 provides that: (1) all information concerning a user, including information relating 
to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment is confidential.  (2)  Subject to section 15, 
no person may disclose any information contemplated in subsection (1) unless - (a) the user consents to that 
disclosure in writing; (b) a court order or any law requires that disclosure; or (c) non-disclosure of the information 
represents a serious threat to public health.  The right to confidentiality of health information is guaranteed by 
                                                          
74  Carstens P and Pearmain D Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law (2007, Durban: LexisNexis) 32  
and Currie & De Waal 316.  
75  Carstens and Pearmain 32. 
76  Even common law agrees with this view.  See for instance the case of Seetal v Pravitha and Another NO 1983 (3)  
SA 827 at 828D-H and 830C(D & CLD)(herafter referred as the Seetal case), which is a case that was decided on common 
law principles as it was instituted before the Constitution of 1996.  This case involved a dispute over paternity.  The applicant, 
who was the husband, was suing the wife for divorce as he was alleging that she had committed adultery.  He wanted blood 
samples to be taken from the wife, who was the first respondent, the child and himself, and to be tested in order to establish 
whether he could possibly be the child’s father.  The wife refused point blank to let any sample of blood to be taken from 
either herself or the child, who was in her custody.  Didcott J, observed at 861C, that a blood test on somebody without his 
consent is unquestionably an invasion of his privacy and the invasion is no less such because on just about every occasion 
the test is otherwise innocuous.   The court dismissed, with costs, the application for the blood test to be conducted on the 
child, holding that it would not benefit him and therefore was not in his best interests.      
77  Carstens and Pearmain 32. 
78  Carstens and Pearmain 32. 
79  Which is entrenched, as above mentioned, by section 14 of the 1996 Constitution. 
80  The National Health Act 61 of 2003 (herafter referred to as The Health Act 2003). 
81  The Constitution of 1996. 
82  Madiba and Vawda 2010 SAJBL  28.  See also The Protection of Personal Information Bill Government Gazette  
No. 32495 of 2009 which also deals with the duty to confidentiality.  Section 47 stipulates that a person acting on behalf or 
under the direction of the Regulator, must treat as confidential the personal information which comes to his or her knowledge, 
except if the communication of such information is required by law or in the proper performance of his or her duties.  
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the National Health Act83 in South Africa.  This is also emphasised in the case of Tshabalala-Msimang and 
Another v Makhanya and Others,84 where the court observed that section 14(1) of the National Health Act85 
imposes a duty of confidence in respect of information contained in a user’s health record.  This is simply 
because information in a health record is information that is private.  Section 14(1) of the National Health Act86 
deems it imperative and mandatory to afford the information recorded on the health record protection against 
unauthorised disclosure.  Here, the right to the user’s privacy is paramount.  In the National Health Act,87 the 
legislature considered the confidentiality of the information important enough to impose certain criminal 
sanctions in the event of the breach of the confidentiality.  Furthermore, in terms of the Constitution,88 as well as 
the National Health Act,89 the private information contained in the health records of a user relating to the health 
status, treatment or stay in a health establishment of that user is worth protecting as an aspect of autonomy and 
dignity.90  Confidential medical information contained in the medical records of a patient is guaranteed and 
protected by both the National Health Act91 and the Constitution92 of South Africa, so much so, that people who 
illegally disclose such confidential information may be penalised by law.     
 
3.4 SOUTH AFRICAN CASE LAW ON MEDICAL CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY 
 
Medical confidentiality which is regarded to be the relationship between the doctor and the patient is often said 
to be originating from the Hippocratic Oath93  which will be discussed in detail below at 3.4.2  Medical 
confidentiality as a notion is said to be almost as old as medicine itself.94  In applying the oath about keeping the 
secrets of sick people, doctors, nurses, pharmacists, other clinical staff, administrative workers, students of 
medicine and other people qualified to be informed about patients’ secrets are obliged not to disclose them, 
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especially without their patients’ consent.95 This ethical rule is echoed in the guidelines of the Health Professions 
Council of South Africa (HPCSA), which are discussed below.     
There are, however, some exceptions to this rule which occur in cases requiring prevention from criminal actions 
or protection of public health96 and these will be dealt with in detail in chapter 4.  Medical confidentiality requires 
doctors and other healthcare workers not to disclose their patients’ confidential information or secrets which they 
have acquired during their professional duties without their patients’ consent except only under certain 
circumstances which are often enforced by the law, such as when the medical practitioner is ordered by the 
court to reply to the questions put to him.97  If medical practitioners and healthcare workers fail to abide by the 
requirement of professional secrecy and unlawfully divulge patients’ secrets in breach of medical confidentiality, 
they may be sued by their patients for breach of medical confidentiality.98  In South Africa and other countries, 
courts have dealt with cases of breach of medical confidentiality and privacy.  Following next will be a discussion 
of cases that dealt with medical confidentiality and privacy in South Africa and other countries.   
The case of Jansen van Vuuren and Another v Kruger, though not dealing with privacy from a constitutional 
perspective, was decided on the principles of common law. In this case, the plaintiff lived in a homosexual 
relationship with one Van Vuuren in Brakpan.99  It appeared that they were fairly well-known residents of that 
town and that the nature of their relationship was either generally known or surmised.  During the beginning of 
1990 they began a business venture in Brakpan and then moved to Nylstroom.  They had, however, retained 
some links with Brakpan.  During that period the plaintiff applied for life insurance cover from Liberty Life 
Insurance Company.  The company required a medical report on the plaintiff’s HIV status.  The first defendant 
had been the plaintiff’s general medical practitioner since 1983 and the plaintiff nominated him to prepare the 
medical report.  For purposes of an HIV blood test, a sample was drawn on 27 March 1990 at the second 
defendant’s laboratory.100  The result was positive and the second defendant informed the first defendant 
accordingly.  The first defendant in consequence arranged an appointment with the plaintiff in order to consult 
with him on the outcome.  That took place on 10 April 1990.  The plaintiff was extremely upset and distressed.  
He was also concerned about a possible leak and raised the issue with the first defendant who promised to 
respect his wish to keep it confidential.   
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The following day, during the course of a game of golf with Dr Van Heerden, also a general medical practitioner, 
and Dr Vos, a dentist, the first defendant disclosed the plaintiff’s condition to them. The plaintiff and these three 
doctors moved in same circle in Brakpan; the plaintiff was engaged in a business venture with van Heerden’s 
wife; Vos had in the past been the plaintiff’s dentist; and the first defendant’s ex-wife and her parents were on 
friendly terms with Van Vuuren.  Van Heerden, in due course, informed his wife.  Whether Vos informed his wife 
was not established in evidence but all assumed that he had.101    The news spread and the plaintiff became 
aware of this fact.  He was annoyed and tried to establish the source of the breach of confidence.  He 
telephoned Mrs Vos.  Her denial was vehement.  His call to Mrs Adriana Kruger (the first defendant’s ex-wife) 
elicited that she had heard the story and that she had been told that the second defendant was the source.  He 
then telephonically spoke to the first defendant who denied that he had disclosed the information to anyone; he 
stated that only the second defendant could have leaked the informed; he expressed the opinion that Mrs Vos 
would probably have spread the rumour; and he advised the plaintiff to let the matter to rest.  The plaintiff did not 
accept this advice and instituted proceedings against the two defendants in October 1990.  However, the action 
was withdrawn against the second defendant.102  The plaintiff’s case against the first defendant was pleaded in 
the following terms: the first defendant had been his general medical practitioner; in the consequence he owed 
him a duty of confidentiality regarding any knowledge of the plaintiff’s medical and physical conditions which 
might have had come to his notice; he became aware of the plaintiff’s HIV status; it was a term of the agreement 
which established the doctor-patient relationship that the first defendant and his staff would treat this information 
in a professional and confidential manner; in breach of the agreement and in breach of his professional duties 
the first defendant ‘wrongfully and unlawfully’ disclosed test results to third parties; in consequence the plaintiff 
had suffered an invasion of, and had been injured in his rights of personality and his right to privacy.103   
Sentimental (i.e. non-pecuniary) damages of R50 000 were initially claimed, but the amount was increased to 
R250 000 during the course of the trial.  The first defendant in his plea admitted the existence of the professional 
relationship, his legal duty to respect the plaintiff’s confidence and the term of the agreement as alleged.  
However, he disputed the making of any disclosures and the resultant damages.  That remained his case until 
Dr Van Heerden testified on behalf of the plaintiff.104  The first defendant then applied and was granted an 
amendment of his plea in terms of which, in the alternative to denial, the absence of wrongfulness was raised on 
three alternative bases: (a) the communication had been made during a privileged occasion, (b) it was the truth 
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and was made in the public interest, and (c) it was objectively reasonable in the public interest in the light of the 
boni mores.  The plaintiff’s claim for damages for the alleged breach of his right to privacy was dismissed by 
Levy AJ in the Witwatersrand Local Division.  The appellants, who were the executors of the estate of the 
plaintiff, Mr McGeary, who died during the course of the trial of an AIDS-related disease, appealed to the 
Appellate Division, against the respondent, the general medical practitioner of Brakpan, who was the first 
defendant.  The trial Judge granted the necessary leave to appeal.105        
In the Appellate Division, Harms AJA observed that as far as the public disclosure of private medical facts is 
concerned, the Hippocratic Oath, formulated by the father of medical science more than 2370 years ago, is still 
in use.  It requires of the medical practitioner ‘to keep silence’ about the information acquired in his professional 
capacity relating to a patient, ‘counting such things to be as sacred secrets’.  He further observed that according 
to the rules of the South African Medical and Dental Council, it amounts to unprofessional conduct to reveal ‘any 
information which ought not to be divulged regarding the ailments of a patient except with the express consent 
of the patient’.  The reason for this rule is twofold:  On the one hand it protects the privacy of the patient.  On the 
other it performs a public interest function.106  The duty of a physician to respect the confidentiality of his patient 
is not merely ethical but is also a legal duty recognised by the common law and as far as the present-day law is 
concerned, the legal nature of the duty is accepted as axiomatic.  However, the court also observed that the 
right of the patient and the duty of the doctor are not absolute but relative.  One is, as always, weighing up 
conflicting interests and a doctor may be justified in disclosing his knowledge ‘where his obligations to society 
would be of greater weight than his obligations to the individual’ because ‘[t]he action of injury is one which pro 
publica utilitate exercetur’.107     
The court then concluded by observing that in determining whether the respondent had a social or moral duty to 
make the disclosure and whether Van Heerden and Vos had a reciprocal social or moral right to receive it, the 
standard of a reasonable man applied.108   The court was of the view that the respondent had no such duty to 
transfer, nor did Van Heerden and Vos had the right to receive the information. The court further observed that 
AIDS is a dangerous condition.  That on its own does not detract from the right of privacy of the afflicted person, 
especially if that right is founded in the doctor-patient relationship.109  A patient has the right to expect due 
compliance by the practitioner with his professional ethical standards: in this case the expectation was even 
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more pronounced because of the express undertaking by the respondent.  Vos and Van Heerden had not, 
objectively speaking, been at risk and there was no reason to assume that they had to fear a prospective 
exposure.  In the consequence the court concluded that the communication to Vos and Van Heerden was 
unreasonable and therefore unjustified and wrongful.110   
In awarding damages to the respondent, Harms AJA observed that the right to privacy is a valuable right and the 
award must reflect that.  Aggravating factors included the fact that a professional relationship was abused, 
notwithstanding an express undertaking to the contrary.  So, too, the breach created the risk of further 
dissemination by others.  The evidence also established that the publication of person’s HIV condition increases 
mental stress and that the plaintiff was seriously distressed by the disclosure.111  And stress hastens the onset 
of AIDS, something which may have occurred in this instance.  On the other hand, the disclosure was limited to 
two medical men who, it was reasonable to assume, would have dealt with the information with some 
circumspection.  The nature of the plaintiff’s condition was that his status would inevitably have become known 
at some stage during the progression of the virus.  He had, to an extent, already severed his links with Brakpan.  
There is no evidence that his friends ostracised or avoided him; it was rather a case of his chosen to withdraw 
from society, something he would probably in any event have done.  In the light of all the circumstances, the 
court felt that R5 000 would be a just award.  The appeal, therefore, was upheld and the order of the Court a 
quo was amended to read ‘Judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of R5 000 with costs on the Supreme Court 
scale’.112  
This was a correct judgment by Harms AJA and a vindication for both medical confidentiality and the right to 
privacy of people living with HIV/AIDS.  The court was correct in holding that medical practitioners, in keeping 
their oath in accordance with the Hippocratic Oath and their professional ethics, are obliged to keep silent about 
the confidential information which is given to them by their patients during their consultations.  That has to be 
case, unless as the court correctly observed, medical practitioners are either given express consent by their 
patients to disclose their confidential information or are obliged by a moral duty or legal duty to divulge such 
confidential information.  In this case of Van Vuuren, it was clear to the court that the doctor of Mr McGeary had 
no such duty to disclose the confidential information to the other two medical practitioners.  The doctor disclosed 
the information whilst he was just socialising with his counterparts.  If doctors were to be allowed to just disclose 
their patients’ confidential information in social gatherings, this would threaten trust in the medical profession, as 
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patients would be reluctant to consult their doctors for treatment.  This would, in turn, also indirectly contribute to 
the spreading of HIV/AIDS, as people would not know whether they are positive or not.  Furthermore, as the 
court also observed, it might have been the case that the plaintiff’s death, which occurred during the course of 
the trial, might have been hastened by the stress caused by the wrongful disclosure of his HIV/AIDS status.     
However, a medical practitioner who is ordered by a court of law to reply to the questions put to him is obliged to 
answer such questions, even if it means that he has to disclose his or her patient’s medical confidential 
information given to him during consultation.113  In such an instance the medical practitioner normally protests 
against divulging their patients’ confidential information by claiming privilege.  Such medical practitioners, who in 
accordance with their ethical duty protest to the presiding judge for having to testify in breach of their 
professional secrecy, are normally accorded sympathetic treatment by judges.  They are nevertheless ordered 
by courts to testify, despite their patients’ confidentiality, if their testimony is relevant to the case.114   
In the case of Parkes v Parkes,115 the action was for divorce on the grounds of adultery.  The plaintiff, in 
evidence, said she was married to the defendant at Naauwpoort, Cape Province, in June, 1906.  Three children 
were born during the marriage.  The defendant had suffered from a venereal disease, which he did not contract 
from her. A medical practitioner, who had been subpoenaed to give evidence but had refused to make a 
statement, was called.  He said he knew the parties.  He was asked by the plaintiff’s counsel if he examined the 
defendant in 1911.  The doctor claimed privilege, since the defendant was his patient.  Gardiner J ruled that the 
question, whether witness had treated defendant for a venereal disease, had to be answered.  The doctor was 
bound to answer the question put to him by the counsel.116  The doctor then said he remembered treating the 
defendant for a venereal disease.  Gardner J then observed that he regretted very much that the law compelled 
him to elicit these facts from a medical man when in the witness box; and that the doctor had done all that he 
possibly could do to observe the professional confidence reposed in him, and that he did not think that any other 
man could have done more to avoid the breach of that professional confidence. The Court granted a decree of 
divorce, with costs, plaintiff to have the custody of the children, defendant ordered to pay plaintiff £1 per month 
for the maintenance of each child until he or she attained the age of 16 years.117              
                                                          
113  Strauss 103 and Rautenbach PGD “Your patient and confidentiality: a practical approach” 2004 The Southern  
African Journal of HIV Medicine 26-28, 27. 
114  Strauss 104 and Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 26-28, 27. 
115  The Parkes case. 
116  The Parkes case. 
117  The Parkes case. 
89 
 
A similar decision seems to have been reached also in the case of Botha v Botha.118  In this case, two doctors 
from Pietermaritzburg, Dr Lind, who was a psychiatrist, and Dr Roper, who was a general practitioner, have 
been subpoenaed to give evidence for the defendant.  After entering the witness-box and being sworn in, and 
after having thereafter given evidence with respect to their qualifications, they had both refused to give evidence 
of what the plaintiff and the defendant revealed to them during consultations which they had with the parties.  
They claimed that their ethical rules prevented them from disclosing confidential information which they have 
been given by the plaintiff and the defendant in their capacities as medical advisers to the parties.  They said 
that if they were to reveal such information, they would be in breach of their Hippocratic Oath which they as 
doctors are bound to observe.119  Leon J observed that it was clear that the evidence which was sought to be 
led was relevant to one of the main issues in this case, namely whether the custody of the minor child, Jacobus, 
should be awarded to the father or to the mother.  The evidence of the doctors would have a bearing on the 
issue as to the fitness or otherwise of the parties to be awarded custody of that child.    Leon J accordingly held 
that the doctors were obliged to answer all relevant questions put to them by counsel.120  In the above cases, 
medical practitioners had done all in their powers to protect the confidential information of their patients and only 
disclosed such confidential information when they were ordered to do so by the courts of law.  
However, courts have felt and held that the medical practitioners who are asked by their patients to disclose 
confidential information between the doctor and the patient to any named person or persons are not justified to 
refuse to do so; and a doctor who discloses the confidential information of his or her patient asked for in those 
circumstances is not guilty of any breach of confidence. This was the view that was held in the British case of C 
v C.121  In this case, in the course of the hearing of a petition for a decree of nullity on the grounds set out in the 
Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, s 7(1)(c), a question arose upon which the parties requested the court to give a 
direction in order that in the similar cases in the future the difficulties, trouble and expense which they had 
incurred could be avoided.  The circumstances which gave rise to that application were as follows: The 
respondent, a short time after marriage, exhibited symptoms which caused her to go to a venereal disease clinic 
where, on February 28, 1945, it was found she was suffering from a venereal disease in a communicable state.  
On this being discovered the petitioner went to the clinic and was examined, observed and treated by the same 
doctor who examined and was treating the respondent.  After some time it was found that there was no 
evidence that the petitioner was suffering from this disease in any form.  The respondent was not told that the 
                                                          
118  Botha v Botha 1972 (2) SA 559 (N) (herafter referred to as the Botha case). 
119  The Botha case. 
120  The Botha case. 
121  The C v C case. 
90 
 
disease from which she was in fact suffering was in a communicable form or, if it was, on February 28, in a 
communicable form, how long it had been in that form.122  On August 3, 1946, a questionnaire consisting of six 
questions was sent to the doctor, signed personally by the petitioner and the respondent, with the approval of 
the lawyers for both parties, asking for information for the purpose of the proposed presentation or their 
respective cases.  If those questions had been answered in one way, the petitioner would have failed in proving 
what was necessary to prove, if he was to succeed, and the respondent would have been able successfully 
defend the case.  To put it in another way, the petitioner would have been unable to prove his case and the 
success of the respondent would have been a foregone conclusion.  The doctor refused to give the information, 
stating that he would, if subpoenaed, give his evidence in court.  He appeared in court and gave evidence and 
answered all questions put to him, and no sort of suggestion was made or could be made as to his good faith.123   
The question which arose out of those circumstances was: Is a doctor, when asked by his patient to give him or 
her particulars of his or her condition and illness to be used in a court of law, when those particulars are vital to 
the success or failure of the case, entitled to refuse?  In the present case, the patient asked the doctor to give 
her the information and asked him also to give the petitioner that same information, with the object of their being 
placed in a position which would enable them to know whether or not the petitioner had a case against the 
respondent; in other words, to assist the course of justice.   
Lewis J observed that it is, of course, of the greatest importance from every point of view that proper secrecy 
should be observed in connection with venereal disease clinics, and that nothing should be done to diminish 
their efficiency or to infringe the confidential relationship existing between doctor and patient.  However, in his 
opinion, the judge felt that those considerations do not justify a doctor in refusing to divulge confidential 
information to a patient or to any named person or persons when asked by the patient so to do.  In the 
circumstances of this case the information should have been given, and in all cases where the circumstances 
are similar the doctor is not guilty of any breach any confidence in giving the information asked for.124  This view, 
by Lewis J, in C v C,125 seems to be the correct view in that there seems to be no justification for a doctor to 
refuse to disclose confidential patient’s information when asked by that patient to do so.  The doctor, according 
to Lewis J, therefore, does not need to be first ordered by the court in order for him or her to divulge the 
confidential patient’s information, he or she may disclose such information to the patient or any other person 
                                                          
122  The C v C case. 
123  The C v C case. 
124  The C v C case. 
125  The C v C case. 
91 
 
mentioned by the patient provided that the patient has given his or her informed consent to the doctor.  And if 
the doctor gives such confidential information with the patient’s consent, he or she will not be guilty of the breach 
of any confidence.  This is a correct view, indeed, because the requirement of medical confidentiality, as 
mentioned above, is that medical practitioners and health workers must not disclose their patients’ confidential 
information, especially without their patients’ clear consent.126   
The case that involved a conflict of rights between privacy, medical confidentiality in the form of medical records 
and press freedom is the case of Tshabalala-Msimang and Another v Makhanya and Others.127  In this case the 
first applicant was a member of the cabinet and the minister of health of the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa.  The second applicant was a private hospital group and one of the private hospitals that it owned 
was operated in the Cape Town Medi Clinic Centre.  The respondents were the editor, journalists and the owner 
and the publisher of ‘The Sunday Times’ newspaper respectively.128  During 2005 the first applicant was 
hospitalised and treated as an in-patient at the Cape Town Medi Clinic on two occasions.  The dispute arose 
when on Sunday, 12 August 2007, the Sunday Times published an article, apparently written by the second and 
third respondents, that was entitled: ‘Manto’s hospital Booze Binge.’  The article, also amongst others, alleged 
that the Sunday Times was also in possession of documents related to Tshabalala-Msimang’s two hospital stays 
in 2005.  Doctors who were given files to assess for the Sunday Times said they were shocked at the excessive 
use of painkillers and sleeping tablets and said the patient should not have been allowed to consume alcohol 
while one them.129  In this matter, therefore, the applicants sought to secure the delivery by the respondents of 
copies of the first applicant’s medical records regarding her stay at the second applicant’s Cape Town hospital 
and an interdict to restrain the respondents from further publishing or commenting on these records and from 
gaining the hospital records or any other private or confidential information concerning the first applicant’s 
medical condition and/or treatment.130  The respondents argued that their access of the medical records of the 
first applicant was justified by the great public interest in the information published.131   
The court observed that it is clear that in terms of the National Health Act,132 the medical records of a person are 
private and confidential.  Generally speaking where a person acquires knowledge of private facts through a 
wrongful act of intrusion, any disclosure of such facts by such person or by any person, in principle, constitutes 
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an infringement of the right to privacy.133  The reason for treating the information concerning a user, including 
information relating to his/her health status, treatment or stay in a health establishment as confidential is not 
difficult to understand because the confidential medical information invariably contains sensitive and personal 
information about the user.  This personal and intimate information concerning the individual’s health reflects 
sensitive decisions and the choices that relate to issues pertaining to bodily and psychological integrity.  This 
personal and intimate private health information which is contained in health records, according to the court, was 
worth of protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity by both the Constitution and National Health 
Act.134   
On the defence of public interest by the respondents, Jajbhay J, observed that it must be noted that public 
interest is a mysterious concept, like a battered piece of string charged with elasticity, impossible to measure or 
weigh.  The concept changes with the dawn of each day, tempered by the facts of each case.  Public interest 
will naturally depend on the nature of the information conveyed and on the situation of the parties involved.  
Public interest is central to policy debates, politics and democracy.  While it is generally acclaimed that 
promoting the common well-being or general welfare is constructive, there is little, if any, consensus on what 
exactly constitutes the public interest.135  The public has the right to be informed of current news and events 
concerning the lives of public persons as politicians and officials.  This right has been given express recognition 
in section 16(1)(a) and section 16(2) of the Constitution136 which protect the freedom of the press and other 
media and the freedom to receive and impart information and ideas.  The public has the right to be informed not 
only on matters which have a direct effect on life, such as legislative enactments, and financial policy.  This right 
may in appropriate circumstances extend to information about public figures.137  The court then concluded by 
acknowledging the fact that the overwhelming public interest pointed in the direction of informing the public 
about the contents incorporated in the medical records in relation to the first applicant, albeit that the medical 
records may have been unlawfully obtained.138  The court, however, held that the document relating to the 
health records in relation to the treatment or stay of the first applicant in the Cape Town Medi Clinic had to be 
returned to the second applicant.  The respondents were further ordered to delete all copies of these medical 
records that may be stored on their personal computers or laptops.  The personal notes made by the 
respondents were not affected by the order as the court felt that it would be difficult to unscramble the 
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information.139  The decision of this case seems to been one of the difficult decisions that the court had to make, 
as the judge himself acknowledged that the decision had not been concluded easily and that the difficulty was 
compounded when the two competing constitutional rights come into conflict, as one must suffer.140  It also 
seems to have been a judgment where the court tried all possible means to satisfy the two sides.  The most 
difficult part, of course, was the one on public interest.  The court was correct in fact in holding the view that 
there is little consensus, if any, on what constitutes public interest.141  It, however, may seem to some that the 
court erred in holding the view that the overwhelming public interest pointed in the direction of informing the 
public about the contents incorporated in the medical records in relation to the first applicant, albeit that the 
medical records may have been unlawfully obtained.142   
Whilst it might have been in the public interest of other people that confidential information in medical records be 
published, it could still be in public interest of other people that such information should not be published, 
despite the fact that the first applicant was a public figure.  It is in the public interest that confidential medical 
information in the medical records remains confidential as the public has to trust medical practitioners and 
healthcare centres in order for them to come for treatment.143  The concept of the public interest, therefore, is a 
controversial matter which can mean different things to different people.  What may be comforting, however, is 
that ultimately the public interest can only be determined by the courts of law.144                  
In Bernstein and others v Bester NO and others,145 there was a dispute, between Mr Bernstein and other 
partners and the employees of Kessel Feinstein, a partnership of chartered accountants (“the applicants”) and 
Mr Bester and other liquidators of Tollgate Holdings Limited (“the respondents”), as to whether the respondents 
were precluded by the Constitution146 from continuing with the examination of the applicants in terms of sections 
417 and 418 of the Companies Act147 (as amended).  In their attack of sections 417 and 418 of the Companies 
Act, the applicants submitted that ‘a witness’s privacy is clearly invaded when he is forced to disclose his books 
and documents that he wants to keep confidential and to reveal information that he wants to keep to himself.’  In 
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addition the applicants contended that the ‘compulsory production of documents under section 417(3) 
constituted a ‘seizure’ within the meaning of the right not to be subject to the ‘seizure of private possessions’ in 
terms section 13 of the Constitution.’148   
Ackermann J of the Constitutional Court observed that a distinction must be drawn between the compulsion to 
respond to subpoena and the compulsion to answer particular questions at a section 417 enquiry in 
consequence of responding to the subpoena.  The mere compulsion to be physically present at a particular 
place at a particular time cannot in itself be regarded as an intrusion on a person’s privacy, however widely that 
concept is defined.  It could be examined in relation to concepts such as freedom or perhaps even dignity, but it 
cannot notionally be categorised as interfering with one’s privacy.  It may of course be that, in particular 
circumstances, the disclosure of the person’s identity might constitute a breach of the right of privacy, but that 
does not arise in this case.  It is the compulsion to respond to particular questions about oneself and one’s 
activities for example, which could lead to an infringement of one’s right to personal privacy.  Before this stage is 
reached a person’s privacy is not compromised.149  
On the scope of the right to privacy, the Constitutional Court also indicated that the concept of privacy is an 
amorphous and elusive one which has been subject of much scholarly debate.  The scope of privacy has been 
closely related to the concept of identity and it has been stated that ‘rights like the right to privacy, are not based 
on a notion of the unencumbered self, but on the notion of what is necessary to have one’s own autonomous 
identity’.150  The Court further cited Forst151 who acknowledges that the communal bonds are not to be 
substituted with abstract relations, but argues beyond this for a multi-levelled recognition of identity.  Besides the 
concrete and abstract realms, this thirdly also pertains to societal membership and fourthly to the community of 
humanity itself.152   The relevance of such an integrated approach to the interpretation of the right to privacy is 
that this process of creating context cannot be confined to any one sphere, and specifically not to an abstract 
individualistic approach.  The truism that no right is to be considered absolute, implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen.  In the context 
of privacy this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, sexual 
                                                          
148  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [56].  The court observed at paragraph [57] that section 13 of the Interim  
Constitution of 1993, entrenched the right to privacy as follows: Every person shall have the right to his or her privacy, which 
shall include the right not to be subject to searches of his or her person, home or property, the seizure of private possessions 
or the violation of private communication.  
149  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [58]. 
150  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [65]. 
151  Forst R “How not to speak about identity: the concept of the person in a theory of justice” Philosophy and Social  
Criticism 1992 (18;1) as cited by Ackermann J in Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [66]. 
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  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [66]. 
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preference and home and environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the community.  
This implies that community rights and the rights of the fellow members place corresponding obligation on a 
citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete member of the civil 
society.  Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into communal relations 
and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks accordingly.153    
In South African common law the right to privacy is recognised as an independent personality right which the 
courts have included within the concept of dignitas.  ‘Privacy is an individual condition of life characterised by 
seclusion from the public and publicity, which implies ‘an absence of acquaintance with the individual or his 
personal affairs in this state.’154  Examples of wrongful intrusion and disclosure which have been acknowledged 
at common law are entry into the private residence, the reading of private documents, listening in to private 
conversations, the shadowing of a person, the disclosure of private facts which have been acquired by a 
wrongful act of intrusion, and the disclosure of private facts contrary to the existence of a confidential 
relationship.  These examples were all clearly related to either the private sphere, or relations of legal privilege 
and confidentiality.  There was no indication that they may be extended to include the carrying on of business 
activities.155  The Court, however, cautioned about attempting to project common law principles onto the 
interpretation of fundamental rights and their limitations, observing that it is important to keep in mind that at 
common law the determination of whether an invasion of privacy has taken place constitutes a single enquiry, 
including an assessment of its unlawfulness.  As in the case of iniuriae, the presence of a ground of justification 
excludes the wrongfulness of an invasion of privacy.   
In constitutional adjudication under the Constitution, by contrast, a two-stage approach must be employed in 
deciding constitutionality of a statute.156  The Constitutional Court, therefore, in the present case came to the 
conclusion that the facts applicable concerned neither the invasion of private living space, nor any specific 
protected relationship.157  The Court, therefore also, concluded that sections 417 and 418 of the Companies Act 
were accordingly not inconsistent with any of the section 13 rights.158  This case, therefore, was concerned with 
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the right to privacy and it seems that the Constitutional Court was correct in its decision that the two sections 
were not inconsistent with the right to privacy as was encapsulated by section 13 of the Interim Constitution.159   
As it appears from the facts of this case, it seems that the applicants wanted to use the right to privacy, which is 
meant to protect private individuals and relationships, to protect their business activities and interests.  The court 
also made important findings about the right to privacy, in the that, like all other rights, privacy is also not 
absolute, however, it is limited by the rights of other citizens.  Furthermore, that the right to privacy of an 
individual may remain truly private in his or her own space or place, but as such individual mingles with other 
community members in social relations and business activities, his or her right to privacy shrinks accordingly to 
those relations and activities.  The right to privacy, therefore, is not absolutely inviolable;160 instead it can be 
limited, provided that such limitation is justifiable and complies with the requirements of section 36 of the 
constitution.161 
In National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others162 the matter 
concerned the confirmation of a declaration of constitutional invalidity of – (a) section 20A of the Sexual 
Offences Act;163 (b) the inclusion of sodomy as an item in Schedule 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act;164 and (c) 
the inclusion of sodomy as an item in the schedule to the Security Officers Act,165 made by Heher J in the 
Witwatersrand High Court on 8 May 1998.166  The Constitutional Court found the offence of sodomy to be 
unconstitutional because it breached the rights of equality, dignity and privacy.167  In making this finding, the 
court further, observed that privacy recognises that we all have a right to a sphere of private intimacy and 
autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture human relationships without interference from the outside 
community.  The way in which we give expression to our sexuality is at the core of this area of private intimacy.  
If, in expressing our sexuality, we act consensually and without harming one another, invasion of that precinct 
will be a breach of our privacy.  Our society has a poor record of seeking to regulate the sexual expressions of 
South Africans.  In some cases, as in this one, the reason for the regulation was discriminatory; our law, for 
                                                          
159  The Interim Constitution of 1993. 
160  See Seetal case at 861D, which is a common law and not a constitutional case as it was instituted before the  
Constitution of 1996, where the court pointed out that it must be admitted, on the other hand, that the privacy of the individual 
is not in law absolutely inviolable.  
161  The Constitution of 1996. 
162  National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and Others 1998 (12) BCLR  
1517; 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC) (herafter referred to as the National Coalition for Gay case). 
163  The Sexual Offences Act 23 of 1957 (herafter referred to as the Sexual Offences Act). 
164  The Criminal Procedure Act 1977. 
165  The Security Officers Act 1987. 
166  The National Coalition for Gay case, paragraph [1]. 
167  The National Coalition for Gay case, paragraph [30]. 
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example, outlawed sexual relationships among people of different races.168  The fact that a law prohibiting forms 
of sexual conduct if discriminatory does not, however, prevent it at the same time being an improper invasion of 
the intimate sphere of human life to which protection is given by the Constitution in section 14.169   
We should not deny the importance of a right to privacy in our new constitutional order, even while we 
acknowledge the importance of equality.  In fact, emphasising the breach of both of these rights in the present 
case highlights just how egregious the invasion of the constitutional rights of gay persons has been.  The 
offence which lies at the heart of the discrimination in this case constitutes at the same time and independently a 
breach of the rights of privacy and dignity, without doubt, strengthens the conclusion that the discrimination is 
unfair.170  The court accordingly held that the common law offence of sodomy to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution171 and invalid.172  This is one of the cases that emphasised the importance of the right to privacy 
especially in intimate private life.  However, this case is also significant in that it also emphasised the 
relationship of the right to privacy with other rights such as the right to dignity and equality. 
In the case of Jordan and Others v State,173 the appellants were the owner of a brothel, a salaried brothel 
employee and a prostitute.  They were convicted in the magistrates’ court of contravening the Sexual Offences 
Act.174 Section 20(1)(aA) of the Act penalised sex for reward and sections 2, 3(b) and 3(c) criminalised brothel-
keeping.  They appealed to the Constitutional Court against the refusal of the High Court to set aside their 
convictions under the brothel provisions.175  The Constitutional Court concluded that section 20(1)(aA) was not 
inconsistent with section 8(2) of the interim Constitution.176  Having come to this conclusion, Ngcobo J, 
expressed grave doubts as to whether the prohibition contained in section 20(1)(aA) implicated the right to 
privacy,177 as this case was different from National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice178 
case.  The court was of the view that the case of the National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality179 was 
concerned with the unfair discrimination against gay people and their right to dignity. The infringement, 
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according to the court, intruded into the private sphere which allows people to establish and nurture human 
relations without interference from the outside community and in so affected the sexuality of gay people ‘at the 
core of private intimacy’, of which none of those considerations were present in this Jordan’s case.180   
This case was concerned with the commercial exploitation of sex, which in the view of the court neither involved 
a violation of dignity nor unfair discrimination.181  However, according to the court, even if the right to privacy was 
implicated, it lied at the periphery and not at its inner core.  What lied at the heart of the prostitutes’ complaint 
was that they were prohibited from selling their sexual services.  After all, they were in the industry solely for 
money.  The prohibition was directed solely at the sale of sexual activity.  Otherwise the prostitutes were entitled 
to engage in sex, to use their bodies in any manner whatsoever and to engage in any trade as long as that did 
not involve the sale of sex and breaking a law validly made.182  What the law limited were the commercial 
interests of the prostitute.  But that limitation was not absolute.  They may pursue their commercial interests but 
not in the manner that involves the sale of sex.  The court, having regard to the legitimate state interest in 
proscribing prostitution and brothel-keeping, considering also the scope of the limitation on the right of the 
prostitute and brothel-keeper to earn a living, concluded that if there be a limitation of the right to privacy, the 
limitation was justified.  The challenge, therefore, based on the right to privacy was dismissed.183  This was a 
correct decision, in that the Sexual Offences Act184 only criminalised the sale of sex and keeping of brothels.  
The Act did not prevent prostitutes from engaging in any sexual activities or interfere with their sexual practices 
which were done privately, as long they were not selling sex.  The law, therefore, did not infringe the right of 
prostitutes of having sex, but only the commercialisation of sex.  It follows, therefore, that the right to privacy 
under these circumstances was not violated or if alleged to be violated, as the court correctly held that would be 
a justifiable limitation.  Prostitution, therefore, still remains criminalised in South Africa.                      
 
In NM and Others v Smith and Others,185 a biography of Ms Patricia de Lille entitled ‘Patricia de Lille’ and 
authored by Ms Charlene Smith, was published by New Africa Books (Pty) Ltd, in March 2002.  The names of 
three women who were HIV positive were disclosed.  They alleged that their names had been published in the 
book without their prior consent having been obtained.  These women claimed that their rights to privacy, dignity 
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and psychological integrity had been violated.  A sequel to that publication was an action for damages in the 
Johannesburg High Court.  The High Court dismissed with costs the action against Ms Smith and Ms de Lille.186  
It, however, ordered the third defendant, New Africa Books (Pty) Ltd, to pay each of the plaintiffs an amount of 
R15 000 and to delete from all copies of the ‘Patricia de Lille’ in its possession, the reference at page 170 and 
171 to the plaintiffs names.  Further, that until such deletion was made, the third defendant should not sell any 
further copies of the book.187  The three women, NM, SM and LH, then appealed to the Constitutional Court, 
after both their appeals to the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal, were unsuccessful.  They appealed 
only against the decisions for the first respondent, Charlene Smith and second respondent, Patricia de Lille, and 
not against the third respondent, New Africa Books (Pty) Ltd, decision.188  Madala J, on the right to privacy 
observed that the academic literature on privacy demonstrates the considerable controversy over the definitional 
nature and the scope of the right.  However, it appears common cause in many jurisdictions that the nature of 
the right envisages a concept of the right to be left alone.189  Privacy encompasses the right of a person to live 
his or her life as he or she pleases.190  Private facts have been defined as those matters the disclosure of which 
will cause mental distress and injury to anyone possessed of ordinary feelings and intelligence in the same 
circumstances and in respect of which there is a will to keep them private.191   
The applicants contended that as a result of the disclosure of their names and HIV status to the public the 
respondents had wrongfully and intentionally or negligently violated their rights of personality, more particularly 
their right to privacy, dignity and psychological integrity and therefore, they claimed that they had suffered 
damages.192  In denying liability, the respondents relied on the fact that the applicants’ names had previously 
been disclosed in the Strauss Report which was not marked ‘confidential’.  They therefore argued that the 
applicants had made public their names and HIV status.  The respondents also relied on the fact that the 
applicants had appeared before the various commissions of enquiry including the Strauss enquiry and had 
brought an application in their own names in the High Court seeking interdict against the inclusion of their 
names in the book.193  The Constitutional Court was of the view that, when the applicants made their application 
for the interdict in their names, they were not thereby saying their names should be published in the book having 
a wide circulation throughout South Africa, which would be the position since the second respondent was a 
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national figure.  Similarly, by attending the various inquiries they were not giving blanket consent to the 
publication of their status.194  On medical confidentiality, Madala J pointed out that private and confidential 
medical information contains highly sensitive and personal information about individuals.  The personal and 
intimate nature of an individual’s health information, unlike other forms of documentation, reflects delicate 
decisions and choices relating to issues pertaining to bodily and psychological integrity and personal 
autonomy.195  Individuals value the privacy of confidential medical information because of the vast number of 
people who could have access to the information and the potential harmful effects that may result from 
disclosure.  The lack of respect for private medical information and its subsequent disclosure may result in fear, 
jeopardising an individual’s right to make certain fundamental choices that he or she has a right to make.  There 
is therefore a strong privacy interest in maintaining confidentiality.196  The disclosure of an individual’s HIV 
status, particularly within the South African context, deserves protection against indiscriminate disclosure due to 
the nature and negative social context the disease has, as well as the potential intolerance and discrimination 
that result from its disclosure.   
The affirmation of secure privacy rights in the Constitution may encourage individuals to seek treatment and 
divulge information, encouraging disclosure of HIV which has previously been hindered by fear of ostracism and 
stigmatisation.  The need for recognised autonomy and respect for private medical information may also result in 
the improvement of public health policies on HIV/AIDS.197  As a result, it is imperative that all private and 
confidential information should receive protection against unauthorised disclosures.  The involved parties should 
weigh the need for access against the privacy interest in every instance and not only when there is an 
implication of another fundamental right, in this case the right to freedom of expression.198  
The Court further pointed out that the assumption that others are allowed access to private medical information 
once it has left the hands of authorised physicians and other personnel involved in the facilitation of medical 
care, is fundamentally flawed.  It fails to take into account an individual’s desire to control information about him 
or herself and to keep it confidential from others.  It does not follow that an individual automatically consents to 
or expects the release of information to others outside the administration of health care.  As appears from what 
has gone on before, there was nothing on the record to suggest that the applicants’ HIV status had become a 
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matter of public knowledge.199  The court also emphasised that there are in the case of HIV/AIDS special 
circumstances which justify the protection of confidentiality, bearing in mind that the disclosure of the condition 
has serious personal and social consequences for the sufferer.  For example, such a person stands to be 
isolated and even rejected by others.  In the present case, each of the applicants testified as to the several 
setbacks which occurred in their lives following the disclosure of their status.  The first applicant had her shack 
burned down by her boyfriend who has since left her and broken off that relationship.  The second applicant has 
withdrawn from the society for fear of being ostracised by her family.  The third applicant has shied away and 
has not told members of her family about her condition which depresses her.200   
The protection of privacy, therefore in the view of the court, increased in every individual an expectation that he 
or she will not be interfered with.  Indeed there must be a pressing social need for that expectation to be violated 
and in the person’s right to privacy interfered with.  There was no such compelling public interest in this case.201  
The Constitutional Court therefore came to the conclusion that, in disagreement with the decision of the High 
Court, the publication by respondents of the HIV status of the applicants’ names constituted a wrongful 
publication of a private fact and so the applicants’ right to privacy was breached by the respondents.  Further, 
that the need for access to medical information must also serve a compelling public interest.202  The court finally 
concluded that, in the present case, highly personal and confidential material had been placed in the book and 
without the respondents having obtained the express informed consent of the applicants.  The consent which 
the applicants had given earlier in the Strauss Report had the consumption of the facts in a book.  This consent 
was limited to medical records and if any other publication was envisaged, the requisite consent had to be 
obtained for that particular publication.   
The respondents clearly violated the dignity and privacy enjoyed by the applicants and were therefore liable to 
compensate the applicants in damages.203  The Constitutional Court then ordered the respondents to pay each 
applicant the sum of R35 000 each, and that the names of the applicants be deleted from all unsold copies of 
the book ‘Patricia de Lille’ by Charlene Smith and that in court each party should pay its own cost, including the 
costs in High Court.204  
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This decision by the Constitutional Court was a victory for protection of the right to privacy and medical 
confidentiality of persons living with HIV/AIDS.  The Court was correct in observing that when the applicants 
made the original application, they were not giving blanket consent that their names be published in a book 
which would in turn be distributed in all the bookshops of South Africa.  This decision, therefore, has an 
implication for researchers and writers who are involved with persons living with HIV/AIDS that before they can 
publish the names of such persons in their articles or books, they must first ensure that they obtain clear written 
and informed consent allowing them to do so.  If they fail to get such consent, they may expose themselves to 
legal action.  The Court was also correct in holding that private and confidential medical information contains 
highly sensitive and personal information about individuals.  It was further also correct in pointing out that the 
assumption that other people are allowed access to private medical information once it has left the hands of 
authorised medical practitioners and other personnel involved in the facilitation of medical care, is fundamentally 
flawed.  This means that private medical information remains confidential even outside the healthcare context.  
This also means that even members of support groups, for instance, and other people, also need to be 
educated that if one of their members discloses his or her HIV status in their meeting, that does mean that they 
are given a blanket permission to inform other people outside such support group without an express permission 
from such a member for them to do so.  Finally, it also seems that the Constitutional Court held the view that the 
right to privacy may be limited by a compelling public interest.  However, the court found that in that specific 
case, such public interest did not exist.   
 
Although the disclosure of private information in the public interest may be justified, it is sometimes sometimes 
difficult to know what is in the public interest.205  Furthermore, Rautenbach206 points out that the  disclosure of 
information in the public’s interest is arguably the situation that creates the most anxiety among health care 
professionals and it is also the most difficult for which to provide practical guidelines.  Disclosure of confidential 
information without consent may be justified where failure to do so may expose the patient or others to risk of 
death or serious harm, that is, where third parties are exposed to risks so serious that they may outweigh the 
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patient’s right to privacy.207  There are, therefore, circumstances where the right to privacy may be limited by 
public interest, however, as indicated above, it is normally the courts which decide whether disclosure in the 
public interest is justifiable or not.208  Disclosure in the public interest will be discussed fully, below in chapter 4.                           
 
3.5 ETHICAL GUIDELINES OF THE MEDICAL PROFESSION AND THE OATH OF  
HIPPOCRATES 
 
3.5.1 Ethical guidelines of the medical profession 
Medical practitioners in South Africa are registered with the relevant professional body known as the Health 
Professions of South Africa (HPCSA) and are also bound to follow the ethical guidelines of this body.  According 
to the Spirit of Professional Guidelines of the HPCSA:209 “Practice as a health care professional is based upon a 
relationship of mutual trust between patients and health care practitioners.”   
Section 5 of the HPCSA Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice with Regard to HIV deals with confidentiality.210  
Section 5 provides that: 
5.1 Ethics, the South African Constitution and the law recognise the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the 
HIV status of a patient. 
5.2 The test results of HIV positive patients should be treated with the highest possible level of confidentiality. 
5.3 Confidentiality regarding a patient’s HIV status extends to other health care practitioners.  Other health care 
professionals may not be informed of a patient’s HIV status without that patient’s consent unless the disclosure is 
clinically indicated.  For treatment and care to be in the best interests of the patient, the need for disclosure of 
clinical data, (including HIV and related test results), to health care practitioners directly involved in the care of the 
patient, should be discussed with the patient. 
5.4 The decision to divulge information relating to the HIV status of a patient must always be done in consultation with 
the patient. 
5.5 The report of the HIV test results by a laboratory, as is the case with all laboratory test results, should be 
considered confidential information.  A breach of confidentiality is more likely to occur in the ward, hospital or 
health care practitioner’s reception area than in the laboratory.  It is, therefore, essential that health care 
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institutions, pathologists and health care practitioners formulate a clear policy as to how such laboratory results will 
be communicated and how confidentiality of the results will be maintained.     
 
It is, therefore clear according to the Ethical Guidelines that doctors, nurses, other health care workers and staff 
that work in the hospital or healthcare practitioner’s workplace, such as a receptionist, are all bound by the duty 
of maintaining the confidentiality of the HIV status of a patient.211  It seems also to be clear that should there be 
a need to disclose the HIV status of the patient, this should always be done with the permission of the patient.  
Failure to do that may lead to a patient instituting legal action against the medical practitioner,212 unless as 
mentioned above, the doctor would disclose such HIV status in cases requiring prevention from criminal actions 
or for the protection of public health.213  Otherwise, the general rule is that the medical practitioners must treat 
and keep the confidentiality of their HIV positive patients with highest possible level of confidentiality.  This duty 
of the medical practitioners to maintain the confidentiality of their patients of course derives from the Oath of 
Hippocrates.214 
3.5.2 The Oath of Hippocrates 
Medical law authors and judges in common law seem to agree that the duty of medical confidentiality of the 
medical practitioners originated from the Oath of Hippocrates.215  In the Van Vuuren case, Harms AJA observed 
that as far as the public disclosure of private medical facts is concerned, the Hippocratic Oath, formulated by the 
father of medical science more than 2370 years ago, is still in use.  It requires of the medical practitioner ‘to 
keep silence’ about information acquired in his professional capacity relating to a patient, ‘counting such things 
to be as sacred secrets.’216  However, it is believed that the original oath was undoubtedly not written by 
Hippocrates, but the work was traditionally included in the Corpus Hippocratum, which is a collection of medical 
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writings credited to Hippocrates, written between the fifth and the fourth century, BC.217  In fact there seems to 
be evidence that this idea was firstly formally preserved in the Indian sub-continent, nearly 500 years before 
Hippocrates, and that the Hippocratic Oath has antecedents in other civilisations.218  However, the original oath 
is rarely read or recited nowadays, and the oaths taken these days are much altered and barely recognisable 
when compared to it.219  The original Oath read as follows: 
I swear by Apollo Physician and Asclepius and Health and Panacea and all gods and goddesses, making them witnesses, 
that I will make complete this oath and this written covenant according to my ability and discernment: 
- To regard my teacher of this art as equal to my parents and to share my livelihood (with him), and to    make a 
contribution to him when he is in need of a debt, and to judge his offspring as equal to my brothers in manhood, 
and to teach this art – if they want to learn it – without wage and written covenant (to them) to make an imparting of 
the set of rules and lecture and all the rest of instruction to my sons and those of my teacher, and to those pupils 
who have been indentured and who have taken an oath according to the medical law, but to no one else. 
- I will use diets for the assistance of the sick according to my ability and discernment; but also to keep away injury 
of health and injustice. 
- I will neither give any deadly drug, having been asked for it, nor will I guide the same advice.  Similarly, I will not 
give an arbortifacient pessary to a woman.  In purity and in holiness I will maintain my life and my art.   
- I will not use the knife, not even on those suffering from the stone, but I will give way to those who are 
practitioners of this work. 
- And as many houses as I may go into, I will go in for assistance of the sick, being free from all voluntary injustice 
and mischief and the rest, even abstaining from sexual pleasures of both female and male persons, both free and 
slave. 
- That which I may see or hear during treatment, or even outside of treatment concerning the life of men, which 
must not in any way be divulged outside, I will not speak, regarding such things to be unutterable. 
And so may it be to me making complete my oath and not making it of no effect that I enjoy the benefits of my life and art and 
be honoured by all men for time eternal; but may it be opposite of this to me transgressing and swearing falsely.220  
 
The original Oath clearly prohibited many practices which are now either allowed or omitted in the present day 
oaths, practices such as abortions, euthanasia and surgeries.  Herrell points out that the early version of the 
                                                          
217  Herrell http://www.utilis.net/hippo.htm (visited 20 July 2011) and Cameron 3. 
218  Cameron 3.  See also the Van Vuuren case at 849I-J, where Harms AJA cited Oosthuizen, Shapiro and Strauss  
Professional Secrecy in South Africa (1983) at 98 as stating that: ‘In a work written in Sanskrit presumed to be about 800 BC 
Brahmin priests were advised to carry out their medical practices by concentrating only on the treatment of a patient when 
they entered a house and not divulging information about the sick person to anyone else.  In ancient Egypt also the priestly 
medical men were under strict oaths to retain the secrets given to them in confidence.  They worshipped in the temples of 
Isis and Serapis, a healer of the sick, and also of their son, Horus, who was usually called Harpocrates by the Greeks and 
pictured with his finger held to the mouth.  The name for medicine, ars muta (dumb art), is used in Roman poetry by Virgil in 
Aeneid XII.  The Pythagorean school in Greece, to which medical men especially belonged, considered silence as one of the 
most important virtues.’  
219  Herrell http://www.utilis.net/hippo.htm (visited 20 July 2011). 
220  Herrell http://www.utilis.net/hippo.htm (visited 20 July 2011). 
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Oath is seldom used today for several reasons of which some are that: (i) Few medical students today would 
take swearing by Apollo and Asclepius seriously; (ii) also, prohibitions of abortions and surgeries, as well as the 
unique financial arrangements and indenturements to the teacher and teacher’s family are far removed from 
modern medical ethics and the practical process of medical ethics and practical process of medical education.221  
However, the Oath that is alleged to be bearing the name of Hippocrates seems to be different from the above 
mentioned original Oath and the modern versions that followed after are similar to it, albeit with some few 
differences.222  This Oath that ‘Bears the Name of Hippocrates’ reads as follows:  
 I do solemnly swear, by whatever each of us holds most sacred 
 That I will be loyal to the Profession of Medicine and just and generous to its members 
 That I will lead my life and practice my art in uprightness and honour 
 That into whatsoever house I will enter: it shall be for the good of the sick to the utmost of my power, my holding  
myself far aloof from wrong, from corruption, from the tempting of others to vice 
That I will exercise my art solely for the cure of my patients, and will give no drug, perform no operation for a criminal 
purpose, even if solicited; far less suggest it 
That whatsoever I shall see or hear of the lives of my patients which is not fitting to be spoken, I will keep inviolable secret 
These things do I swear.  Let each of us bow the head in sign of acquiescence 
And now, if I will be true to this oath, may good repute ever be mine; the opposite, if I should prove myself forsworn.223 
   
This Oath that is alleged to be bearing the name of Hippocrates is different from the original one in that it omits 
swearing using Apollo or Asclepius and also omits prohibition of abortions.  As mentioned above, the modern 
version of the oath seemed to follow this Hippocrates Oath instead of the original version and an example of the 
modern version of the Hippocratic Oath is the one by the South African Medico-Legal Society224 which stipulates 
that: 
In the name of God, Most compassionate, Most high, I do solemnly swear, by whatever I hold most sacred, that I will 
exercise the art of medicine solely for the cure of my patients, and will give no drug, perform no operation for a criminal 
purpose, even if solicited, far less suggest it; in like manner I will not give to a woman any kind of strange material to produce 
abortion, and I will maintain respect for human life from the moment of its conception.   
That whatsoever I shall see or hear of the lives of men or women which is not fitting to be spoken, I will [keep] inviolably 
secret.  I will not carry out moral judgment of any patient, but will deal with its diseases to the maximum of my capacity 
                                                          
221  Herrell http://www.utilis.net/hippo.htm (visited 20 July 2011). 
222  http://www.aapsonline.org/ethics/oaths.htm (visited 03 August 2011). 
223  http://www.aapsonline.org/ethics/oaths.htm (visited 03 August 2011). 
224  The South African Medico Legal Society The Hippocratic Oath http://new.samls.co.za/node/149 (visited 26 July  
2011) 
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without concerning the circumstances.  Knowing my own limitations and those of medicine in general, I will make an effort to 
cure when possible and always comfort.  I will only request studies if I believe that they have reasonable probability to 
produce better results for my patients, and I will not carry out studies neither procedures nor surgery only for monetary gain.  
I will freely refer my patients to other doctors if I am convinced that they are more enabled than I to treat a certain problem. 
I will care for my patients and their families as I would have them care for me and my family.  Into whatever houses I enter, I 
will go into them for the benefit of the sick and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief and or corruption; and, further 
from the seduction of females or males.  I will not experiment with patients unless they grant their consent after informing 
them truthfully, and I will continue being a student all my professional life. 
I will try to work like an expert for all my patients to be able to take care of them more indeed and to be able to apply the 
lessons they provide to me in the care of other patients.  I will offer care to all the patients who ask for it.  No matter the sex, 
race, colour, creed or economic status.  I will voluntarily offer part of my time for the care of the poor and undeserved ones.  
While I continue to keep this oath inviolated, may it be granted to me to enjoy the practice of the art of medicine, respected 
by all men, at all times! But should I trespass or violate this oath, that God and society demand these violations against me.         
 
It can be clearly observed that the South African Medico-Legal Society Oath, like the one that is alleged to bear 
the name of Hippocrates, differs from the original version in that there is no longer swearing by the names of 
Apollo, Asclepius or other gods or goddesses that were referred to in the past, but instead the oath refers to 
God, the Almighty.  However, there are some similarities that were kept from the original Oath, such as 
prohibition of abortion and the keeping of confidentiality of the secrets that the doctor has heard from his or her 
patients.  The South African modern Oath and other modern versions have also followed the Hippocratic Oath of 
the Declaration of Geneva of the World Medical Associations.225  What is strikingly common among these Oaths, 
starting with the original version to the modern versions, is that they all agree that the secrets of the patients 
which are not fitting to be spoken, must be kept secret.  With the Declaration of Geneva Hippocratic Oath 
stipulating that such secrets confided to the medical practitioners must be kept even after the patient has 
died.226  This shows how important the Hippocratic Oath values the confidentiality of the medical information that 
the patient confides to the doctor.  This is the reason why ethically doctors are still required to maintain medical 
confidentiality of their patients even today.227  And also, it is the reason why if medical practitioners violate this 
ethical obligation with no justification, this may point to a breach of medical confidentiality.228   
                                                          
225  http://www.aapsoline.org/ethics/oaths.htm (visited 03 August 2011), this Declaration of Geneva Hippocratic Oath  
reads as follows:  I solemnly pledge myself to consecrate my life to the service of humanity; I will give my teachers the 
respect and gratitude which is their due; I will practice my profession with conscience and dignity; The health of my patient 
will be my first consideration; I will respect the secrets which are confided in me, even after the patient has died; I will 
maintain by all the means in my power, the honour and the noble traditions of the medical profession; My colleagues will be 
my brothers; I will not permit considerations of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing to intervene between 
my duty and my patient; I will maintain the utmost respect for human life from its beginning even under threat and I will not 
use my medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity; I make these promises solemnly, freely and upon my honour. 
226  http://www.aapsoline.org/ethics/oaths.htm (visited 03 August 2011). 
227  Cameron 3 and Ouzounakis and Chalkias 2010 International Journal of Caring Sciences 1.   
228  See the Van Vuuren case at 856G. 
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3.6 CONFIDENTIALITY AFTER DEATH 
 
There is agreement from almost all the international and regional documents, codes and instruments around the 
world that the obligation of the medical practitioners to keep confidentiality of their patients’ health information 
continues even when such patients have died.229  The World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Geneva, 
for instance, stipulates that the physician must state that: “I will respect the secrets which are confided in me, 
even after the patient has died”230 and the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines for 
Good Practice, provides that health care practitioners still have an obligation to keep personal information 
confidential after a patient dies.231    
This doctor’s duty to maintain confidentiality even after the patient is dead is based on respecting the privacy of 
the patient, fidelity to the best interests of the patient, and maintaining public trust in medicine in generally.232  
Unauthorised revealing of the HIV status or other medical information after death may affect the perceptions of 
others about the deceased patient or cause speculation, suspicion, or judgments regarding his or her character.  
Such illegal disclosure by the doctor would infringe the patient’s privacy and best interests.233   This therefore 
means that the duty of a doctor to keep confidential personal health information of his or her patients does not 
end when the patient dies, but it continues to exist even after such a patient has died.234   
Sperling points out that the question of whether there exists a privacy interest in one’s personal health 
information after death is not only theoretical, but also has important practical implications and also legal 
implications.235  The fact is that the personal health information of dead patients is normally required for various 
                                                          
229  See World Medical Association (WMA) International Code of Medical Ethics (herafter referred to as WMA  
International Code of Medical Ethics 1983) (as amended by the 35th World Medical Assembly Venice, Italy, October 1983), 
World Medical Association (WMA) Declaration of Geneva (herafter referred to as WMA Declaration of Geneva 1983 (as 
amended in Venice in 1983), Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health 
Care Professions-Confidentiaility: Protecting and Providing Information (herafter referred to as HPCSA Guidelines for Good 
Practice Booklet 11) 2nd ed Booklet 11 Pretoria 30th May 2007, section 9.5., and American Medical Association 
Confidentiality of HIV Status on Autopsy reports (herafter referred to as the CEJA Report 1992)  CEJA Report C-A-92 1992.  
See also General Medical Council Regulating Doctors Ensuring Good Medical Practice-Confidentiality: Protecting and 
Providing Information (herafter referred to as General Medical Council Confidentiality Protecting and Providing Information) 
April 2004, section 30. 
230  WMA Declaration of Geneva 1983.   
231  HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice Booklet 11, Section 9.5 (9.5.1). 
232  The CEJA Report 1992. 
233  The CEJA Report 1992. 
234  Yang C “Patient confidentiality: live and dead” 2006 (18;3) Tzu Chi Med J 241-243, 242. 
235  Sperling 187. 
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purposes.236  Some of such uses are those for therapeutic purposes, for instance, providing treatment for 
relatives of the deceased or other parties in need; for research purposes, such as determining the cause of 
death or disease from which death resulted; as well as evidentiary  and succession purposes. In the latter 
instance, medical information of a decendent who died testate may be sought by parties who would like to show 
that such decendent was of unsound mind when he or she made his or her last will and testament and it may 
also be required by insurers in relation to death benefits.237   
There seems to be no dispute, therefore, that the doctor-patient medical confidentiality does not die with the 
patient, but continues even after the death of such patient.  What is interesting and controversial, however, is the 
contradiction that seems to exist between two international codes of the same international body, that is, the 
World Medical Association (WMA) which are International Code of Medical Ethics238 and the Declaration of 
Geneva,239 as to the extent such confidentiality of the patients should be kept by the doctors.240  The 
International Code of Medical Ethics, for instance, provides that: “A physician shall preserve absolute 
confidentiality on all he knows about his patient even after the patient has died.”241  The Declaration of Geneva, 
on the other hand, however, stipulates that the physician must state that: “I will respect the secrets which are 
confided in me, even after the patient has died.”242  As James and Leadbeatter point out, the International Code 
of Medical Ethics rejects any circumstance in which disclosure may be justified, which is an absolutist approach, 
whilst the Declaration of Geneva recognises that there are circumstances where disclosure may be justified.243  
It is amazing that there seems to be this contradiction as these two codes are published under the auspices of 
the World Medical Association, however, these opposing opinions may be an indication of differing views within 
the medical profession and national practices.244   
There seems to be two schools of thought, at the one extreme, some argue strongly for absolute 
confidentiality,245 an argument that result, as in France, in a criminal offence if such confidentiality is violated.246  
On the other extreme, some argue for the complete rejection of the duty of confidentiality.247  For the absolutists, 
                                                          
236  Sperling 187. 
237  Sperling 187. 
238  WMA International Code of Medical Ethics 1983. 
239  WMA Declaration of Geneva 1983. 
240  James DS and Leadbeatter S “Confidentiality, death and the doctor” 1996 (49) J Clin Pathol 1-4, 1. 
241  WMA International Code of Medical Ethics 1983. 
242  WMA Declaration of Geneva 1983.   
243  James and Leadbeatter 1996 J Clin Pathol 1 and Yang 2006 Tzu Chi Med J 242. 
244  James and Leadbeatter 1996 J Clin Pathol 1. 
245  Led by Kottow 1986 Journal of Medical Ethics 117-122. 
246  James and Leadbeatter 1996 J Clin Pathol 1. 
247  Led by Warwick 1989 Journal of Medical Ethics 183-185. 
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Kottow argues and defends confidentiality as an exceptionless or absolute commitment on the part of the 
doctors.248  Emson, however, refutes Kottow’s arguments of confidentiality being exceptionless or absolute.249  
Whilst Emson agrees with Kottow that in its original form, as a medical value, confidentiality may have been 
absolute, he argues that this concept has become eroded by patient consent, legal actions and change in the 
climate of public opinion.250  According to him, the confidentiality of the doctor-patient relationship in societies 
deriving their law from English origins has been greatly modified by requirements arising out of legal statutes 
and common law judgments.   
 
Despite this, however, he further argues that confidentiality remains a value that a physician must strive to 
preserve, although he cannot do this without considering its effect upon possible innocent third parties.251  
According to Emson, confidentiality is no longer absolute, as Kottow claims, but whilst it is still important, it has 
now being modified by other circumstances, such as patient consent, legal actions and public opinion.  Emson’s 
view seems to be the correct one which, as will be discussed below, are mirrored in many international 
documents and national ethical codes.  A more radical approach against that of the absolutists is the view 
espoused by Warwick.252  Warwick argues that doctors need not accept any information in confidence.253  He 
argues that there should be no medical confidentiality between the doctor and the patient at all.  He argues that 
if no confidence is expected, the patient can decide whether or not his illness would merit a loss of privacy.254  
He believes that acceptance of the principle of non-confidentiality of information revealed to medical 
practitioners would increase personal privacy and personal autonomy.255  This view of no confidentiality between 
the doctor-patient, however, does not seem to be possible as there are very important considerations in favour 
of the continuance of medical confidentiality, e.g. the interest of public health. Few patients would be willing in 
                                                          
248  Kottow 1986 Journal of Medical Ethics 117, he further argues at 118 that, “In the case where a physician believes  
the patients exorbitant threats and alerts the police, a morally questionable principle becomes involved.  The patient has 
sought the clinical encounter and proffered information on the understanding that this is necessary for an efficient therapy 
and also that the relationship with the physician is protected by a mantle of confidentiality.  Confidence is offered and 
accepted in the medical profession, and known to be an indispensable component of the encounter, thus enticing the patient 
to deliver unbiased, unfiltered, uncensored and sincerely presented information.  Consequently, it appears contradictory and 
perverse to offer confidentiality as an enticement to sincerity, only subsequently breach it because it cannot remain 
unpublicised.  Confidence is understood as an unconditional offer, otherwise it would not be accepted, and it appears 
profoundly unfair to disown the initial conditions once the act of confiding has occurred.”   
249  Emson HE “Confidentiality: a modified value” 1988 (14) Journal of Medical Ethics 87-90, 87. 
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251  Emson 1988 Journal of Medical Ethics 87. 
252  Warwick 1989 Journal of Medical Ethics 183-185. 
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the present circumstances to consult doctors if they do not trust that their medical information will be kept 
confidential.  Further, confidentiality is no longer absolute, as Emson correctly submits.256  This is not only the 
position in South Africa, but also in England, Wales and others.257   
In fact, as Yang points out, not every code around the world follows the absolutist approach that is advocated by 
the International Code of Medical Ethics.258  Many international codes and documents seem to follow the view 
held by the Declaration of Geneva which recognises that confidentiality of the dead patient is not absolute and 
that there are circumstances where disclosure may be justified.259  The Australian Medical Association (AMA) 
Code of Ethics, for instance, provides that the doctors must maintain their patients confidentiality, but that 
exceptions to this must be taken very seriously which may include where there is a serious risk to the patient or 
another person; where required by law; where part of approved research, or where there are overwhelming 
societal interests.260   
The Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA), also, stipulates that the extent to which confidential 
information may be disclosed after a patient’s death depends upon the circumstances, which include the nature 
of the information, whether that information is already public knowledge or can be anonymised, and the intended 
use to which the information will be put.  Health care practitioners are required to consider whether the 
disclosure of the information may cause distress to, or be of benefit to, the patient’s partner or family.261  It is 
therefore clear that the medical practitioner’s obligation to keep confidentiality of his or her patients’ health 
information continues even when such patients have died.  However, such obligation to keep confidentiality is 
not absolute and may, depending on the circumstances, be disclosed. 
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3.7 HOW DO THESE ETHICAL GUIDELINES IMPACT ON THE SPREAD OF HIV/AIDS IN 
CONSENSUAL SEXUAL RELATIONS IN CIVIL AND AFRICAN CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES?  
 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act262 defines customary law as meaning the customs and usages 
traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture 
of those peoples.263  A customary marriage, therefore, is defined as meaning a marriage concluded in 
accordance with customary law.264  A customary marriage is recognised to be valid by section 3(1) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, if it meets the following requirements: (a) the prospective spouses-(i) 
must both be above the age of 18 years; and (ii) must both consent to be married to each other under customary 
law; and (b) the marriage must be negotiated and entered into or celebrated in accordance with customary 
law.265  Customary marriages have also been characterised by the payment of lobolo by the family of the 
husband to the family of the wife.  Lobolo is defined by the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act as the 
property in cash or in kind, whether known as lobolo, bogadi, lumalo, thaka, ikhazi, magadi, emabheka or by 
other name, which a prospective husband or head of his family undertakes to give to the head of the prospective 
wife’s family in consideration of a customary marriage.266   
Customary marriage, therefore, has also been defined as an agreement between two families, with bridewealth 
as its object.267  However the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, although it gives the definition of lobolo, 
does not mention that it is requirement for a valid marriage.268  The implication created by this situation, 
therefore, would be that a customary marriage would be recognised to be a marriage if it complies with the 
requirements stated above, even if lobolo is not paid.  There had been a debate about the function and 
desirability of lobolo which has continued into the twenty-first century, that lobolo leads to the subordination of 
                                                          
262  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (herafter referred to as Recognition of Customary  
Marriages Act 1998), Section 1. 
263  See Herbst M and Du Plessis W “Customary law v Common law marriages: A hybrid approach in South Africa”  
2008 (12;1) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 1-15, 3, who point out that African customary law in the modern sense of 
word denotes all those legal systems originating from African societies as part of the culture of particular tribes or groups that 
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264  Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998. 
265  Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998. 
266  Section 1 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 1998. 
267  Bennet TW Customary Law in South Africa (2004, Cape Town: Juta and Company Ltd) 220.  See also Herbst and  
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women.269  However, despite such debates many people still practise and support lobolo and very few people 
would be prepared to support its abolishment.  Its symbolic functions remain a powerful force and lobolo has 
been and is still regarded as the rock on which the customary marriage is founded.270  In fact, in many African 
cultures where this custom is practised, lobolo has always been regarded as the link that builds and strengthens 
the relationship between the two families, that of the husband and wife.271   
 
Customary law, unlike civil or Christian marriages which are strictly monogamous, allows polygyny.272  This 
means that in customary marriages, men are allowed to marry as many wives as they wish and can afford.273  
With each new marriage, the wife and her children establish a separate house.274  All the valid customary 
marriages which were entered into by a spouse in more than one customary marriage, before or after the 
commencement of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act are recognised to be marriages, provided they 
comply with the provisions of the Act.275  The problem of polygyny when it comes to the issue of HIV/AIDS, is 
that it creates an environment where if one partner in a polygynous union is infected, the male partner would 
distribute the disease to all the partners he sleeps with in the marriage.276  This would lead to a spread of 
HIV/AIDS.  Polygyny, therefore, is a risky social or cultural practice as far as vulnerability to HIV infection is 
concerned, though however, there is no evidence that it leads to a higher rate of infection than monogamy which 
is practised by couples in civil marriages.277  Polygyny is feasible in the context of the HIV/AIDS pandemic if all 
the partners in the marriage are faithful.278  This would mean, therefore, that in order to fight the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, whether in a monogamous civil marriage or in polygynous customary marriage, couples must always 
be encouraged to be faithful to one another.   
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Customary marriages are also characterised by patriarchy, which denotes the authority and the range of special 
rights and privileges enjoyed by senior males.279  By implication, this means that all women are subordinate and 
according to tradition, the husband, as the head a conjugal unit, may expect his wife to be meek and 
obedient.280  However over time, as a wife proved her worth, her status improved and finally in old age, the 
significance of gender differences was quietly forgotten.281  Nowadays, it could be argued that the status of 
women has significantly improved by virtue of section 9 of the Constitution282 which elevated all women to be 
equal to their husbands.  This, however, does not mean that all women in South Africa in practical terms are 
equal to their husbands.  In some parts of the country patriarchy and unequal gender relationships still exist.   
 
As Izama points out in terms of women’s control of their sexuality in marriage, customary norms weigh heavily 
against them and controlling their own sexual life in marriage.283  Women are normally socialised by older 
women to indulge their husbands whenever they want sex, as failure to do so would drive the husband into other 
women’s arms.  Women normally do not initiate sex and so cannot insist on condom use in marriage as a 
strategy for the prevention of infection against diseases, including HIV.284  Neither are they able to abstain for 
long periods from sex, except when they are separated from their husbands and usually sex is regarded as a 
hidden or private thing and discussions about it is taboo.  When husbands migrate to towns or mine for work and 
come back after a long period of time, wives are still powerless to insist on protected sex.285  All these factors 
may assist in the spreading of HIV/AIDS.  To compound this situation, this position is exacerbated by the strong 
emphasis on health care practitioners maintaining confidentiality of a patient’s HIV status.  As discussed above, 
these guidelines emphasise the importance of the maintenance of confidentiality of the HIV status of the patient.  
Section 5(5.1) of the Health Professions of South Africa (HPCSA)286  provides that “[e]thics, the South African 
Constitution and the law recognise the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the HIV status of a 
patient.”  The application of the ethical guidelines, although not legally binding and although protecting a patient 
from unwarranted disclosure of his or her HIV status, may, however, by emphasising confidentiality and patient 
autonomy at almost all costs, have the unintended and inadvertent consequence of exposing the sexual partner 
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of the infected person to the virus, whether they are in a relationship, civil or customary union or not.  The duty 
to disclose one’s HIV status is clearly that of the HIV-positive person himself or herself.   
This thesis seeks to illustrate that a more nuanced approach to medical confidentiality is necessary; one that will 
recognise the unique context in which HIV in South Africa is transmitted and the factors that contribute to or 
assist in the spreading of the virus.  Interventions, such as partner-notification, which will be discussed and 
submitted under chapter 4, below, become important in such situations in order to protect the ignorant 
uninfected partners and to curb the spread of HIV/AIDS.  It will also be for the same reason that chapter four will 
discuss that although medical confidentiality may be limited in exceptional circumstances, as argued above, 
HIV-infection poses novel challenges that requires a different approach. How such an approach should be 
framed, will be discussed in the chapters that follow.287 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The rights to privacy, confidentiality and also medical confidentiality have been shown to be one of the most 
important rights to persons living with HIV/AIDS, especially considering that despite constitutional protection, 
stigmatisation and discrimination against persons living with HIV/AIDS remain. These rights enable persons 
living with HIV/AIDS to control their health information and determine to whom they can disclose their HIV 
positive status and if they want to disclose such status.  All these rights, however, are not absolute and they can 
be modified by circumstances such as the patient consent, legal actions, statutes and the protection of public 
health.  Medical practitioners who have an obligation to keep confidential their patients personal health 
information are also governed by ethical guidelines of their professional bodies.  The ethical guidelines 
emphasise the importance of maintaining confidentiality of patients’ information.   
Despite the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of patient information, this chapter has argued that the 
context of HIV requires a different approach that will strike a balance between protecting the patient from 
unwarranted disclosure of his or her HIV status, yet also protect the ignorant sexual partners of these persons in 
                                                          
287  See Sunday Sun of 6 July 2008 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “My Deadly Secret”).  This paper reported  
about a guy who four years ago tested for HIV, but never told his wife.  And he still continued to have sex with her whilst he 
knew that he was HIV positive. 
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instances where the infected person decides not to disclose his or her HIV status to these partners. Such an 
approach should take cognisance of varied social and cultural factors that influence perceptions and attitudes 
relating to the disclosure of a person’s HIV status. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
THE LIMITATION OF THE RIGHTS TO PRIVACY, CONFIDENTIALITY AND MEDICAL 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The rights contained in the Bill of Rights of the South African Constitution1 are not absolute.2  All the rights and 
liberties in the Bill of Rights are limited by the limitation clause, section 36.3  It is generally accepted in 
international law, the domestic law of most states, and according to international and other human rights 
instruments, that only a very few number of rights, if any, are absolute.4  These rights include freedom from 
torture, the abuse and exploitation of children and possibly freedom from servitude, freedom of conscience, 
belief, thought and opinion.5  The majority of human rights and liberties, therefore, are of necessity restricted by 
the inherent duty, which should be perceived as the inextricable counterpart of a corresponding right, to respect 
the rights of others.6  In South Africa, however, as Mureinik points out,7 there are no rights in the Bill of Rights 
which are absolute, not even the rights to freedom from torture and servitude.8  In fact, in the case of S v 
Williams,9 the question of whether there are indeed any rights, which despite the apparent universality of the 
limitation clause could not be limited, was left open by the Constitutional Court.10  It must, however, be noted 
                                                          
1  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996. 
2  Currie I & De Waal J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005, Cape Town: Juta & Company Ltd) 163, Cheadle  
MH, Davis DM and Haysom NRL South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002, Durban: Butterworths) 695, 
Mureinik E “A Bridge to where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights” 1994 SAJHR 31-48, 33 and 35, and Bernstein and 
others v Bester NO and others 1996 (4) BCLR 449(CC) (herafter referred to as The Bernstein v Bester case), paragraph [67].  
3  Section 36 of the Constitution of 1996, Currie & De Waal 163 and Mureinik 33. 
4  Devenish GE The South African Constitution (2005, Durban: LexisNexis Butterworths) 179. 
5  Devenish 179. 
6  Currie & De Waal 163 and Devenish at 179, who points out that, the classical example in this regard is that  
freedom of speech does not allow one person to defame another nor would it sanction a person shouting ‘fire’ in a full theatre 
when there is no fire. 
7  See Devenish 179, who points out that Mureinik gave no explanation why there are no rights which are absolute.   
8  Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 35, Currie & De Waal 163 and Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695. 
9  S v Williams 1995 (3) SA 632 (CC) (herafter referred to as The Williams case), paragraphs [55-56]. 
10  Devenish 179.  In this Williams case, paragraphs [55-56], the Constitutional court observed that applicants had  
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that section 36  only limits the rights contained in Bill of Rights and does not limit other rights which are directly 
or indirectly granted elsewhere in the Constitution.11  The right to privacy (and hence also confidentiality and 
medical confidentiality), is therefore limited by section 36 of the Constitution.12  This chapter will examine the 
limitation of the rights to privacy, confidentiality and medical confidentiality by the limitation clause, section 36 of 
the Constitution.13 
 4.1.1 Meaning of limitation 
Currie and De Waal describe a ‘limitation’ as a synonym for ‘infringement’ or possibly a justifiable infringement.14  
A law that limits a right violates that right. Such violation, however, will not be unconstitutional if it takes place for 
the reason that is accepted as a justification for infringing rights in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom.15  It follows, therefore, that not all violations of fundamental rights are 
unconstitutional, for instance, where a violation can be justified in accordance with the criteria in section 36, it 
will be held to be constitutionally valid.16   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
contended that the rights at issue were not capable of limitation and that section 33(1) was therefore not applicable.  
However, the court was of the view that the issue had been raised in argument in other cases before it, but it was an issue 
which did not need to be resolved in that case. 
11  Currie & De Waal 163.  See also the case of Van Rooyen and Others v S and Others (General Council of the  
Bar of South Africa Intervening) 2002 (5) SA 246 (CC) paragraph [35], where the constitutional court observed that 
institutional judicial independence itself is a constitutional principle and norm that goes beyond and lies outside the Bill of 
Rights.  The provisions of section 36 of the constitution dealing with the limitation to rights entrenched in the Bill of Rights are 
accordingly not applicable to it.  Judicial independence is not subject to limitation. This observation by the constitutional court 
in this case seems to be the correct view in that section 36(1) stipulates that the rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited and 
does not talk about other rights.  However, this observation by the court is controversial in the sense that it gives the 
implication that other rights that are granted elsewhere in the constitution and not in the Bill of rights, may, therefore be 
regarded as absolute rights.  This is so because, there seems to be no other limitation in the constitution except the limitation 
clause which is section 36.  It follows, therefore, that if these rights are not subject to section 36, the conclusion that may be 
drawn would be that they are absolute rights.  However, these rights may still be limited through the courts as is the case 
with the United States constitution which, as Cheadle, Davis and Haysom point out at 695, that though it does not have 
limitation clause and the rights are stated in absolute terms, nevertheless the courts have always balanced the constitutional 
rights and social interests using the scope of the right and the threshold levels of scrutiny to manage the conflict.  See also S 
v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (herafter referred to as the Makwanyane case) paragraph [100].    
12  The Constitution of 1996 and The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [67]. 
13  The Constitution of 1996. 
14  Currie & De Waal 164. 
15  Currie & De Waal 164. 
16  Currie & De Waal 164. 
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4.2 THE LIMITATION CLAUSE 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution17 provides that: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of the law of general application to the extent that the 
limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom, 
taking into account all relevant factors, including- 
(a) The nature of the right; 
(b) The importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) The nature and the extent of the limitation; 
(d) The relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
(e) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the constitution, no law may limit any right entrenched 
in the Bill of Rights.18    
 
The main function of the limitation clause has been said to be the clear recognition that the constitutional rights 
are not absolute and that they may be limited by law giving effect to social interests, as expressed by a 
democratically elected legislature.19  The other function of a limitation clause is to provide a basis by which a 
majority in a democracy can have its political will, but only within the framework which demands that the 
exercise of all political power is subject, at the very least, to rational justification.20  By doing that, the limitation 
clause provides a template not only for the courts but, also for the legislature and it provides a common platform 
for dialogue between the courts and the legislature.21  Finally, the limitation clause also determines what and 
who can limit the rights.22  It is, however, important to note that the fact that there is a general limitation clause of 
the rights in the Bill of Rights does not mean that the rights can just be limited for any reason whatsoever.23  The 
reason needs to be exceptionally strong and serve a compelling purpose.24  Furthermore, in order for the 
limitation to be justifiable, there must be a good reason for thinking that it would achieve the purpose it is 
designed to achieve, and that there is no other realistically available manner in which the purpose can be 
                                                          
17  The Constitution of 1996. 
18  The Constitution of 1996. 
19  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695, Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 35 and Currie & De Waal 163. 
20  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695. 
21  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695. 
22  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695. 
23  Currie & De Waal 164. 
24  Currie & De Waal 164. 
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achieved without limiting the rights.25  This was emphasised in the case of S v Manamela,26 where the 
Constitutional court pointed out that as a general rule, the more serious the impact of measure on the right, the 
more persuasive or compelling the justification must be.  Ultimately the question is one of degree to be 
assessed in the concrete legislative and social setting of the measure, paying due regard to the means which 
are realistically available in the country at this stage, but without losing sight of the ultimate values to be 
protected.27  Also, in the case of S v Williams,28 in finding the provisions which infringed the rights in issue to be 
unconstitutional, the Constitutional court held that although the provision concerned is a law of general 
application, the limitation it imposes on the rights in question is, in the light of all the circumstances, not 
reasonable, not justifiable and it is furthermore not necessary.29  This means that the limitation clause puts a 
very stringent test for limiting the rights, in that not just any reason may be used to limit the rights in the Bill of 
Rights, but a very important and a convincing reason is required. 
The limitation clause is general in that it applies to all the rights in the Bill of Rights and stipulates that all the 
rights may be limited in accordance with the same set of criteria.30  This general limitation clause differentiates 
the South African Constitution from other Bills of Rights and international rights documents, such as the United 
States Constitution, which does not have a limitation clause31 and the German Basic Law which does not have a 
general limitation clause, but which attaches specific limitation provisions to many of the fundamental rights.32   
The South African Bill of Rights adopted the general limitation clause from its principal model, the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which has a list of rights and a general limitation clause governing the 
limitation of those rights.33  The inclusion of this general limitation clause in the Bill of Rights also means that the 
process of limitation must be differentiated from the process of interpretation of the rights, and in this manner, 
the Bill of Rights involves a two-stage approach:  The first is to determine whether the right in question is 
violated by a law or conduct of the respondent; and secondly (which normally depends on an affirmative answer 
                                                          
25  Currie & De Waal 164. 
26  S v Manamela 2000 (3) SA 1 (CC) (herafter referred to as The Manamela case). 
27  The Manamela case, paragraph [32]. 
28  The Williams case. 
29  The Williams case, paragraph [92].  
30  Currie & De Waal 165. 
31  See The Makwanyane case, paragraph [100], where the constitutional court observed that the South African  
Constitution differs from the constitution of the United States, which does not contain a limitation clause, as a result of which 
the courts in that country have been obliged to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow interpretation of the rights 
themselves. See also Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695. 
32  Currie & De Waal 165. 
33  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695, Currie & De Waal 165 and S v Zuma and others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC)  
(herafter referred to as The Zuma case), paragraph [21]. 
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of the first question), to determine whether the violation can be justified as a permissible limitation of the right.34  
The second stage concerns the justification for the limitation, the application of section 36(1).35   
 
This two-stage approach was adopted and emphasised by the Constitutional court in the case of S v Zuma and 
Others,36 where the court pointed out that the Canadian cases on reverse onus provisions seem to be 
particularly helpful, not only because of their persuasive reasoning, but because section 1 of the Charter has a 
limitation clause analogous to section 33 of the South African interim Constitution and this called for a ‘two-
stage’ approach.37  First, has there been a contravention of a guaranteed right? If so, is it justified under the 
limitation clause?  The single stage approach (as in the United States constitution or Hong Kong Bill of Rights) 
may call for a more flexible approach to the construction of the fundamental right, whereas the two-stage 
approach may call for a broader interpretation of the fundamental right, qualified only at the second stage.38    
The two-stage approach will next be discussed.   
 
4.2.1 Two-staged approach 
4.2.1.1  Whether the right in question is infringed by a law or conduct of the respondent 
The first stage of the enquiry is to determine whether a law or conduct of the respondent has infringed a right of 
the applicant.39   The court must determine the scope of the rights by the process of interpretation and there are 
two approaches to the task.40  The first is that the rights be given the broadest possible scope within the bounds 
                                                          
34  Currie & De Waal 166, Devenish 183, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 696, The Makwanyane case, paragraph [100]  
and Viljoen F “Disclosing in an Age of AIDS: Confidentiality and Community in Conflict” in Viljoen F (ed) Righting Stigma: 
Exploring a Rights-Based Approach to Address Stigma (2005, Pretoria: AIDS and Human Rights Research Unit, University of 
Pretoria) 76. 
35  Section 36(1) of the Constitution of 1996. 
36  See The Zuma case, paragraph [21] and Ferreira v Levin NO and others and Vryhenhoek v Powell NO and others  
1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) (herafter referred to as The Ferreira and Vryhenhoek case), paragraph [44].  Note that the Zuma case, 
seems to have followed and adopted the ruling of the Canadian case of R v Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, paragraphs [9] and 
[14], where the court expressed the view that to determine whether a particular reverse onus provision is legitimate, Martin 
J.A. outlined a two-pronged enquiry.  Two specific questions are raised: (1) does s. 8 of the Narcotic Act violate s. 11 of the 
Charter; and, (2) if it does, is s. 8 a reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society for the purposes of s. 1 of the Charter?     
37  The Zuma case, paragraph [21]. 
38  The Zuma case, paragraph [21]. 
39  Currie & De Waal 166, Devenish 183, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 696, The Zuma case, paragraph [21] and The  
Ferreira and Vryhenhoek case, paragraph [44].  See also the case of Hoffmann v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 
1235 (CC) (herafter referred to as The Hoffmann case), paragraph [41], where the constitutional court held that the refusal by 
SAA to employ the appellant as a cabin attendant because he was HIV-positive violated his right to equality guaranteed by 
section 9 of the Constitution.  
40  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698 and Currie & De Waal 166. 
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of the text.41  This approach argues that any limitation of the application of the right should be reserved for the 
limitations enquiry under section 36.  If the text is wide and general enough to encompass the full range of 
interests, the scope of the right will accordingly be wide.42  Under this approach, for instance, freedom of speech 
includes all speech, whether insulting or defamatory or hate speech, (subject of course to the narrowing of the 
scope of hate speech in section 16(2)).43   
The alternative approach is to define the constitutionally protected interest advanced by the right.  That interest 
may be narrower than a literal interpretation of the text and may be determined by hermeneutic exercise based 
on the text, the context and the foundational values.44  This approach has been endorsed by the Constitutional 
court.45  This approach entails an analysis of the text in its context, namely the historical background to both the 
Constitution and the right, the reason for the inclusion as a constitutional right, the concepts enshrined in the 
right and their legal elaboration under both South African law and comparative law, the other provisions of the 
Constitution, in particular the other constitutional rights, and the foundational values.46  Under this approach, for 
instance, the right to freedom of expression may be held not to include hate speech, or the right to freedom of 
association not to include terrorist organisations or crime syndicates.47  However, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom48 
argue that the courts should engage in rights analysis on the understanding that there is no need to shape the 
contours of the right in order to accommodate pressing social needs and that the rights analysis should not be a 
proxy for the limiting of rights.  The first stage, therefore, of inquiry is for the court to determine whether the right 
in question was violated or not.  If the court finds that the right in question was not violated, then the case ends 
there.  However, if the court finds that a law infringed a constitutional right, then, the second stage is triggered.  
This means that the onus will now shift to the defendant to prove to the court that though the law had infringed a 
constitutional right, however, such infringement is justified under section 36 of the Constitution.  
 
 
                                                          
41  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698.  The Zuma case, paragraph [18], seems to have adopted this approach. 
42  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698. 
43  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698. 
44  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698. 
45  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698.  See also The Ferreira and Vryenhoek case, paragraph 46, where the  
constitutional court, pointed out that this court has given its approval to an interpretive approach ‘which, whilst paying due 
regard to the language that has been used, is generous and purposive and gives expression to the underlying values of the 
constitution.’    
46  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698. 
47  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 698. 
48  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 699. 
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4.2.1.2  Whether the violation can be justified as a permissible limitation of the right 
The law that limits the rights in the Bill of Rights will be justifiable, according to section 36(1) of the Constitution, 
only if it is a law of general application which is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom.49  This justification will now be discussed in detail below. 
4.2.1.2.1 Law of general application 
Rights may only be validly limited by a law of general application.50  A limitation of a right must have its source in 
a law of general application and it cannot be located in an executive act or policy, unless an authorising law 
permits such limitation.51  A limitation must be authorised by a law, and the law must be of general application.52  
The law of general application requirement is the expression of a basic principle of liberal political philosophy 
and of constitutional law known as the rule of law and there are two components to this principle.53  The first is 
that the power of the government derives from the law.  The government must have lawful authority for all its 
actions otherwise it will not be a lawful government.54  It should be noted, however, that the fact that a law does 
not apply to all persons does not mean that it is not a law of general application.55  It may be limited to an area, 
category of persons, or subject matter.  Provided that its application is not arbitrary or personal, the law will be a 
law of general application, which includes legislation, subordinate legislation, the common law and customary 
law.56  This requirement of the law of general application was clearly illustrated in the case of August v Electoral 
Commission,57 where the issue before the Constitutional court concerned the voting rights of prisoners.  The 
appeal in this case arose out of the fact that the High court had held that the Electoral Commission (The 
Commission) had no obligation to ensure that awaiting trial and sentenced prisoners may register and vote in 
the general elections which had been announced on 2 June 1999.58  The 1996 Constitution, according to the 
Court, provided that one of the values on which the one, sovereign and democratic state of the Republic of 
South Africa was founded, was ‘[u]niversal and adult suffrage’ and ‘a national common voters’ roll.’  It continued 
                                                          
49  The Constitution of 1996. 
50  Currie & De Waal 168, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 702 and Devenish 180. 
51  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 702 and Devenish 180. 
52  Currie & De Waal 168 and Devenish 180.  See also The Hoffmann case, paragraph [41], where the constitutional  
court held that the refusal by SAA to employ the appellant as a cabin attendant because he was HIV-positive violated his 
right to equality guaranteed by section 9 of the Constitution.  Further, that the third enquiry, namely whether this violation was 
justified, did not arise as the court was not dealing with a law of general application. 
53  Currie & De Waal 168, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 702 and Devenish 180. 
54  Currie & De Waal 168. 
55  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 702. 
56  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 702 and Currie & De Waal 169. 
57  August v Electoral Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) (herafter referred to as The August case). 
58  The August case, paragraph [1]. 
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to state that ‘[e]very adult citizen had the right to vote in elections for the legislative body established in terms of 
the Constitution, and to do so in secret’.59  Further that, unlike the interim Constitution, however, the above 
sections contained no provision allowing for disqualifications from voting to be prescribed by law.  Accordingly, if 
parliament sought to limit the unqualified right of adult suffrage entrenched in the Constitution, it would be 
obliged to do so in terms of a law of general application which met the requirements of reasonableness and 
justifiability as set out in section 36.60  Parliament, according to the Court, had not sought to limit the right of 
prisoners to vote through the Electoral Act,61 as prisoners were not included in the list of disqualified persons.62   
 
The Constitutional court held that in the absence of a disqualifying legislative provision, it was not possible for 
the respondents to seek to justify the threatened infringement of prisoners’ rights in terms of section 36 of the 
Constitution, as there was no law of general application upon which they could rely to do so.63  The court then 
ordered the Electoral Commission, amongst others, to make all reasonable arrangements necessary to enable 
the applicants and other prisoners to vote in those general elections.64  The Constitutional court was correct in 
this view, because denying the prisoners their constitutional right to vote by the Commission, without any law of 
general application authorising it to do so, was tantamount to undermining the rule of law.  The second aspect of 
the rule of law relates to the character or quality of the law which authorises a particular action.65  The law must 
be general in its application and this means that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and precise that 
those who are affected by it can ascertain the extent of their rights and obligations.  On a substantive level, it 
means that, at a minimum, the law must apply impersonally, it must apply equally to all and it must not be 
arbitrary in its application.66  The law of general application requirement in section 36 therefore prevents laws 
that have personal, unequal or arbitrary application from qualifying as legitimate limitations of rights.67  This was 
emphasised in the case of S v Makwanyane,68 where the Constitutional court pointed out that South Africa had 
moved from the past, characterised by much which was arbitrary and unequal in the operation of the law, to a 
present and a future in a constitutional state where the state action must be such that it is capable of being 
                                                          
59  The August case, paragraph [3]. 
60  The August case, paragraph [3]. 
61  Electoral Act 73 of 1998 (herafter referred to as the Electoral Act). 
62  The August case, paragraph [4]. 
63  The August case, paragraph [23]. 
64  The August case, paragraph [42]. 
65  Currie & De Waal 168. 
66
  Currie & De Waal 169 and Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 703. 
67  Currie & De Waal 168. 
68  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [156]. 
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analysed and justified rationally.69   
 
The idea of the constitutional state presupposes a system whose operation can be rationally tested against or in 
terms of the law.  Arbitrariness, by its very nature, is dissonant with these core concepts of the new 
constitutional order.  Neither arbitrary action nor laws or rules which are inherently arbitrary or must lead to 
arbitrary application can, in any real sense, be tested against the precepts or principles of the Constitution.70  
Arbitrariness must also inevitably, by its very nature, lead to the unequal treatment of persons.  Arbitrary action 
or decision-making is incapable of providing a rational explanation as to why similarly placed persons are treated 
in a substantially different way.  Without such a rational justifying mechanism, unequal treatment must follow.71  
The law that limits a right must be a law of general application, apply to all people equally and be not arbitrary, in 
order for it to qualify as a justifiable limitation.   
4.2.1.2.2 Approach generally 
The limitation clause requires any infringing law to be reasonable and justifiable in terms of section 36(1).72  The 
determination of reasonableness and justifiability must be conducted in a context, in an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom and in the light of all relevant factors.73  The limitation of 
fundamental rights, therefore, as sanctioned by section 36, involves a judicious weighing up of competing 
societal and ethical values, using an assessment based on proportionality.74  This view was emphasised in the 
case of S v Makwanyane,75 where the court observed that the limitation of rights for a purpose that is reasonable 
and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an 
assessment based on proportionality.76  Different rights have different implications for democracy, and therefore, 
also for our body politic, premised as it is on “an open and democratic, society based on freedom and equality, 
with the result that “there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness and 
necessity”.77   Principles must therefore be established and articulated, but the application of these to particular 
circumstances can be assessed on a case by case basis.  It, therefore, follows that reasonableness and 
                                                          
69  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [156]. 
70  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [156]. 
71  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [156]. 
72  See Prince v President of the Law Society, Cape of Good Hope and Others 1998 (8) BCLR 976 (C), where the  
court held that for all the reasons, including the strong body of foreign judicial decisions, the inroads made by section 4(b) of 
the Drugs Act into the exercise by the applicant of his religious observations, is in the judgment of the court justified by 
section 36(1) of the constitution. 
73  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 703 and Currie & De Waal 176. 
74  Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 703 and Currie & De Waal 176. 
75  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [104]. 
76  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [104]. 
77  The Makwanyane case, paragraph [104]. 
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justification of the limitation of rights will be determined by the courts having weighed and balanced all the facts 
of the case and determined which right weighs heavier than the other.  In terms of section 36, therefore, all 
rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited provided that the law limiting the rights will be reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society and such law must be a law which applies to all people.   
 
4.3 NATIONAL HEALTH ACT ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS TO PRIVACY AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
 
The National Health Act,78 section 14, deals with the right to confidentiality and section 15 deals with access to 
health records.  Section 14 provides that: 
(1) All information concerning a user, including information relating to his or her health status, treatment or stay in a health 
establishment is confidential. 
(2) Subject to section 15, no person may disclose any information contemplated in subsection (1) unless- 
(a) the user consents to that disclosure in writing; 
(b) a court order or any law requires that disclosure; or 
(c) non-disclosure of the information represents a serious threat to public health. 
 
Section 15, on the other hand, provides that: 
(1) A health worker or any health care provider that has access to the health records of a user may disclose such personal 
information to any other person, health care provider or health establishment as is necessary for any legitimate purpose 
within the ordinary course and scope of his duties or her duties where such access or disclosure is in the interests of the 
user.  
 
Section 14(2) (b) and section 14(2)(c) therefore limit the rights to privacy and confidentiality of a patient.  It is 
clear according to sections 14(2)(b) and 14(2)(c) that a patient’s health information may not be disclosed unless 
a court order requires the disclosure or that non-disclosure of the information would cause a serious threat to 
public health.  It follows, therefore, that in circumstances where a court requires a disclosure of a patient’s health 
information, his or her right to privacy will be limited by the health care worker’s disclosure of such health 
information to the court.79  Furthermore, where a healthcare worker is of the opinion that non-disclosure of 
health information of a patient would pose a serious threat to the public, he or she can limit the rights to privacy 
and confidentiality of such a patient by disclosing his or her health status.  Section 15(1) also allows health care 
workers to disclose personal health information of a patient to any other person, health care provider or health 
                                                          
78  The National Health Act 61 of 2003 (herafter referred to as The Health Act 2003). 
79  Strauss SA Doctor, Patient and the Law 3rd ed (1991, Pretoria: JL van Schaik) 103, Rautenbach PGD “Your  
patient and confidentiality: a practical approach” 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 26-28, 27, Parkes v 
Parkes 1916 CPD 702, Botha v Botha 1972 (2) SA 559 (N) and C v C (1946) 1 ALL ER 562. 
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establishment, if such a disclosure is in the interest of such a patient and by so doing such health care workers 
would be limiting the rights to privacy and confidentiality.  
4.3.1 Regulations made in terms of the National Health Act on notifiable communicable diseases 
The National Health Act, Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases,80 regulation 12, stipulates that: 
The Minister may, after consultation with the National Health Council, declare by Notice in the Government Gazette any 
disease to be a notifiable communicable disease if in his or her opinion such a disease: 
(a) poses a serious threat to an entire or part of a population of a particular province or the Republic; 
(b) may require immediate, appropriate and specific action to be taken by the national department, one or more 
provincial departments and/or one or more municipalities; 
(c) may be regarded as a public health emergency of international concern or a public health risk;  
and may determine that- 
(i) on application of a province, any disease other than a notifiable communicable disease under (a) and (b), 
be declared notifiable within a province or district for a period specified in the notice or until the notice is 
withdrawn; 
(ii) certain diseases be notifiable in certain provinces or certain municipalities; 
(iii) certain diseases be notifiable by certain categories of health care workers; and 
(iv) specific diagnostic or laboratory criteria apply to specific diseases for notification. 
 
It should, however, be noted that HIV/AIDS is not listed as a notifiable communicable disease in Annexure A of 
the National Health Act, Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases.81  It follows therefore that HIV/AIDS is 
not a notifiable disease in South Africa and may not be reported to health authorities as contemplated by 
regulation 13(1).82  The question of whether HIV/AIDS should be made a notifiable disease in South Africa, as 
some seem to suggest,83 will be discussed in detail, under 5.5 below. 
                                                          
80  The Health Act 2003, Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases (GG 33107 of 13 April 2010) (herafter  
referred to as Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases). 
81  Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases . 
82  Regulation 13(1), Regulations Regarding Communicable Diseases, which stipulates that: When a health care  
provider diagnoses the disease referred to in Annexure A in a person or in a specimen obtained from a person, he or she 
must report the findings thereof to the relevant district and local authority concerned and: (a) where the disease concerned is 
acute and life threatening as referred to in Annexure A Table 1, immediate verbal notification based on clinical suspicion 
must be done and this must be followed by notification in writing within 24 hours of laboratory confirmation of the disease; (b) 
for diseases listed in Annexure A Table 2, notification must be done in writing within 24 hours of laboratory confirmation of 
the disease; and for other communicable diseases referred to in Annexure A Table 3, notification must be done in writing 
within seven days. 
83  See, City Press of 4 March 2012 page 1.  (The paper depicted this as “ANC wants new Constitution”).  In this  
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4.4 CRIMINAL LAW (SEXUAL OFFENCES AND RELATED MATTERS) AMENDMENT ACT (THE 
CRIMINAL LAW AMENDMENT ACT),84 HIV TESTING OF ACCUSED PERSONS AND 
INFORMATION TO VICTIMS 
 
The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act (The Criminal Law Amendment Act )85 
deals with the limitation of the rights to privacy and confidentiality of sexual offenders.  Section 30, stipulates 
that: 
(1)(a) Within 90 days after the alleged commission of a sexual offence, any victim or any interested person on behalf of a 
victim, may apply to a magistrate, in the prescribed form, for an order that-  
  (i) the alleged offender be tested for HIV and that the results thereof be disclosed to the victim 
  or interested person, as the case may be, and to the alleged offender; or 
(ii) the HIV test results in respect of the alleged offender, obtained on application by a police official as 
contemplated in section 32, be disclosed to the victim or interested person, as the case may be. 
 (2)(a) Every application must- 
  (i) state that a sexual offence was committed against the victim by the alleged offender; 
  (ii) confirm that the alleged offence has been reported as contemplated in section 28(2); 
  (iii) state that the victim may have been exposed to the risk of being infected with HIV as a result  
of the alleged sexual offence. 
 31(3) If the magistrate is satisfied that there is prima facie evidence that-  
(a) a sexual offence has been committed against the victim by the alleged offender; 
(b) the victim may have been exposed to the body fluids of the alleged offender; 
(c) no more than 90 calendar days have lapsed from the date on which it is alleged that the offence in question took 
place, the magistrate must- 
(i) in the case where the offender has not been tested for HIV on application by the police official 
as contemplated in section 32, order that the offender be tested for HIV in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Paper, it is observed that: “The ANC is contemplating dramatic changes to the country’s Constitution, including scrapping the 
“sunset clauses” and changing the powers of the Reserve Bank and provinces.  City Press is in possession of draft policy 
documents that will be distributed to the party’s branches tomorrow ahead of its policy conference in June.  The documents 
are likely to shape the direction of government programmes if adopted at the ANC’s national conference in December.  In a 
section on strategy and tactics titled the “The second transition?” the ANC says the Constitution of 1996 ‘may have been 
appropriate for a political transition, but it has proven inadequate and even inappropriate for a social and economic 
transformation phase’.  Other points to be discussed include that: HIV/AIDS should be made a notifiable disease.” 
84  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (herafter referred to as The  
Criminal Law Amendment Act). 
85  The Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
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State’s prevailing norms and protocols and that the HIV test results be disclosed in the 
prescribed manner to the victim or interested person, as the case may be, and to the alleged 
offender. 
The Criminal Law Amendment Act,86 therefore, limits the rights to privacy and confidentiality of the sexual 
offenders as it stipulates clearly that the offender may be ordered by the magistrate to be tested for HIV against 
his will87 and the result, thereof, of such a test be disclosed to the victim and interested persons.  However, 
sections 36 and 37 of The Criminal Amendment Act still maintain the confidentiality of the application and the 
test results in that such disclosure has to be done only to the relevant persons mentioned by the Act.88  In fact, 
section 38(b) makes it an offence for anyone with malicious intent or who in a grossly negligent manner 
discloses the results of any HIV tests in contravention of section 37, and such an individual would be guilty of an 
offence and is liable to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding three years.89  The Criminal 
Amendment Act, therefore, is a limitation to the right of privacy and confidentiality of sexual offenders and it may 
be argued that it a justified limitation as far as it benefits the victims.  A victim of rape, for instance, may be 
anxious to know whether the offender was HIV-positive or negative when he or she was raped. Knowledge of 
the results may assist in deciding to be tested for HIV or use Antiretroval drugs (ARVs) to prevent infection from 
the virus.   
    
4.5 BIRTHS AND DEATHS REGISTRATION ACT 
 
The Births and Deaths Registration Act (Births and Deaths Registration Act),90 deals with the registration of 
death in sections 14 to 22.  Section 14 provides that: 
                                                          
86  The Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
87  In fact, according to section 38(2), an alleged offender who, in any manner whatsoever, fails or refuses to comply  
with or avoids compliance with, or deliberately frustrates an attempt to serve on himself or herself, an order of court that he or 
she be tested for HIV, is guilty of an offence and is liable on conviction to a fine or imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
three years. 
88  The Criminal Law Amendment Act, section 37, for instance, stipulates that: (1) The results of the HIV tests  
performed on an alleged offender in terms of this chapter may, subject to subsection (2), be communicated only to  (a) the 
victim or interested person referred to in section 30; (b) the alleged offender; and (c) the investigating officer and where 
applicable, to (i) a prosecutor if alleged offender is tested as contemplated in section 32; or (ii) any other person who needs 
to know the test results for the purposes of any civil proceedings or an order of the court. 
89  Section 38(b) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. 
90  Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 (herafter referred to as The Births and Deaths Registration Act). 
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(1)(a) In the case of a death due to natural causes any person who was present at the death, or who became aware 
thereof, or who has charge of the burial concerned, shall give, as soon as practicable, by means of a certificate 
mentioned in section 15(1) or (2), notice thereof to a person contemplated in section 4. 
(2) If the person contemplated in section 4 is satisfied on the basis of the certificate issued in terms of section 15(1) or 
(2) that the death was due to natural causes, he shall complete the prescribed death register and issue a 
prescribed burial order authorising burial. 
 […] 
15(1) Where a medical practitioner is satisfied that the death of any person who was attended before his death by the 
medical practitioner was due to natural causes, he shall issue a prescribed certificate stating the cause of death. 
(2) A medical practitioner who did not attend any person before his death but after the death of the person examined 
the corpse and is satisfied that the death was due to natural causes, may issue a prescribed certificate to that 
effect. 
[…] 
22 After a death has been registered in terms of this Act, the Director-General shall issue a prescribed death 
certificate. 
 
According to Births and Registration Act, if a medical practitioner is satisfied that the death of a person whom he 
or she had attended to before this person died is due to natural causes, he or she has to issue a prescribed 
certificate stating the cause of death (section 15(1)).   The death certificate91 has two pages.92  The first page is 
for the registration of the death with the Department of Home Affairs, so that they can issue a burial order and 
on this page the doctor only has to indicate if the cause of death was the result of ‘natural’ or ‘unnatural’ 
causes.93  The second page is a confidential document that is only used for data collection and it not a public 
record.  Even if this second page shows that a person died of an AIDS-related illness, it is a confidential 
document.  The family of the deceased person will only be given the second part of the death certificate if they 
are to make a legal claim; otherwise, they are normally given only the first page.94  Doctors, in South Africa, 
therefore, are not allowed to enter AIDS as a cause of death on the first page of the death certificate and as a 
result of this, the Health Professionals Council of South Africa (HPCSA) took a medical practitioner (Dr Wagner) 
                                                          
91  Birth and Death Registration Act: Regulations of 1998, as cited by Barret-Grant K et al HIV/AIDS and The Law-A  
Resource Manual 2nd ed (2001, The AIDS Law Project and The AIDS Legal Network) 129. 
92  It differs from section 36 of the Australian Births, Deaths and Marriages Act of 1996, which stipulate that the form  
consists of three sections and each section must be completed by the doctor which are: (1) The stub which is kept for the 
doctor’s records; (2) The central panel, the doctor’s certificate of cause of death, which is to be handed to the funeral 
directors and; (3) The outer panel, the notice of death, which must be sent promptly to the Births, Deaths and Marriages 
Registration office.   
93  Barret-Grant 129. 
94  Barret-Grant 129. 
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to a disciplinary hearing in Bloemfontein after the practitioner listed AIDS as a cause of death of a young woman 
on the death certificate, contrary to the HPCSA policy.95   
There may be strong arguments in favour of disclosing AIDS on the death certificates, as persons would know 
the real cause of death and stop speculating about such things as witchcraft, for instance. 
 
4.6 THE CHILDREN’S ACT AND PROVISIONS CONCERNING CONFIDENTIALITY OF HIV DIAGNOSIS 
 
The Children’s Act,96 section 133(1) and section 133(2), deal with the confidentiality of information on the 
HIV/AIDS status of children.  Section 133(1), stipulates that: 
No person may disclose the fact that a child is HIV-positive without consent given in terms of subsection (2), except- 
(a) within the scope of that person’s powers and duties in terms of this Act or any other law; 
(b) when necessary for purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act;  
(c) in terms of an order of a court.97 
It seems clear according to section 133(1) that although the right confidentiality of HIV positive status of a child 
must be protected, there are circumstances where such right to confidentiality may be limited.  Amongst others, 
one such circumstance is when a court order dictates that the HIV status of a child be disclosed.  This disclosure 
is another example of a justified limitation of right to confidentiality of a child who is HIV-positive. 
 
 
                                                          
95  See http://solidaritysa.co.za/Home/wmview.php?ArtID=609 (visited 15 March 2012) and  
http://www.panapress.com/SA-health-body-grills-doctor-for-indicating-AIDS-as-cause-of... (visited 15 March 2012).  
96  The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (herafter referred to as The Children’s Act). 
97  Section 133(1) of The Children’s Act.  Section 133(2), stipulates that: Consent to disclose the fact that a child is  
HIV-positive may be given by-(a) the child, if the child is-(i) 12 – years of age or older; or (ii) under the age of 12 years and is 
of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of such a disclosure; (b) the parent or care-
giver, if the child is under the age of 12 years and is not of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social 
implications of such a disclosure; (c) a designated child protection organisation arranging the placement of the child, if the 
child is under the age of 12 years and is not of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of 
such a disclosure; (d) the superintendent or person in charge of a hospital, if – (i) the child is under the age of 12 years and 
is not of sufficient maturity to understand the benefits, risks and social implications of such a disclosure; and (ii) the child has 
no parent or care-giver and there is no designated child protection organisation arranging the placement of the child; or (e) a 
children’s court, if – (i) consent in terms of paragraph (a), (b), (c) or (d) is unreasonably withheld and disclosure is in the best 
interest of the child; or (ii) the child or the parent or care-giver of the child is incapable of giving consent.      
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4.7 COMMON LAW PROVISIONS 
 
Common law has long recognised that a health care worker owes a duty of care, not only to his or her own 
patients, but also to other patients at large.98  A partner at risk may sue a doctor for failing to disclose 
information if the doctor exercised his or her discretion against disclosure and, as a result, the partner at risk 
becomes infected.99  In that sense the discretion is very constrained, and effectively amounts to a duty as the 
exercise of the discretion not to disclose may give rise to legal liability.  In practice the discretion, therefore, 
amounts to an obligation once the health care worker has determined that someone is at a clear risk of infection 
from the tested person.100  The question as to what a doctor’s duty of care entails is determined with reference 
to the standards of reasonableness as set out in the legal convictions of the community or boni mores.101  The 
question to be asked by the health care worker or anyone applying his or her discretion is: will it be considered 
reasonable and in the community interest to disclose?102   
In the case of Minister van Polisie v Ewels,103 the court expressed the view that, our law has developed to the 
stage wherein an omission is regarded as unlawful conduct when the circumstances of the case are of such a 
nature that the omission not only incites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the community 
demand that the omission ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the damage suffered ought to be made 
good by the person who neglected to do a positive act.104  The courts have also recognised that the right to 
privacy is not absolute but can be limited.  In the case of Bernstein and Others v Bester NO and Others,105 the 
court pointed out that the truism that no right is to be considered absolute,106 implies that from the outset of 
interpretation each right is always already limited by every other right accruing to another citizen.107  In the 
context of privacy, this would mean that it is only the inner sanctum of a person, such as his/her family life, 
                                                          
98  Viljoen 76.    
99  Viljoen 76. 
100  Viljoen 76. 
101  Carstens P and Pearmain D Foundational Principles of South African Medical Law (2007, Durban: LexisNexis)  
958 and Viljoen 76.   
102  Viljoen 76. 
103  Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA (A) (herafter known as The Ewels case). 
104  The Ewels case. 
105  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [67]. 
106  Currie & De Waal 163, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695 and Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 33 and 35. 
107  As Marty Lewinter at http//:www.freedomkeys.com/rights.htm (visited 18 May 2012), points out that, as Justice  
Oliver Wendell Holmes said: ‘The right to swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose begins.’  Rights must apply to 
everyone in same sense at the same time.  So rights must therefore be limited to claims of freedom to do anything which 
does not violate the freedom of others.  
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sexual preference and home environment, which is shielded from erosion by conflicting rights of the 
community.108  This implies that community rights and the rights of fellow members place a corresponding 
obligation to the citizen, thereby shaping the abstract notion of individualism towards identifying a concrete 
member of civil society.  Privacy is acknowledged in the truly personal realm, but as a person moves into 
communal relations and activities such as business and social interaction, the scope of personal space shrinks 
accordingly.109  This case clearly shows that no right can be regarded as unlimited.110  Rights, as the court 
correctly pointed out, are limited by the rights of other people.  Privacy of person, as the court also emphasised, 
remains truly private as long as the individual remains at his or her home environment that is away from the 
intrusion of others.  But once the person starts to mingle with other people in social interactions such as school, 
work, church, business, social media (such as Facebook and Twitter111), his or her privacy becomes limited by 
such interactions.              
 
4.8 DUTY TO INFORM EXPOSED THIRD PARTIES IN TERMS OF THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICAL 
GUIDELINES 
 
The ethical guidelines of the Health Professions of South Africa (HPCSA)112 lay out the ethical duties under 
which the medical practitioners will be obliged to inform third parties, such as exposed health care workers and 
                                                          
108  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [67]. 
109  The Bernstein v Bester case, paragraph [67].  The court, however, in this Bernstein case at paragraph [71],  
pointed out that caution must be exercised when attempting to project common law principles onto the interpretation of 
fundamental rights and their limitation; it is important to keep in mind that at common law the determination of whether an 
invasion of privacy has taken place constitutes a single enquiry, including an assessment of its unlawfulness.  As the case of 
other iniuriae the presence of a ground of justification excludes the wrongfulness of an invasion of privacy.  In constitutional 
adjudication under the constitution, by contrast, a two-stage approach must be employed in deciding constitutionality of a 
statute.   
110  Currie & De Waal 163, Cheadle, Davis and Haysom 695 and Mureinik 1994 SAJHR 33 and 35. 
111  See Daily Dispatch of Tuesday, May 15, 2012, page 6 (The paper depicted this as: “Warning for Facebook, Twitter  
users”), where this paper reported that Facebook and Twitter users should not say in private what they do not want to be 
made public.  This was the advice from the former head of social media in President Jacob Zuma’s private office.  The advice 
by a master’s student, Suni Gopal, comes as the American Consumer Report last week revealed that most Facebook users 
worldwide were sharing too much information and simply ignored privacy settings.  Gopal said recent Twitter storm over the 
racist tweets by model Jessica Leandra dos Santos was an example of how private thoughts could easily be exposed to the 
wider public.  She was cited by the paper as saying: ‘Many people are unaware other members of the public can easily view 
their comments and profile information.  They are under the impression only their friends can see their thoughts, feelings and 
actions.  However, literally thousands of others are now privy to one’s personal information, from where you are and what 
you are doing, to being able to view your private holiday pictures.’     
112  See the Health Professions Council of South Africa (HPCSA) Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care  
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sexual partners, of a patient’s HIV-status, and as a result, limit the rights to privacy and confidentiality of the 
patient.  These ethical duties will next be discussed. 
4.8.1 Exposed health care workers 
The HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions, Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice 
with regard to HIV113 address the responsibilities of health care practitioners to positive HIV patients in guideline 
4, whereas guideline 5 deals with confidentiality.  Guideline 4 provides that: 
4.5 In the management of an HIV positive patient it is important that the health care practitioner gives due 
consideration to other health care professionals who are also involved in the management of the same patient (e.g. 
where necessary, and with the patient’s consent, informing them of the HIV status of the patient). 
Guideline 5, provides as follows in respect of confidentiality: 
5.1 Ethics, the South African Constitution and the law recognise the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of the 
HIV status of a patient. 
5.2 The test results of HIV positive patients should be treated with the highest possible level of confidentiality. 
5.3 Confidentiality regarding a patient’s HIV status extends to other health care practitioners.  Other health care 
practitioners may not be informed of a patient’s HIV status without that patient’s consent unless the disclosure is 
clinically indicated.  For treatment and care to be in the best interests of the patient, the need for disclosure of 
clinical data, (including HIV and related test results), to health care practitioners involved in the care of the patient, 
should be discussed with the patient. 
5.4 The decision to divulge information relating to the HIV status of a patient must always be done in consultation with 
the patient.  
 
The health care worker, therefore, may tell other health care workers about his or her patient’s HIV status, 
provided that the patient gives his or her consent to such disclosure to the other health care workers.  Where the 
disclosure of the patient’s HIV status to other health care workers is clinically indicated, the health care worker 
must first discuss such disclosure with the patient, but will be ethically entitled to inform other health care 
workers of the patient’s HIV status, even if the patient refuses to allow him or her to do so.114  The reason for 
this would be if the information is going to be important for future medical treatment and this must be explained 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Professions Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information 2nd ed Booklet 11 (herafter referred to as HPCSA 
Guidelines Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information) and HPCSA Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice with 
regard to HIV 2nd ed Booklet 12 (30th May 2007 Pretoria) (herafter referred to as HPCSA Ethical Guidelines with regard to 
HIV). 
113  HPCSA Guidelines with regard to HIV. 
114  See Dickens BM “The doctor’s duty of confidentiality: separating the rule from the expectations” 1999 (77;1)  
University of Toronto Medical Journal 40-43, 41, who points out that health care professionals may discuss personal details 
of an identified patient’s best clinical care with others who share clinical responsibility for the patient’s well-being, since this 
falls within the scope of the patient’s implied consent. 
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to the patient, who must give permission for the medical information to be passed on to other health care 
workers or health facilities.115  However, the guidelines, unlike in the case of partner disclosure, which will be 
discussed below, are unclear about what should happen in the case where the disclosure is not clinically 
indicated and the patient refuses that other health care practitioners should be informed.  As the case is now, it 
seems that if the patient refuses that his or her HIV status information be disclosed to other health care workers, 
the health care worker will have to respect such a decision and not disclose such information.116       
4.8.2 Exposed sexual partners 
The HPCSA Guidelines for Good Practice in the Health Care Professions, Ethical Guidelines for Good Practice 
with regard to HIV,117 provide guidance regarding partner disclosure in guideline 9.  Guideline 9 stipulates that: 
9.1 Health care practitioners should try to encourage their HIV positive patients to disclose their status to their sexual 
partners so as to encourage them to undergo VCT and access treatment if necessary.  This is consistent with good 
clinical practice. 
9.2 If the patient refuses consent, the health care practitioner should use his or her discretion when deciding whether 
or not to divulge the information to the patient’s sexual partner, taking into account the possible risk of HIV infection 
to the sexual partner and the risks to the patient (e.g. through violence) that may follow such disclosure.  The 
decision must be made with great care, and consideration must be given to the rights of all the parties concerned.  
                                                          
115  Barret-Grant 124 and Carstens and Pearmain 958.   
116  Barret-Grant 124.  See, however, Carstens and Pearmain 958, who cite The Medical and Dental Council ethical  
guidelines of 1989 which seemed to be specific on the fact that if the patient refused to have other health care workers 
informed, the patient had to be told that the health care worker had an ethical duty to inform other health care workers 
involved with the patient, failing of which if the health care worker were to be found to have committed an act or omission 
which would have led to the unnecessary exposure to HIV infection of another health care worker, the Council would see this 
in a very serious light and would consider disciplinary action against the practitioner concerned.  See also the case of Jansen 
van Vuuren and Another v Kruger 1993 (4) SA 842 (AD) (herafter referred to as The Van Vuuren case) at 854C-G, where the 
court also cited the said Medical and Dental Council guidelines of 1989 and concluded that an important aspect was that the 
patient had to be informed of the doctor’s obligation to make a disclosure, which would give the patient the opportunity to say 
why it is in fact not necessary, something which the court felt in that case the plaintiff was denied.  It is interesting to note, 
however, that in that case the court did not decide on the basis of whether the defendant had an ethical duty or legal duty to 
inform the other two health care workers about the HIV status of his patient, but decided on whether he had a social or moral 
duty to make such a disclosure.  The court was of the view that the health care worker had no such social or moral duty to 
transfer, nor did the other two health workers had the right to receive, the information.  In certain circumstances, however, as 
stipulated in HPCSA Guidelines Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information, guideline 7.2 provides that: where 
patients have consented to treatment, express consent is not usually needed before relevant personal information is shared 
to enable the treatment to be provided.  An example in point here is that express consent is not needed before a general 
practitioner discloses relevant personal information to a medical secretary so that she can type a referral letter.  In such 
circumstances, the patient will be assumed to have given implied consent to such disclosure being made to the secretary.  
However, according to guideline 7.3 the health care practitioner must make sure that any recipient to whom personal 
information about patients is disclosed, understands that it is given to them in confidence, which they must respect.  Also, 
according to guideline 7.4 in cases of medical emergency, the health care worker should disclose the relevant information 
promptly to those providing the patient’s care, and explain the situation to the patient after the emergency had passed.  See 
also Dickens 1999 University of Toronto Medical Journal 41, who seems to concur with this by stating that patients expect, 
and the law requires, that relevant information will be made available to all members of a patient’s health care team.  
Patients’ consent to this disclosure is an element of their consent to care.    
117  HPCSA Guidelines with regard to HIV. 
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If the health care practitioner decides to make the disclosure against the patient’s wishes, the practitioner must do 
so after explaining the situation to the patient and accepting full responsibility at all times.  The following steps are 
recommended, the health care practitioner must: 
9.2.1 Counsel the patient on the importance of disclosing to his or her sexual partner and on taking other 
measures to prevent HIV transmission. 
9.2.2 Provide support to the patient to make the disclosure. 
9.3.3 If the patient still refuses to disclose his or her HIV status or refuses to consider other measures to 
prevent infection, counsel the patient on the health care practitioner’s ethical obligation to disclose such 
information. 
9.3.4 If the patient still refuses, disclose information on the patient’s HIV status to the sexual partner and assist 
them to undergo VCT and access treatment if necessary. 
9.2.5 After disclosure, follow up with the patient and the patient’s partner to see if disclosure has resulted in 
adverse consequences or violence for the patient, and, if so, intervene to assist the patient appropriately. 
9.3 Health care practitioners must recognise the major ethical dilemma when confronted with a person who is HIV 
positive and who refuses, despite counselling, to inform his/her partner or partners. 
 
Health care workers have an ethical duty to inform exposed sexual partners about the HIV status of their 
patients, provided they have followed the recommended steps of first counselling the patient to disclose his or 
her HIV status himself or herself.  In the case where the health care worker had counselled the patient about 
informing his or her sexual partner, but the patient refuses to do so, then the health care worker is ethical 
obliged to inform the sexual partner and thereby justifiably limiting the right to confidentiality of that patient.  
Disclosure by the health care worker to the exposed sexual partner, as will be discussed below, may also be 
done in the public interest in order to protect the sexual partner from harm by the patient.  The implication 
created by these guidelines is that in the case of multiple sexual partners, the health care worker will have to 
inform all identifiable sexual partners of the patient, as it will serve no purpose to inform only one sexual partner 
if there are others whom the patient may still infect.  This will also be discussed below. 
4.8.3 Disclosure in the public interest 
The ethical guidelines also deal with the disclosure of patients’ information in the public interest, which is 
normally a sensitive, controversial and a subject of public debate.118  Guideline 8 of the HPCSA Guidelines for 
                                                          
118  For instance, there is currently a public debate in South Africa about whether the disclosure of information in the  
public interest should not be included as a defence in the controversial Protection of State Information Bill.  See Daily 
Dispatch of 4 May 2012 page 4.  (The paper depicted this as “Information Bill a threat to Democracy”).  This paper cited 
South African Editors’ Forum (Sanef) as having said that: “Without the insertion of a clause protecting from prosecution those 
who publish such secrets in the public interest…the bill is a danger not just to press freedom, but to democracy.”  
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Good Practice in the Health Care Professions, Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information deals with 
disclosure of information other than for treatment of individual patients.119  It stipulates that:  
 8.2.4 Disclosures in the public interest: 
8.2.4.1 In cases where health care practitioners have considered all available means of obtaining consent, but 
are satisfied that it is not practicable to do so, or that the patients are not competent to give consent, or 
exceptionally, in cases where patients withhold consent, personal information may be disclosed in the 
public interest where the benefits to an individual or to society of the disclosure outweigh the public and 
the patient’s interest in keeping the information confidential, (e.g. endangered third parties such as the 
spouse or partner of patient who is HIV positive, who after counselling refuses to [disclose] his or her 
status to such spouse or partner; or reporting a notifiable disease). 
8.2.4.2 In all such cases the health care practitioner must weigh the possible harm (both to the patient, and the 
overall trust between practitioners and patients) against the benefits that are likely to arise from the 
release of information. 
 
The ethical guidelines therefore require the health care practitioners to do the difficult task of weighing between 
the two public interests, one of which was discussed in chapter 3 above, namely that of protecting the 
confidentiality of the patient in order for the public to trust health care workers and to access treatment,120 and 
the other being that of protecting the public from harm.121  As Rautenbach points out, 122 disclosing information in 
the public interest is arguably the situation that creates the most anxiety among health care professionals and is 
also the most difficult to provide practical guidelines for.  This means that medical practitioners will often find 
themselves in a dilemma of choosing between the two public interests, that is, whether to keep the information 
about the patient confidential or to disclose it in order to protect the public from harm.  However, difficult as it 
may be, the health care workers have to make the decision.  What they are required to do according to the 
professional guidelines, therefore, is to make a decision whether the benefits of the individual or society of the 
disclosure outweigh the public or patient’s interest to keep the information confidential.123  Disclosure of 
                                                          
119  HPCSA Guidelines Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information. 
120  See the Van Vuuren case 850B-D, where the court expressed the view that according to the rules of the SA  
Medical and Dental Council it amounted to unprofessional conduct to reveal ‘any information which ought not to be divulged 
regarding the ailments of a patient except with the express consent of the patient’.  The reason for the rule is twofold.  On the 
one hand it protects the privacy of the patient.  On the other it performs a public interest function.  See also the American 
case of Tarasoff v The Regents of the University of California 17 Cal. 3d 425 (1976), Supreme Court of California (herafter 
referred as The Tarasoff case), where the court recognised the public interest in supporting effective treatment of mental 
illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy and the consequent public importance of safeguarding the 
confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication. 
121  Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 27. 
122  Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 27. 
123  HPCSA Guidelines Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information, Strauss 17 and The Van Vuuren case, at  
850F-I.  See also Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 27, who points out that in all cases such 
as these the possible harm to the patient must be weighed against the benefits that are likely to arise out of the release of 
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confidential information without consent may be justified where failure to do so may expose the patient or others 
to risk of death or serious harm, that is, where third parties are exposed to risks so serious that they outweigh 
the patient’s right to privacy.124   
The case in issue would be the English case of W v Egdell,125 where W, a paranoid schizophrenic, was detained 
in a secure hospital because he had shot seven people, killing five and wounding two.  Ten years later his 
attorneys requested Dr. Henry George Egdell, a psychiatrist, to evaluate W’s mental condition in order to 
prepare an application for eventual release or transfer to less secure facility.   Upon receipt of Egdell’s negative 
report, which pointed out that W’s interest in guns and homemade bombs predated his schizophrenia, the 
attorneys withdrew W’s application.  When Egdell learned that neither W’s hospital nor review tribunal had seen 
the report, in the interest of further treatment, he sent a copy to the hospital and asked the hospital to send the 
copy to the tribunal.  W claimed Egdell had breached his duty to confidentiality.   
 
Balancing the public interests in confidence and in disclosure, the court held in favour of the restricted disclosure 
of vital information about W’s dangerousness because of the grave concern for public safety.  The court was 
correct in its decision in this case.  The doctor, Egdell, was correct in disclosing the mental condition of his 
patient, W, to the hospital and the review tribunal, in order for them to make a correct decision if they had to 
decide whether to release W into the community or not.  W’s right to confidentiality was correctly limited by the 
court in favour of public safety, as it was not absolute in any event.126  Had the doctor failed to warn the review 
tribunal and W happened to be released and subsequently harmed or killed other people, the doctor could have 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
the confidential information.  See also The Tarasoff case, paragraph [440], where the court recognised the public interest in 
supporting effective treatment of mental illness and in protecting the rights of patients to privacy and the consequent public 
importance of safeguarding the confidential character of psychotherapeutic communication.  However, the court had the view 
it must weigh this interest against the public interest in safety from violent assault.    
124  Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 27.  See The Van Vuuren case, at 850F-I,  
where the court had the view that the right of the patient and the duty of the doctor are not absolute but relative.  One is, as 
always, weighing up conflicting interests and a doctor may be justified in disclosing his knowledge where his obligations to 
society would be of greater weight than his obligations to the individual.  See also HPCSA Guidelines Confidentiality: 
Protecting and Providing Information, 8.2.4.3, which lay out the following examples of circumstances where disclosure of 
personal information may be done for the purpose of protecting a patient or other persons from death or serious harm.  Such 
circumstances, include, but not limited to: (a) access to prophylactic treatment for a person who has had contact with an 
infectious disease, or (b) an employee with a health condition which may render him or her unable to work safely posing a 
danger to co-workers or clients and (c) a driver of a vehicle who requires medication to control illness that might impair his or 
her driving.  See also The Tarasoff case, paragraph [436], where the court pointed out that a doctor must also warn a patient 
if the patient’s condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as driving a car, dangerous to others. 
125  W v. Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835, Court of Appeal. 
126  See The Van Vuuren case, at 850F-I, where the court expressed the view that the right of the patient to  
confidentiality was not absolute but relative.   
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been sued by such people or their relatives.127  Health care practitioners, therefore, will be justified to disclose 
their patients’ confidential information if they believe that the public interest in disclosure outweighs the public 
interest in confidentiality.128  However, disputes about public interest will ultimately be determined by the courts 
of law.129        
 
4.9 DO MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS HAVE A LEGAL DUTY TO INFORM EXPOSED THIRD PARTIES? 
 
In South Africa, the legal situation concerning the medical practitioner’s legal duty to inform or warn exposed 
third parties about the HIV status of his or her patients is still not clear.  As Carstens and Pearmain point out,130 
the legal duty to warn third parties when a patient is a potential danger to them has been canvassed fairly 
extensively by the American courts, but not by the South African ones.  South African courts, influenced by 
these American decisions, however, are likely in future to hold that there is a legal duty to warn, especially 
because the same considerations that lead to them may be applicable in South African law due the fact that the 
right to privacy is not absolute; the rights in the Bill of Rights are interrelated and interconnected; and there has 
to be balancing of the right to privacy and the rights to life and freedom and security of the person.131   
The leading American case on the duty to warn which may have an impact on South African courts is the case 
of Tarasoff v The Regents of the University of California (the Tarasoff case).132  In this case, Prosenjit Poddar 
killed Tatiana Tarasoff.  The plaintiffs, Tatiana’s parents, alleged that two months before their daughter’s death, 
Poddar confided his intention to kill Tatiana to Dr. Lawrence Moore, a psychologist employed by the Cowell 
                                                          
127  An example of an HIV case is an Australian case which is reported at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/ (visited 30 April  
2012), where an Australian woman successfully sued two doctors after they failed to tell her that her husband was HIV 
positive.  The woman, known only as ‘PD’, and her then fiancé, known only as ‘FH’, underwent joint tests for sexual tests for  
sexually transmitted infections and HIV in November 1998.  All her tests were negative but her fiancé tested positive for HIV.  
The couple were not told each other’s results and they subsequently married and had unprotected sex.  The woman 
contracted the disease.  The woman told the court she believed both test were negative.  She said doctors Nicholas Harvey 
and King Weng Chen should have warned her of her husband-to-be’s condition.  Judge Jerrold Cripps ruled that the two 
doctors should have warned the woman’s fiancé he would be breaking the law if he did not tell her that he had HIV.  The 
court had a view that the doctors should not have assumed that the fiancé would tell her about his HIV-positive test.  The 
court awarded the woman A$ 727, 000 damages. 
128  See The Tarasoff case, paragraph [442], where the court concluded that the public policy favouring protection of  
the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist communication in such circumstances must yield to the extent to which 
disclosure is essential to avert danger to others. 
129  Rautenbach 2004 The Southern African Journal of HIV Medicine 27.   
130  Carstens and Pearmain 1000. 
131  Carstens and Pearmain 1000. 
132  The Tarasoff case. 
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Memorial Hospital at the University of California at Berkeley.  They alleged that on Moore’s request, the campus 
police briefly detained Poddar, but released him when he appeared rational.  They further claimed that Dr. 
Harvey Powelson, Moore’s superior, then directed that no further action be taken to detain Poddar.  No one 
warned the plaintiffs of Tatiana’s peril.133  The plaintiffs’ complaint predicated liability on two grounds, namely the 
defendants’ failure to warn plaintiffs of the impending danger; and their failure to bring about Poddar’s 
confinement.  The defendants, in turn, asserted that they owed no duty of reasonable care to Tatiana and that 
they were immune from suit.134   
The court expressed the view that the defendant therapists could not escape liability merely because Tatiana 
herself was not their patient.  When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should 
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use 
reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger.  The discharge of this duty may require the 
therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.  Thus it may call for him 
to warn the intended victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances.135  The court, further, expressed the view that although the plaintiffs’ 
pleadings asserted no special relation between Tatiana and the defendant therapists, they established the 
special relation between Poddar and the defendant therapists, which arises between a patient and his doctor or 
psychotherapist.  Such a relationship may support affirmative duties for the benefit of third persons.  Thus, for 
example, a hospital must exercise reasonable care to control the behaviour of a patient which may endanger 
other persons.  A doctor must also warn a patient if the patient’s condition or medication renders certain 
conduct, such as driving a car, dangerous to others.136   
The court concluded that the public policy favouring protection of the confidential character of patient-
psychotherapist communication must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential to avert danger to 
others.  The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins.137  The court held that the plaintiffs could 
amend their complaints to state a cause of action against the defendant therapists by asserting that the 
therapists in fact determined that Poddar presented a serious danger of violence to Tatiana, or pursuant to the 
standards of their profession should have so determined, but nevertheless failed to exercise reasonable care to 
                                                          
133  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [430]. 
134  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [431]. 
135  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [431]. 
136  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [436]. 
137  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [442]. 
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protect her from that danger.138  This Tarasoff ruling has, for the first time, created a duty for the mental health 
professionals, both psychiatrists and psychologists, to protect society from dangerous patients when they learn 
that an individual is in danger.139  Though, as Carstens and Pearmain observe, 140 this ruling was also criticised 
and decried by some mental health commentators as undermining the practice of psychotherapy by destroying 
the tenets of confidentiality, it seems that these observers were wrong in that the Tarasoff ruling was followed in 
other American cases thereafter.  
The Tarasoff case, indeed, is an important decision regarding the legal duty of medical practitioners to warn 
third parties if their patients are dangerous.141  The court was correct in finding that when a therapist determines, 
or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of 
violence to another person, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against 
such danger and that obligation may call for him to warn the intended victim of the danger, to notify the police, or 
to take whatever other steps are reasonably necessary under the circumstances.142  However, the health care 
practitioner is not only obliged to warn an identifiable individual, as was the case with Tarasoff, but he or she 
may be required to inform other third parties even if they are not identifiable.  As Dickens points out, 143 the duty 
is sometimes expressed as a duty to warn, but giving an identified victim due warning is only one option to 
discharge the duty ‘to use reasonable care to protect’ foreseeable victims.  When future victims are not 
individually identifiable, such as when a patient threatens violence against a class of persons, notice to the 
police will usually be appropriate.144  However, as mentioned above, the legal position concerning the legal duty 
to warn third parties, in South Africa, is still not clear.  South African courts have long recognised the legal duty 
to act in certain situations and the legal convictions or boni mores of the society, as discussed above.145   
In the case of Minister van Polisie v Ewels,146 the court held that where the respondent, an ordinary citizen, had 
been assaulted by a sergeant of police, who was not on duty, in a police station under the control of the police 
and in the presence of several members of the police, who jointly, and even easily, could have prevented or 
                                                          
138  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [448].  
139  Carstens and Pearmain 1003. 
140  See Carstens and Pearmain 1003, who cite cases such as McIntosh v Milano 403 A2d 500 (NJ 1979), where the  
court found a psychiatrist liable using the rationale of Tarasoff. 
141  See Dickens 1999 University of Toronto Medical Journal 42, who points out that the duty is not limited to  
psychotherapists, but applies to any practitioner who according to ‘the standards of his profession,’ believes a patient to pose 
‘a serious danger of violence to another.’      
142  The Tarasoff case, paragraph [431]. 
143  Dickens 1999 University of Toronto Medical Journal 42. 
144  Dickens 1999 University of Toronto Medical Journal 42. 
145  Carstens and Pearmain 1001 and Viljoen 76. 
146  The Ewels case. 
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have put an end to the attack, had a legal duty to have come to the assistance of the respondent. Not assisting 
the respondent was a failure which happened in the course of the policemen’s duty, which meant that the 
appellant was liable for the damages claimed by the respondent.  The court further observed that our law has 
developed to the stage where an omission is regarded as unlawful conduct when the circumstances of the case 
are of such a nature that the omission not only incites moral indignation but also that the legal convictions of the 
community demand that the omission ought to be regarded as unlawful and that the damage suffered ought to 
be made good by the person who neglected to do a positive act.   
The present position is that if a South African court finds that there is duty to warn that applies to health care 
workers, for example, it would be either based on reasonableness in the context of the facts of the case or on 
the boni mores of the society.147  In the case of a failure to warn, the conduct in question would be an omission 
on the part of the health professional.148  The legal convictions of the society, of course, may not allow that a 
health care practitioner fail to warn an individual if he or she knows that his or her patient is dangerous and has 
threatened to kill that person in the past.  However, it may not be ruled out that South African courts may follow 
decisions, such as Tarasoff, in the future to hold health care practitioners liable for damages if they fail to warn 
individuals about the dangerousness of their patients, which may include protecting persons against the 
potential harm of HIV/AIDS. 
 4.9.1 Exposed health care workers 
In South Africa, as discussed above, there appears to be no clear legal duty on the part of a health care worker 
to warn other health care workers about the HIV status of their patients. Court decisions on this issue will turn to 
the issue of the social or moral duty to warn.149  The case that involved a disclosure of an HIV status of a patient 
by a health care worker to other health care workers is the case of Jansen van Vuuren v Kruger (The Van 
Vuuren case).150  In this case, discussed elsewhere in this thesis, the doctor of Van Vuuren, Dr Kruger, 
disclosed his patient’s HIV positive condition to two other medical doctors, Dr Van Heerden and Dr Vos during 
the course of a game of golf.151  The court observed that the duty or right to communicate and the reciprocal 
duty or right to receive the communication may be legal, social and moral.  A legal duty to communicate would, 
for example, exist in respect of the duty of a medical practitioner to testify in court or to disclose a notifiable 
                                                          
147  Carstens and Pearmain 1001. 
148  Carstens and Pearmain 1001. 
149  The Van Vuuren case at 856D-G. 
150  The Van Vuuren case. 
151  The Van Vuuren case at 847F-G. 
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disease.  A social or moral duty was exemplified in Hague v Williams,152 where it was held that knowledge of a 
child’s pathological heart condition was not of such confidential nature that it prevented the physician from 
disclosing it extracurially to an insurer to whom the parents had applied for life insurance on the child.153  In 
determining whether Van Vuuren’s doctor had a social or moral duty to make the disclosure and whether the 
other two doctors had a reciprocal social or moral right to receive it, the court applied the standard of a 
reasonable man.   
The court held the view that the doctor had no such duty to transfer, nor did the other two doctors have the right 
to receive the information.  The court then concluded that the communication to Vos and Van Heerden was 
unreasonable and therefore unjustified and wrongful.154  This view by the court seems to be the correct view in 
that when the doctor made the disclosure to the two doctors about the HIV status of his patient, they were out 
enjoying a round of golf.  As the court correctly stated, there was no threat of exposure to the two doctors which 
could justify the breach of doctor-patient confidentiality.  So, morally, the doctor was not justified to disclose the 
HIV status of his patient to the other two medical practitioners.  The Van Vuuren case decision shows that the 
courts may accept that there is a social or moral duty to disclose or warn other health care practitioners on the 
part of a health care practitioner, but that such duty should be done in a proper manner.     
4.9.2 Exposed sexual partners 
There is no legal duty in South Africa on the part of a health care worker to warn a sexual partner about the HIV 
status of his or her patient. It appears that courts would again base decisions in this regard on the social or 
moral duty to warn.155  Strauss156 points out that in South African law, there appears to be a qualified duty on a 
person to come to the rescue of another.  It is unlikely that the duty would be interpreted by a court of law as 
requiring a doctor to take active steps to directly inform the sexual partner or partners of the patient.  Decisions 
of this kind would depend on what is regarded as reasonable in all the circumstances of the case.157  Ordinarily, 
a medical practitioner, who has diagnosed a patient to be HIV positive, would be regarded as having acquitted 
himself of his duty to society once he has informed the patient of the diagnosis and has warned him or her of the 
                                                          
152  Cited in The Van Vuuren case, 851D-E, as Hague v Williams [1962] 181 Atlantic Reporter 2d 345, Supreme Court  
of New Jersey. 
153  The Van Vuuren case, 851D-E. 
154  The Van Vuuren case, 856D-G. 
155  Barret-Grant 124. 
156  Strauss 17. 
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potential offspring, unless ‘safe sex’ is practised.158  A doctor can hardly be expected to cast himself in the role 
of a private investigator or information officer seeking out and warning the sexual partners of the patient.  If, 
however, it were to come to the knowledge of a doctor, who has properly counselled a patient, that the latter 
refuses to practise ‘safe sex’, and the identity of a regular sexual partner, such as the patient’s husband or wife, 
is known to the doctor, it may conceivably be regarded as reasonable for the doctor to act by informing the 
sexual partner about the HIV status of his patient.159  It may, however, also be expected of the doctor in the case 
of a polygamous marriage to inform all the sexual partners as they also would identifiable in such a case.  It 
does appear, however, in South Africa, that the doctor would not have a legal duty, but would have social or 
moral duty to inform exposed sexual partner or partners about the HIV status of his patient. 
 
4.10 DOES THE HIV-POSITIVE INDIVIDUAL HAVE A LEGAL DUTY TO INFORM HEALTH CARE 
WORKERS AND SEX PARTNERS? 
 
There is generally no legal duty for an infected individual to disclose his or her status and one cannot be 
compelled to disclose one’s HIV status.160  However, that being said, where non-disclosure of one’s HIV positive 
status is coupled with the conduct that causes transmission of HIV to another, legal liability may follow; criminal 
liability from the conduct through which HIV is transmitted and civil liability from the non-disclosure.161  In fact, in 
many countries, around the world such as Canada, United States of America (USA), Australia,162 Germany, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, United Kingdom and some African countries such Uganda, anyone who infects 
another person with HIV, commits a criminal offence and may be prosecuted under laws expressly criminalising 
HIV transmission or under a variety of appropriate traditional offences, such as attempted murder, murder, 
manslaughter, assault or poisoning.163   
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Transmission of HIV, therefore, in countries such as the USA is a crime in certain states, prosecuted under 
specific HIV statutes.164  In the USA, for instance, where thirty-six states have prosecuted HIV-positive 
individuals for criminal exposure or transmission, only twenty-eight countries criminalise HIV transmission using 
specific HIV public or criminal law statutes.165  California, Kansas, Maryland, Oklahoma, South Dakota and 
Washington have laws that criminalise HIV exposure with intent.  A Missouri law allows for the death penalty if 
transmission is proved as a result of HIV exposure without disclosure and the military courts have court-
marshalled more than thirty HIV-positive individuals for having unprotected sex without disclosure and almost all 
have been convicted.166  However, some states in the USA and other countries in Europe prosecute HIV 
transmission because it meets the definition of the more general offences of assault, attempted murder or 
conduct endangering life, and therefore they chose to use existing laws and not HIV specific statutes.167  The 
State of Texas, for instance, up to the end of 2009, convicted fifteen people for HIV-related criminal offences 
and yet it does not use HIV specific statutes but existing laws to prosecute.168  Similarly, European countries 
such as Switzerland, Denmark, Italy, Germany and United Kingdom have used existing laws and not HIV-
specific legislation.169    
Countries such as Germany punish reckless or negligent HIV transmission.170  The German Criminal Code 
provides that whoever causes bodily harm to another through negligence shall be punished by up to three years’ 
imprisonment or fine.171  This provision is usually applied to reckless driving and medical negligence and is 
regarded as important in view of the increase in traffic and the use of dangerous instruments in specialised 
professions.  It is also wide enough to apply to negligent bodily harm in the case of HIV infection.172  The 
‘negligence’ mentioned in the German Criminal Code may take the form of an infected person knowing about his 
or her infection, but failing to take the steps a reasonable person would have taken to prevent infection, perhaps 
because he or she hopes that the virus will not be transmitted (conscious negligence).  Negligence could also 
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consist of an infected person not ascertaining his or her serostatus in circumstances where a reasonable person 
would have gone for testing.173  However, there had not been a case in Germany dealing with negligent bodily 
harm in case of HIV infection through sexual intercourse by a person who was aware of being HIV-positive.174  
In England and Wales, as well, in addition to public health strategies, the criminal law has been utilised against 
persons living with HIV who recklessly transmit the disease through consensual sexual intercourse.175  Still, 
other countries’ jurisdictions punish not only actual transmission but also risky conduct that creates merely a risk 
of HIV-transmission, such as unprotected sex, mother-to-child transmission through breastfeeding, non-
disclosure to a sex partner of HIV status and spitting on another by an infected person.176   
 
In the Southern Africa Development Corporation (SADC) region, countries do not criminalise HIV transmission, 
be it deliberate or reckless, instead, emphasis is placed on public health goals, such as education, information, 
voluntary counselling and testing, universal access to HIV prevention programmes and the provision of support 
systems, including treatment.177 The SADC region is made up of the following countries: Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Namibia, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Swaziland, Lesotho, 
South Africa and Mauritius.178   
 
The members of SADC subscribe to the Model Law on HIV/AIDS in Southern Africa (SADC Model Law)179 
which, unlike its West African model,180 does not call for the criminalisation of HIV, but advocates a caring 
approach in combating the disease.181  The Model law calls for member states to promote public awareness on 
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nature of HIV/AIDS, its causes and modes of transmission.  It also encourages schools, institutions and health 
care facilities to participate in awareness campaigns and governments are also urged to sensitise communities 
of dangerous cultural practices that have to be avoided, such as early marriage, widow inheritance and female 
genital mutilation.182   
 
Despite this SADC Model law, however, there seems to be about 50% of SADC member states who have 
introduced legislation that specifically create offences for the wilful transmission of HIV and provide for harsher 
sentences for sexual offenders.183  Zimbabwe is one of such SADC states which have adopted HIV-specific 
legislation.184  South Africa, however, appears to be one of those member states that have adhered to the SADC 
Model law by not criminalising HIV transmission,185  but opted to use existing general criminal offences to deal 
with cases of transmission.186  The South African Law Commission (the Commission) had cautioned that 
criminal law is not the means by which the spread of HIV should be addressed, and that the AIDS epidemic is 
first and foremost a public health issue and it is internationally accepted that non-coercive measures are the 
most successful means through which public health authorities can reduce the spread of the disease.187  
However, the Commission recognised the fact that it is accepted that there are individuals, who through their 
irresponsible behaviour, deliberately place others at risk of HIV infection and that existing public measures are in 
themselves insufficient as a means to deal with harmful HIV-related behaviour.188  The Commission 
recommended that common law crimes of murder, culpable homicide, rape and assault could be used to deal 
with harmful HIV-related behaviour.  However, up to that time, there had never been a prosecution under 
common law of harmful HIV related behaviour in South Africa and therefore there was no legal clarity in the 
appropriateness of these crimes to deal with such behaviour.189   
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The Commission concluded by pointing out that the possibility of creating an HIV-specific statute should be 
examined which would look at the four possible options.  These options were: (a) criminalising the intentional 
infection of another with HIV; (b) criminalising the intentional exposure of another to any sexually transmitted 
disease (including HIV); (c) prohibiting sexual intercourse by a person with HIV with any other person, unless 
certain conditions exist (such as consent by the other person who knows of the accused’s HIV status; and (d) 
requiring a person with HIV to take all reasonable measures to prevent transmission of the disease.190  
However, until to date, there seems to be no such HIV-specific statute which has been enacted by the South 
African legislature.191  The Commission, however, in a subsequent report, recommended that harmful HIV-
related behaviour should not be criminalised, reasoning that criminalisation may harm rather than help people 
living with HIV, and disturb public health efforts to stop the spread of HIV.192  It would, however, be 
recommended that in view of the high HIV-infection rate, South Africa take the route of criminalising the 
intentional infection with HIV of another person by a person who knows that he or she is HIV positive.  As 
already argued above, there seems to be absolutely no justification for a person to deliberately or intentionally 
infect another person with HIV.  One example of a civil case that dealt with the transmission of HIV is the case of 
Venter v Nel.193   In this case, the plaintiff claimed an amount of R466 031, 86, alleging that the defendant, a 
businessman who resided in the Durban area, infected her, with HIV.  This occurred when the parties had 
sexual intercourse during August and September 1995.  The court had no difficulties in reaching its decision as 
the matter was undefended.  The court awarded the damages totalling R344 399, 06, taking into account past 
medical expenses, future medical expenses and general damages.     
 
In the Canadian case of R v Cuerrier (The Cuerrier case),194 the accused was charged with two counts of 
aggravated assault pursuant to section of the Criminal Code.  Even though he had been explicitly instructed by a 
public health nurse to inform all prospective sexual partners that he was HIV positive and to use condoms every 
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time he engaged in sexual intercourse, the accused had unprotected sexual relations with the two complainants 
without informing them that he was HIV positive.195  Both complainants had consented to unprotected sexual 
intercourse with the accused, but they testified at the trial that if they had known that he was HIV positive, they 
would never have engaged in unprotected intercourse.  At the time of the trial, neither complainant had tested 
positive for the virus.  The trial judge had entered a directed verdict acquitting the accused and the Court of 
Appeal upheld the acquittals.   
In allowing the appeal and ordering a new trial, the court observed that in the context of the wording of section 
265, an accused’s failure to disclose that he is HIV positive is a type of fraud which vitiates consent to sexual 
intercourse.196  The essential element of fraud in commercial criminal law is dishonesty, which can include non-
disclosure of important facts and deprivation or risk of deprivation.  The dishonest action or behaviour must be 
related to the obtaining of consent to engage in sexual intercourse.  The accused’s actions must be assessed 
objectively to determine whether a reasonable person would find them to be dishonest.  The dishonest act 
consists of either deliberate deceit respecting HIV status or non-disclosure of that status.  Without disclosure of 
HIV status there cannot be a true consent.197  The consent cannot simply be to have sexual intercourse.  
Rather, it must be consent to intercourse with a partner who is HIV-positive.  The extent of the duty to disclose 
will increase with risks attendant upon the act of intercourse.  The failure to disclose HIV-positive status can lead 
to a devastating illness with fatal consequences and in those circumstances there exist a positive duty to 
disclose.  The nature and extent of the duty to disclose, if any, will always have to be considered in the context 
of the particular facts presented.198   
To establish that the dishonesty resulted in deprivation, which may consist of actual harm or simply a risk of 
harm, the Crown needs to prove that the dishonest act had the effect of exposing the person consenting to a 
significant risk of serious bodily harm.  The risk of contracting AIDS as a result of engaging in unprotected 
intercourse meets the test.199  Further, in situations such as this, the Crown is still required to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the complainant would have refused to engage in unprotected sex with the accused if she 
had been advised that he was HIV-positive.  Therefore, a complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse can 
properly be found to be vitiated by fraud under section 265200 if the accused’s failure to disclose his HIV-positive 
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status is dishonest and results in deprivation by putting the complainant at a significant risk of suffering serious 
bodily harm.201   
Where public health endeavours fail to provide adequate protection to individuals like the complainants, the 
criminal law can be effective.  The criminal law has a role to play both in deterring those infected with HIV from 
putting the lives of others at risk and protecting the public from irresponsible individuals who refuse to comply 
with public health orders to abstain from high-risk activities.202  The court concluded by holding that an individual 
who knows that he was HIV-positive and had unprotected sexual intercourse without disclosing this condition to 
his partner may be found guilty of contravening section 265 of the Criminal Code.  It is right and proper for public 
health authorities to be concerned that their struggles against AIDS should not be impaired.203  This case 
provides a classic example of the ineffectiveness of the health scheme.  The accused was advised that he was 
HIV positive and on three occasions he was instructed to advise his partner of this and not to have unprotected 
sex.  Nevertheless, blithely ignored these instructions and endangered the lives of the two partners.  Through 
deterrence, the Criminal Code will protect and serve to encourage honesty, frankness and safer sexual 
practices.  The court stated that if the application of the Criminal Code really does impede the control of AIDS, it 
the Canadian parliament would have to determine whether the protection afforded by the Code should be 
curtailed in the interests of controlling the plague solely by the public health measure.204   
The Cuerrier case established that there is a positive legal duty upon the infected HIV positive person to 
disclose his or her status, to his or her sexual partner or partners, failing of which he or she may be criminally 
charged.  The court was correct in holding the view that without disclosure of the HIV-positive status there can 
be no true consent.  It is true that consent should not, in the case of HIV-positive person who knows his or her 
status, only be for sexual intercourse.  But consent should be for sexual intercourse with an HIV-positive person.  
In fact, the only reason why an HIV-positive person would refuse to disclose his or her status to his or her sexual 
partner, impliedly, would be that he or she is afraid that the sexual partner would refuse to have sexual 
intercourse or unprotected sexual intercourse with him or her in this instance, which is what happened in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
commits an assault when (a) without the consent of another person, he applies force intentionally to that other person, 
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Cuerrier case.  Both the complainants had testified that they would not have engaged in unprotected sex with 
the accused if they had known that he was HIV positive, which must have been one of the main reasons why the 
accused had concealed his HIV-positive status.  It is clear that by not disclosing his HIV status the accused 
intended to have unprotected sexual intercourse with the complainants, and thereby, as the court correctly 
stated, infecting them with the devastating illness with fatal consequences.  Surely, there is a justification for 
criminal law to punish such an accused and thereby serve as a deterrent to other would be offenders who would 
like to have unprotected sexual intercourse with others whilst they know that they are HIV positive and thereby 
continue the spread of HIV in the process.   
The Cuerrier case provides support for the criminalisation of harmful HIV transmission and non-disclosure of HIV 
status.  The court correctly reasoned that the health care system is in certain cases ineffective and this case 
provided a classic example.  It seems to be clear that where an HIV positive person has been told three times to 
inform his or her partner and not to have unprotected sex but failed to do so, the public health system of 
counselling the patient is ineffective in that respect.  It is in such cases therefore that the criminal law can be 
effective.205   
In these instances, the criminal law can provide a much needed measure of protection in the form of deterrence 
and reflects society’s abhorrence of the self-centered recklessness and the callous insensitivity of actions of the 
respondent and those who have acted in a similar manner.  In order to effectively address the spread of HIV, 
both the public health system and criminal law should play a role, as public education alone may not succeed in 
modifying the behaviour of individuals at risk of contracting AIDS, as the Cuerrier case illustrates.206  It follows 
that if the deterrence of criminal law is applicable it may well assist in the protection of individuals and it should 
be utilised.207  It is recommended, therefore that firstly, an HIV positive person should be counselled and 
advised by the healthcare worker to inform his or her partner or partners about his or her HIV status.  If he or 
she fails to do so he can then be criminally charged and if found guilty, be sentenced and this will serve as a 
deterrence to others.   
The Canadian case of Cuerrier was followed and applied by the case of R v Williams (The Williams case).208  In 
this case, the complainant and the respondent, during their sexual affair that lasted for approximately 18 
months, engaged in numerous acts of vaginal intercourse and occasional fellatio.  Condoms were used 
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occasionally. The complainant did not take the usual precautions against pregnancy because the respondent 
had told her that he had had a vasectomy.209  The relationship began in June 1991 and soon after the sexual 
activity began.  Unknown to the complainant, the respondent attended a medical clinic for HIV testing on 
October 16, 1991.  Seemingly, his name was on the list of former partners provided by an individual who tested 
HIV positive.  He was told on November 15, 1991, that he was HIV-positive.  He received counselling on three 
different occasions by two doctors and a nurse about HIV, its transmission, safer practices and his duty to 
disclose his HIV status to sexual partners.  The respondent said he was devastated by the result of the test, but 
chose to follow none of the recommended safer practices in his relationship with the complainant, whom he kept 
in the dark about his HIV status.  He provided the names of two past sexual partners to the public health 
authorities, but not the name of the complainant.210  The complainant took an HIV test on November 20, 1991, 
tested negative and informed the respondent.  Their relationship continued for another year, ending for 
unrelated reasons in November 1992.211  The complainant, subsequently, took the second test and was 
informed that she was HIV-positive on April 15, 1994.  When she confronted the respondent with the result of 
her test, he repeatedly and falsely denied that he had ever tested positive for HIV.  It was accepted that the 
complainant would never knowingly have had sex with an HIV-positive person.212   
The respondent had conceded that he infected the complainant with HIV.  Similarly, the Crown had conceded 
that it is quite possible that the respondent infected the complainant before learning of his HIV-positive status.213  
The court expressed the view that the respondent acted with a shocking level of recklessness and selfishness.  
There was no doubt that he committed a criminal assault with regard to the complainant, and further that he was 
guilty of an attempted aggravated assault (maximum penalty of seven years) and common nuisance (maximum 
penalty of two years).214  However, the court dismissed the appeal for aggravated assault holding that the Crown 
was unable to establish the actus reus of that particular offence.215  In dismissing the appeal, the court reasoned 
that there was a reasonable doubt that the assault in question was capable of causing the life-threatening 
consequences alleged in the indictment. The court further reasoned that medical evidence indicates that a 
single act of unprotected vaginal intercourse carries a significant risk of HIV transmission.216  Accordingly, at the 
time the respondent found out that he was HIV-positive, it was clear that he had already been a carrier of HIV for 
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a significant period of time.  Equally, although the complainant tested negative for HIV shortly thereafter, she 
may as well have been infected with HIV but not yet had time to develop the antibodies that would disclose her 
condition in the test.  It was therefore at least doubtful that the complainant was free of HIV infection at the time 
the respondent first discovered, and then concealed, his HIV status on November 15, 1991.217  In applying the 
Cuerrier’s principle, the court observed that the most important date in this case was November 15, 1991, which 
was the date that the respondent learned that he was HIV-positive.  The court reasoned that the critical date for 
the purpose of establishing fraud to vitiate consent is when the respondent had sufficient awareness of his HIV-
positive status that he can be said to have acted ‘intentionally or recklessly, with the knowledge of the facts 
constituting the offence, or with wilful blindness towards them.’218   
Once an individual becomes aware of a risk that he or she has contracted HIV, and hence that his or her 
partner’s consent becomes an issue, but nevertheless persists in unprotected sex that creates a risk of further 
HIV transmission without disclosure to his or her partner, recklessness is established.  In this case, therefore, 
the court had the view that November 15, 1991 was the date that the respondent clearly knew that he was HIV-
positive and, moreover, had been warned by the doctors that sexual intercourse with an unprotected partner 
could have potentially lethal consequences for her, but nevertheless persisted.219  However, the court had the 
view that although the respondent, in this case, was deceitful after November 15, 1991, the Crown conceded 
that it could not show that sexual activity after that date harmed the complainant or even exposed her to a 
significant risk of harm, because at that point she was possibly, and perhaps likely, already infected with HIV.   
Furthermore, the court observed that to constitute a crime, the actus reus and the mens rea or intent must, at 
some point, coincide.  Here, however, before November 15, 1991, there was an endangerment but no intent; 
after November 15, 1991, there was an intent but at the very least a reasonable doubt about the existence of 
any endangerment and therein laid the Crown’s problem in this case.220   
The absence of consent was an essential element of any assault and there was no doubt, according to the 
court, that the complainant did not subjectively consent to unprotected sex with an HIV-positive partner, as she 
so testified.  Following 15, November, 1991, the respondent knew, but the complainant did not, that he was HIV-
positive.  Each act of unprotected sex exposed her to the lethal virus.  There was nothing whatsoever in the 
evidence to suggest that the complainant, believing rightly or wrongly that she was HIV free, consented to such 
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risk.221  The Cuerrier principle was applied in this case.  The complainant never consented to have sexual 
intercourse with a partner who was HIV-positive.  As of November 15, 1991, he knew that he was HIV-positive 
and she did not, and at all relevant times, she believed that both she and the respondent were HIV free.  That 
was enough to reject the respondent’s argument on consent.222  The court, further, pointed out that the differing 
results in Cuerrier and this, Williams case, simply reflect the different factual circumstances.  The conduct of this 
respondent after November 15, 1991 is no less reprehensible.  The abuse of the complainant’s trust, the 
obtaining of her consent by deceit, and the sexual activity itself are all common to both cases.  The difference 
here is that, unknown to the respondent at the time, there was a reasonable doubt on the evidence that the life 
of the complainant was capable of being endangered after 15, 1991 by exposure to a virus she had likely 
already acquired.223  The court then left open the question of whether there would be consequences of 
unprotected sex between HIV positive infected partners.  The court concluded by holding that in the case, actus 
reus of aggravated assault ‘is present in an incomplete but more-than-merely-preparatory way’.  The respondent 
stood properly convicted of attempted assault.224  The court then affirmed the respondent’s convictions for 
aggravated assault and common nuisance but dismissed the Crown’s appeal with respect to the charge of 
aggravated assault.225  
The William’s case followed and applied Cuerrier’s principle in holding that consent is vitiated by non-disclosure 
by an HIV positive person to his or her sexual partner.  And also, that similar to the Cuerrier case, the 
complainant in the William’s case also never consented to have sexual intercourse with a partner who was HIV-
positive.  The court in the William’s case was correct when it pointed out that the two cases had similarities such 
as the abuse of the complainant’s trust, the obtaining of her consent by deceit, and the sexual activity itself.226  
However, the court noted that there was a difference between the two cases being that, unknown to the 
respondent at the time, there was a reasonable doubt on the evidence that the life of the complainant was 
capable of being endangered after November 15, 1991, by exposure to a virus she had likely already 
acquired.227  The William’s case also was able to prove the ineffectiveness of the health care system and the 
justification of criminalisation of harmful transmission by HIV-positive people to their sexual partners.  This is 
proved by the fact that, also in this case, the respondent was counselled three times by two doctors and a nurse, 
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but nevertheless chose not to follow their advice of informing his sexual partner about his HIV status and to 
practise safe-sex by using, for instance, condoms during the sexual intercourse.  Instead, despite that 
counselling, he continued to have unprotected sexual intercourse with his sexual partner for another year after 
that counselling.  Furthermore, to clearly demonstrate his intention of infecting the complainant with HIV, the 
respondent gave the public health authorities the names of only two of his past sexual partners, but not the 
name of the complainant.  The reason why he withheld the name of the complainant might be that he wanted 
them not to notify the complainant about his HIV status.    
Finally, though the court may seem to be justified in dismissing the appeal for aggravated assault and affirming 
attempted aggravated assault due to the evidence that was before it at the time, it was correct for the court to 
leave open the question of whether there would be consequences of unprotected sex between HIV-positive 
infected partners.  Medical evidence may in future show that harm may arise between people who are both 
infected by HIV and who continue to engage in unprotected sex, as they stand the risk of infection and 
reinfection.  Reinfection may cause an HIV positive person to deteriorate quicker and to die in a short space of 
time, unlike a person who has been infected only once.228   
The Cuerrier and Williams cases were followed by a recent Canadian case of R v Mabior.229  The accused, in 
this case, was diagnosed HIV-positive on January 14, 2004.  At the time of his diagnosis and many times, 
thereafter, the accused was advised by a public health nurse to inform his sexual partners of his HIV status and 
to always use condoms.230  The accused began antiretroviral therapy (ART) shortly after his diagnosis.  The 
therapy resulted in an undetectable viral load between early October and December 2005.  From January 2004 
to March 2006, he engaged in sexual intercourse with multiple women without disclosing his status.  The trial 
court convicted the accused on six counts of aggravated sexual assault for not disclosing his status to his sexual 
partners.  He was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment.231  The decision was appealed to the Manitoba 
Court of Appeal.  The Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network sought and was granted intervener status.  The 
principal issue on the appeal was whether the trial judge erred in her application of the legal test of ‘significant 
risk of serious bodily harm’, a principle established by the Cuerrier’s decision, in the particular circumstances of 
the case.  According to the trial judge, even when a condom was used there was a significant risk of HIV 
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transmission for the purpose of criminal law.  She also concluded in the similar manner for an undetectable viral 
load.  According to her, the risk would only be sufficiently reduced when a person has both an undetectable viral 
load and uses a condom.232  The Court of Appeal, applying the Cuerrier’s decision, disagreed with the trial judge 
and stated clearly that the test set out in Cuerrier was not a ‘no risk’ test but required the presence of a 
significant risk.  Significant risk meant something other than an ordinary risk.  It meant an important, serious, 
substantial risk.  The court also expressed the view that legal assessments of risk in this area should be 
consistent with the available medical studies and acknowledged that the application of the legal test in Cuerrier 
must evolve to account appropriately for the development in the science of HIV treatment.233  The court then 
held that the careful use of a condom or an undetectable viral load can reduce the level of risk below the 
threshold test of a significant risk.  Based on these findings, the accused was acquitted of four counts of 
aggravated sexual assault with respect to those sexual encounters in which he carefully used a condom (even 
though his viral load was detectable) or did not use a condom but had an undetectable viral load.234 
The Mabior case, therefore, could be described as an attempt of the court to clarify the Cuerrier standard.235  In 
fact, as Elliot and Symington point out, many Canadian lower courts have since Cuerrier, managed to interpret 
and apply the ‘significant risk’ threshold in making determinations about the duty to disclose and criminal liability, 
or lack thereof, for not disclosing.236  Until recently, the bulk of those cases have taken the correct view that the 
use of condom would preclude criminal liability for not disclosing.237  However, Elliot and Symington still feel that 
there remains a degree of uncertainty and inconsistency in the Canadian law, as some courts still dispense 
entirely with any assessment of the risk of harm.  They therefore feel that the Supreme Court has a key role to 
play in refining and clarifying the law, in accordance with good science and with larger public policy objectives, 
so as to give clear guidance to lower courts that certain conduct, for example, sex with condoms, or sex in 
circumstances where there is low or undetectable viral load, falls below the criminal legal threshold of ‘significant 
risk’.238   
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The Mabior case, indeed, though it attempted to clarify the Cuerrier legal test, also left out some uncertainties.  
Though the Appeal Court acquitted the accused of four counts of aggravated sexual assault with respect to 
those sexual encounters in which he carefully used a condom (even though his viral load was detectable) or did 
not use a condom but had an undetectable viral load, however, there seems to be no explanation why the 
accused decided to engage in several sexual encounters with the complainants without informing them of his 
HIV-positive status.  It could still be argued that even though the accused might have felt that there could be no 
significant risk of infecting the complainants if he used the condom or when he had an undetectable viral load, 
however, he still had to inform the complainants about his HIV status, in order for them to make informed 
decisions on whether they would sleep with an HIV-positive person or not.  The facts of this case, again like 
Cuerrier and Williams cases, might also serve as an example of the ineffectiveness of the public health system, 
as the accused was also advised to inform sexual partners of his HIV-status, but failed to do so.  The Mabior 
case highlights the dilemmas that the courts will have to face in dealing with a complicated disease such as 
HIV/AIDS.  The courts will have to make such difficult decisions of whether non-disclosure of an HIV-positive 
person should be regarded as rape or not in a case where the accused has used a condom or had an 
undetectable viral load.  
The first case that dealt with HIV transmission in South Africa was the case of S v Nyalungu (the Nyalungu 
case).239  In this case in 2003, the Pretoria regional court had convicted a man who was HIV-positive and raped 
a young woman while he was aware that he was HIV-positive, of rape and attempted murder.  The case was 
referred to the High Court for sentence.  The court sentenced the man to the minimum sentence of life 
imprisonment.  The importance of this case is that the court referred to both Cuerrier’s case and William’s case 
in reaching its decision.240   
The Nyalungu case ruling was followed in the case of S v Snoti (he Snoti case).241  In this case, the appellant, a 
29-year-old man, was charged as accused 1 with the rape of the complainant, a 9-year-old girl.  One Eunice 
Wezi Cingi Makana, a woman, appeared as accused 2, and was charged with being an accomplice to the 
aforesaid rape.  She was, however, eventually acquitted due to insufficient evidence.242  The appellant appealed 
to the Full Bench of the Eastern Cape Division against the sentence of life imprisonment, imposed by Jones J, 
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242  The Snoti case. 
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following a conviction of rape in the South East Cape Local Division.  The trial court found that there were no 
substantial and compelling circumstances to justify not imposing the life sentence.  The court considered two 
aggravating factors in particular.243  First, that the complainant was a helpless little girl and that the appellant 
had been in a position of trust.  Secondly, and what placed this case in the very worst category of rape cases, 
according to the court, was that the accused knew that that he was HIV-positive at the time of the offence.  The 
court held that the trial court correctly found that in the light of the aggravated factors that there were no 
substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence than that of life imprisonment.244  The 
appellant’s conduct in raping a 9-year-old girl entrusted to his care, knowing of his HIV status, was reprehensible 
in the extreme.  The court further held that the fact that the complainant had fortuitously escaped being infected 
with HIV had no bearing on the appellant’s moral blameworthiness.  The appeal was, therefore, dismissed.245   
In both these cases, Nyalungu and Snoti, it seems clear that the courts wanted to send a strong message to the 
would be offenders that the law will not tolerate people who rape women or other people whilst knowing that 
they are HIV-positive and thereby infect them with the virus on the process.    The court, in Snoti case, correctly 
emphasised the fact that that case was placed in the very worst category of rape cases.246  Furthermore, the 
court also correctly held that the fact that the complainant had luckily escaped being infected with HIV had no 
bearing on the appellant’s moral blameworthiness.247     
It is important, however, to note that both the South African cases of Nyalungu and Snoti were rape cases, 
unlike the two Canadian cases of Cuerrier and Williams which involved consensual sexual intercourse.  The 
Criminal Law Amendment Act,248 section 3, points out that, any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally 
commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of 
rape.  The scope of rape, according to the Criminal Amendment Act, therefore, has been widened to include any 
complainant, who might be a man or female.  It is not clear yet, whether South African courts would consider a 
consensual sexual intercourse between an HIV-positive person and a complainant who was not informed that 
the other person was HIV-positive to be rape or not.249  South African courts seem prepared to sentence heavily 
those individuals who, while knowing that they are HIV-positive, rape women and children.  The idea that people 
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248  The Criminal Law Amendment Act 32 of 2007.  
249  Van der Bijl C “Rape as a materially-defined crime: Could ‘any act which causes sexual penetration’ include  
omissions?” 2010 SACJ 235. 
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should take responsibility and always insist on condom use, is not feasible in the traditional context of Africa 
because, as already discussed above in chapter 3, women normally do not initiate sex and so cannot insist on 
condom use in marriage as a strategy for the prevention of infection against diseases, including HIV.250 
Criminalisation of HIV transmission, however, is an extremely controversial issue and has been widely 
debated.251   There seems to be two sides, that is, the proponents for and opponents against criminalisation of 
HIV transmission.252  These arguments for and against criminalisation, according to Van Wyk, seem to be based 
on two international models for combating AIDS.253  The first model emphasises the rational nature of people 
and their fundamental rights.  It promotes non-coercive measures, such as education, information, voluntary 
testing, counselling and voluntary behavioural change and is very often accompanied by anti-discrimination 
legislation. It assumes that when people are informed, they will exercise self-discipline, adapt their behaviour to 
protect themselves and others, and act in a socially responsible way.254  The second model emphasises state 
intervention and coercive measures in the private lives of people, for instance, by prescribing compulsory testing 
for couples who are to be married or even of the whole population, and by imposing quarantine, isolation and 
criminal sanction, and stresses the individual’s responsibility to protect others.255  This model probably over-
estimates the success of state control.256   
South Africa has consistently applied the first model.  The emphasis has been laid on information and education 
about HIV and on the right of people with HIV.  A national Advisory Group was established as early as 1998, 
while a massive education and information campaign was launched and leaflets in nine languages as well as 
free condoms were distributed.257   
4.10.1 Proponents for criminalisation 
Van Wyk, one of the proponents of criminalisation, criticised South Africa’s stance of adhering to the first model, 
discussed above, by pointing out that it is clear that the escalating figures of HIV show that this approach has 
                                                          
250  See Izama CMM The HIV:AIDS Problem and Customary Marriages among the Baganda in Uganda: A Discussion  
of Some Aspects of Customs, lived reality and HIV/AIDS (unpublished Master’s Degree in Women’s Law long essay) 5. 
251  Van der Bijl 2010 SACJ 234, points out that this is evidenced by the fact that deliberate infection of HIV/AIDS was  
included as part of the definition of rape in the Draft Bill on Sexual Offences Act 50 of 2003, but was consequently removed 
from the proposed definition and made a separate offence in the Working Paper of 2004.  An omission to disclose such 
information was made punishable under that Draft Bill. 
252  Ndawula LLM dissertation 30 and Anyangwe 408. 
253  Van Wyk 2000 Codicillus 3.  
254  Van Wyk 2000 Codicillus 3. 
255  Bhamjee 2008 Obiter 319. 
256  Van Wyk 2000 Codicillus 3. 
257  Van Wyk 2000 Codicillus 3. 
160 
 
not been successful and further that it had probably been too idealistic.258  She then proposes a middle course 
between the two extremes or that a combination of the two models rather be adopted.  This approach would 
accept that rights to equality and non-discrimination go hand in hand with duties and responsibilities, and that 
once a certain level of awareness and information about HIV/AIDS is reached in a community, those who 
continue to act in an irresponsible manner must be held accountable.259  While it is accepted that coercive 
measures are not suitable as a first line of attack in combating HIV, they are a suitable back-up for 
accommodating and enabling non-coercive efforts made by the public health authorities.  However, it must be 
generally accepted that public health measures should first be exploited before recourse is had to criminal 
sanctions.260  Van Wyk concludes by pointing out that there should be a serious consideration of criminalising 
the negligent transmission of exposure to HIV as a uniquely South African solution to the problem of harmful 
HIV-related sexual behaviour.261 
Bamjee, though claiming not to be advocating for the criminalisation of HIV status but only reckless, harmful 
behaviour thereof, contends that criminal law does have a role to play, but not as the only means or measure for 
curbing the spread of the virus.262  Bamjee states that it is hoped that this will bring to the attention of 
prosecutors the length and breadth of the notion, that successful prosecutions can be instituted in instances 
where HIV is an element of criminal misconduct.263  Van der Bijl argues for the omission of non-disclosure by an 
HIV-positive person who deliberately infects another with a life-threatening illness during consensual 
intercourse, to be considered a form of conduct which causes the condition of sexual penetration prohibited by 
definition of rape.264 She contends that the phrase ‘any act which causes sexual penetration’ of section 3 of the 
definition of the Criminal Law Amendment Act,265 does not suggest that it includes or excludes omissions.  That 
the use, therefore, of the term ‘any act’ is arguably extremely wide, and could be used to refer to both act and an 
omission.266  She argues, further that, if the legal convictions of the community are taken into consideration, it 
would be reasonable to regard the term ‘act’ to include an omission, so that in a situation where a person 
intentionally fails to disclose his or her HIV status, or infection with another form of life-threatening illness during 
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264  Van der Bijl 2010 SACJ 224. 
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266  Van der Bijl 2010 SACJ 228. 
161 
 
sexual penetration, such a person’s omission could arguably qualify as an act which caused the sexual 
penetration.  If that person had informed his sexual partner of his status, it is doubtful whether the former would 
have engaged in the act had she been aware of all the facts.  The failure to disclose, therefore, is the act which 
caused the penetration.267  However, the Criminal Law Amendment Act does not criminalise intentional infection 
of another with HIV or other life-threatening illnesses, and the current definition of rape contains no reference to 
the deliberate infection with HIV or life-threatening illnesses.  The reason given for this is that it is believed that 
South African women have the highest prevalence rate for HIV and that failure to disclose their HIV status would 
only increase discrimination against such women.268  According to Van der Bijl, there seems to be authority for 
the view that the deliberate infection of another person with life-threatening illness should be regarded as rape, 
as such infection is a material fact which should negate consent, but the position has not been taken further as it 
has been felt that the common-law crimes are sufficient in this regard.269  
Chalmers contends that while there is a role for the criminal law in restricting the spread of HIV, it is one that 
pales into insignificance alongside broader public health measures.  He maintains that criminal law nevertheless 
does have a role in shaping attitudes and hopefully altering behaviour.270  He furthermore proposes that if a 
specific legislation is to be drafted to address issues of HIV transmission and exposure, the scope of any 
offence created must be carefully delineated.271  Matthieson points out that she believes that a person, who 
knowing that she or he is HIV-positive, has sexual intercourse with another who has not consented to the risk of 
transmission, engages in in a morally unacceptable conduct.272  The challenge is to confront the complexities 
and formulate criminal law response that effectively targets blameworthy conduct, while at the same time 
remaining sensitive to those living with HIV.  Indeed, it accepted that criminalisation of the reckless transmission 
of HIV via consensual sexual intercourse presents a plethora of both moral and legal problems.273  HIV cannot 
be analogised with non-fatal offences against the person and its transmission invariably takes place during an 
intimate relationship.  Decisions made in this context intersect with concepts of trust and attraction that are inept 
for legal examination.274  Moreover, unlike other sexual transmitted diseases (STD), HIV carries a stigma of 
blame, which holds that certain ethic groups and homosexuals have brought the disease upon themselves.  
Notwithstanding this, however, it can be broadly accepted that something has gone wrong when a person learns 
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that she or he is infected with HIV and continues to have unprotected sexual intercourse with another who has 
no reason to know that she or he is being put at risk of infection.275  Provided the elements are applied as 
suggested, the criminal law will represent a morally sound response to the HIV pandemic which positively 
supplements public health.276   
Proponents for the criminalisation of HIV transmission agree that, although there are challenges and 
complexities concerning criminalisation, criminal law has role to play in fighting the spread of the virus through 
deliberate and reckless transmission.  
The public health system does not seem to offer solutions in these instances, which is why it could be argued 
that criminal law has role to play as a supplement to public health, in order to deter such individuals from wilfully 
and recklessly spreading the virus by having intercourse with unsuspecting sexual partners.277  An integrated 
approach, as advocated by Van Wyk, should be considered, that is, where an HIV-positive individual will first be 
counselled and advised by health care workers to inform his or her sexual partner or partners about his or her 
HIV status and using protection if they agree with the partner to have sexual intercourse.278  If such an 
individual, however, fails to adhere to the advice of health care workers and continues to have unprotected 
sexual intercourse with his or her sexual partners or partners, then criminal law can be used to serve as 
deterrence to such an unacceptable behaviour.                                    
4.10.2 Opponents of criminalisation 
One of the opponents of criminalisation of HIV transmission is Viljoen, who in his reply to Van Wyk, argues that 
the existing common law has not been used adequately, for understandable reasons. 279  He contends that 
‘Bedroom offences’ are notoriously difficult to police.  But the existing common law can certainly be used to 
convict a flagrant and persistent infector.280  Transforming the discourse on HIV/AIDS into a criminal law 
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discourse will be at the expense of cultivating a discourse of openness and tolerance.  It will polarise society into 
two groups of ‘us’, the innocents, and ‘them’, the guilty.281  Rather, the answer lies in facing up the realities.  The 
HIV virus is spreading because information aimed at prevention is not getting through or is not taken seriously.  
Policy makers and those informing public policy should focus on creating an enabling environment in which 
people will feel free to ‘come out’ with HIV/AIDS and not on questioning common scientific wisdom, 
masquerading with red ribbons, or engaging in symbolic actions with a counter-productive effect.282  Weait and 
Azad argue that it is no doubt true that a partner’s disclosure that he is HIV-positive is the most immediate and 
direct way in which a person may be made aware of the risk of contracting HIV through unprotected sexual 
intercourse. They suggest that it is wrong in principle that a person in receipt of this information should be able 
to assert that a criminal act has been committed if he or she is infected through consensual sex with that 
partner.283  But the question of whether a partner’s non-disclosure ought automatically to mean that a criminal 
act has been committed is not so easy to sustain.   
The criminal law is a blunt instrument that deploys general, universally applicable principles in determining 
liability.284  The neutral categories of harm, fault, causation and consent are ones ill-suited to judge conduct that 
takes place in the context of relationships characterised by infinitely various manifestations of intimacy, sexual 
desire, trust and honesty.  Similarly, the impartial criteria of evidential sufficiency and the ‘public interest’ that 
inform the prosecution process are ones that may serve to conceal discriminatory effects, however, unwitting 
and unintended those are.285 They further argue that there is a strong consensus in the HIV sector against the 
criminalising of reckless transmission.286  Weait and Azad state that the response to criminalisation must be part 
of a wider effort to return United Kingdom (UK) to its initial successful response to HIV, one grounded in public 
health and human rights.287     
Merminod contends that even though the deterrence rationale is used in every HIV case, deterrence as a goal of 
sentencing is only speculative.288  Non-legal literature, as well as expressed opinions by judges, is openly 
sceptical of the deterrence objective.  This scepticism is based on the conclusions of a number of studies 
showing that potential offenders do not know the legal rules, do not make rational choices, or do not perceive 
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the exact cost for a violation that outweighs the expected gain.289  The need to set sentences appears to be 
outweighed by significant potential negative impacts arising from criminal procedures in Canada.  In fact, 
criminal laws in Canada are not likely to stop HIV/AIDS transmission.  Instead they appear to create a hostile 
environment enhancing stigmas of HIV/AIDS and thus prevent people from seeking testing and advice for fear of 
being identified as HIV-positive.290   
Criminalisation creates the belief that only HIV-positive people should carry the burden of protected sex.  Rather 
than criminalising HIV, a combination of education, persuasion, social support, and increased informed media 
coverage represents the best hope for decreasing the incidence of risk taking in sexual conduct.291      
 
4.11 CONCLUSION 
 
The right to privacy, which includes confidentiality, is not absolute.292 This chapter has discussed some of the 
justifiable limitations of this right.  
Although there is no legal duty upon an infected individual to warn his or her partner about his or her HIV-
positive condition, it is encouraging that if such an HIV-positive individual engages in an unprotected sexual 
intercourse and thereby transmits HIV to his or her sexual partner, criminal and civil liabilities may be laid 
against such an individual.  Also, in cases where an HIV-positive person has raped a woman or child whilst 
knowing that he is HIV-positive, the courts have imposed heavy sentences in order to deter the-would be 
offenders.293 It has also been shown that, though reliance should, first and foremost, be on the health care 
system to educate infected people with HIV about informing their sexual partners or practising safe sex, 
however, where such efforts fail (as was the case in the two Canadian cases of Cuerrier and Williams),294 
criminal law sanctions should be applied. Whether this takes the form of existing provisions or new legislation 
will depend on the effectiveness of existing criminal provisions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS UTILITARIANISM, COMMUNITARIANISM AND AFRICANISM 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Philosophically, there are various schools of thought and theories concerning the rights to privacy, confidentiality 
and medical confidentiality.  Different philosophers have different views about the keeping of confidentiality or its 
limitation by its competing and corresponding duty of disclosure.1  These schools of thought, which will be 
discussed in this chapter, include individualism, utilitarianism and communitarianism or Africanism.  These 
philosophical models,, in one way or the other, have a direct or indirect impact on the manner in which people 
(individually or as a group) behave or make decisions, especially in cases of sickness or when faced with death.  
Parker, for instance, argues that in times of stress, families often adopt individualistic values of the medical world 
and this leads them unintentionally to trample on the values and concerns which sustain families.2  For example, 
an individual who lives an urban setting may tend to be influenced by individualism, in terms of which freedom of 
choice (eg to decide to keep confidential or disclose HIV-positive status to others) is emphasised at the cost of 
communitarian values.  However, the same may not be the case with someone who lives in a rural, 
communitarian setting, where people often share feelings and views with each other for social and moral 
support.  In such circumstances, an individual would feel more obliged to share his or her HIV status with other 
community members. This chapter will first discuss three schools of thought with the purpose of evaluating 
which theory best supports an understanding of issues relating to disclosure and confidentiality of HIV status.  
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5.2 A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF INDIVIDUALSM 
 
The term ‘individualism’ is said to have been invented by Alexis de Tocqueville.3  De Tocqueville noted that the 
word was ‘a novel expression, to which a novel idea has given birth.’4  By this he meant that the ‘novel’ idea of 
celebrating individual wants and intentions, discussed by moralist and social critics for a century or two, had 
reached the point where it needed a name of its own and could be regarded as the touchstone of a culture or 
national character, for better or for worse.5  The important philosophical watershed of individualism was the 
Protestant reformation of the sixteenth century during which Martin Luther asserted sovereignty of individual 
conscience and the right of the individual to commune directly with God, which no human institution, including 
the church itself, could overrule.6  Subsequently, the eighteenth-century period of Enlightenment advanced the 
compelling and intoxicating idea that human reason could unlock a pattern of unending improvement in science 
and politics.7   
The roots of individualism as a method can be traced in the approach of Hobbes, who was England’s greatest 
political thinker and whose self-appointed mission was to harness the emerging scientific spirit of his age, the 
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New York: Basil Blackwell) 138. 
4  Ketcham 138 and Kirkpatrick 35. 
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a man to connect everything with his own person, and to prefer himself to everything in the world.  Individualism is a mature 
and calm feeling, which disposes of each member of the community to sever himself from the mass of his fellow creatures; 
and to draw apart with his family and his friends; so that, after he has thus formed a little circle of his own, he willingly leaves 
society at large to itself.  Egotism originates in blind instinct: individualism proceeds from erroneous judgment more than from 
depraved feelings; it originates as much in the deficiencies of the mind as in the perversity of the heart.  Egotism blights the 
germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public life, but, in the long run, it attacks and destroys all 
others and is at length absorbed in downright egotism.  Egotism is a vice as old as the world, which does not belong to one 
form of society more than another: individualism is of democratic origin and it threatens to spread in the same ratio as the 
equality conditions.’
   
6  Kingdom J No Such Thing as Society? Individualism and Community (1992, Buckingham: Open University Press)  
8. 
7  Kingdom 8.  See also Elliot A and Lemert C The New Individualism: The Emotional Costs of Globalization (2006,  
Oxon: Routledge) 43, who observed that in 1782, when the culture of the modern world, modernity was taking shape, one of 
the Europe’s most influential and controversial writers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, began a most unusual book with the 
following astonishing proclamations: ‘I have begun on a work which is without precedent, whose accomplishment will have 
no imitator.  I propose to set before my fellow mortals a man in all truth of nature; and this man shall be myself.  I have 
studied mankind and know my heart; I am not made like any one I have been acquainted with, perhaps like no one in 
existence; if not better, I at least claim originality and whether Nature has acted rightly or wrongly in destroying the mold in 
which she cast me, can only be decided after I have been read.’  In these words, Rousseau seemed to claim nothing less 
than to set forth the claim that he was an utterly unique human being.     
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latter to enhance understanding of the natural world for the benefit of society.8  When Hobbes analysed society, 
he identified at its core the individual acting in accordance with certain psychological principles, which were 
certain self-evident axioms discovered by introspection.9  His most fundamental axiom was that of the instinct to 
avoid death surpasses all others.  He argued that every person shuns death by a certain impulsion of nature, no 
less than that whereby a stone moves downwards.  From this could be inferred the notion that all complex willed 
behaviour was explicable in terms of aversions and appetites, always reflecting the desire for self-preservation.  
The individual was a calculating machine living a cost-benefit analysis existence.10  From these individual 
postulates, Hobbes deduced a vision of life as a ‘state of nature’.  This was, according to him, a nightmare in 
which egocentric individuals forever torment each other with their selfish ambitions; a war of all against all lived 
in ‘continual fear and danger of violent death’.  He famously declared life in nature to be nasty, brutish and 
short.11  Egoism was not, according to Hobbes, an ethical idea; it was a cold reality.  His prescription was that 
the only way people could be saved from the troublesome life which nature offered was to place themselves 
voluntarily under an all-powerful, self-perpetuating sovereign.  Obligation to the ruler was based upon prudence: 
self-interest was a perfectly sound basis for morality.12   
This was a daring and radical leap in thought, reversing the traditional view that morality could only be derived 
from nature (conscience) or the will of God, backed by the threat of an eternal netherworld of hell-fire.  Hobbes 
believed that he had deduced universal moral obligation from fact; he had determined what ought to be from 
what was.13   
This notion was fraught with danger.  In placing self-interest before the morality of religion, Hobbes relived the 
fable of Adam.  Not only was God cast out, the idea of community with claims above individuals lost meaning 
and life itself had no purpose beyond individual self-interest.14  Ironically, though Hobbes’ inferences led to 
decidedly illiberal conclusions, those who followed his methodology were to find a basis for a liberal state.15  
One such person was John Locke, who held a contrasting view of the individual in a state of nature, and who is 
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regarded as the father of liberalism.16  Locke’s notion did not dispense with God; however, he placed the 
individual at the centre of his earthly universe.  He also invoked the state of nature, but unlike Hobbes’s jungle, 
Locke’s natural people behaved like English gentlemen.  Far from imposing order by means of force, his 
government required but a minimal role, merely protecting the sacred natural rights bestowed by God.17  
According to Locke, therefore, individuals in a state of nature possess rights to life, limb and liberty.  From these 
derive a right to the produce of one’s own labour, implying a share of the human inheritance of the earth; that is, 
ownership of property which to toil.18  However, on the face of it, the right to property is not unlimited.  Since, 
according to him, no one can have the right to cause another to starve in core of God’s plenty, the right is 
restricted to an amount required to sustain life, whatever is beyond this is more than a person’s share and 
belongs to others.  Locke’s own logic, however, led him away from this egalitarian principle.19  
Locke did not offer a complete institutional model of government; however, but wished to see it being kept to a 
minimum.  According to him, government must not create rights but should merely protect those already in 
nature, which should not be removed from persons without their consent.20  The government must be assumed 
to be based on the notional contract, implied in the very existence of the society; an assumed tacit consent 
amongst people to forgo certain natural rights for prudential reasons.  He therefore supported the idea of limited 
constitutional government and a separation of powers.  This was no absolutist Leviathan with power to appoint 
its successors, but a government of the majority.  However, Locke’s democratic inclinations, like those of other 
liberals, were limited.21  Through his democratic precepts, Locke managed the amazing feat of justifying 
inequality even to the extent of curtailing the property rights of others, a conclusion most welcome to the large-
scale property-owning class, as well as to the newly developing bourgeoisie.  This was accomplished through 
the concept of money, since without money; the production of more food than would be eaten leads to waste 
and offends God’s law.22   
Money, however, enables excess produce to be sold and the profits stored, eventually to become interest-
earning capital. Locke thus grounded capitalistic appropriation and accumulation in nature, with no natural 
limitation on individuals having more than their fair share.  His state of nature was hence no primitive jungle but 
                                                          
16  Kingdom 10 and Kirkpatrick 23. 
17  Kirkpatrick 24, Kingdom 10 and Locke J “On the Extent and End of Civil Government” in Daly M (ed)  
Communitarianism: A New Public Ethics (1994, Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company) 6. 
18  Kirkpatrick 25 and Kingdom 11. 
19  Kingdom 11. 
20  Kingdom 11. 
21  Kingdom 11. 
22  Kingdom 12. 
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a fantastical place where one finds not only a natural right to unlimited property, but money, wages and capitalist 
markets.  Locke viewed capitalism as natural and unequal possession of property as a right which people bring 
to civil society; it is not created by the state and should not be removed by it.23  This inequality tendency was the 
ironical result of all individualist doctrines; although starting from postulates of equality they reached contrary 
conclusions.  The societies were not truly atomised but contained competing groups of insiders and outsiders; 
which were class societies, divided by ownership of property.  If this was implicit in Hobbes and Locke, it 
became starkly obvious when individualists invented a world which they believed could work, not by means of 
government but by clockwork.  This delicate, self-regulating mechanism, working with the precision of a Victorian 
gold-plated pocket-watch, was the market.  This situation as was envisaged by Hobbes and Locke, still prevails 
even today in many states in the world, including South Africa. This inequality, where individuals who are rich 
become richer and the poor poorer,24 has led to many revolts around the world in countries such as Egypt, 
Tunisia and Libya.  In South Africa, also, there had been many service delivery demonstrations,25 not to mention 
violent strikes for higher wages in certain sectors,26 as people feel that there is little being done to improve their 
lives. 
                                                          
23  Kingdom 12. 
24  This was confirmed by Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe as reported by the Daily Sun of Friday 31 August  
2012.  The paper depicted this as “Blame capitalism for poverty – Motlanthe”.  The Deputy President is reported as having 
charged that the gap between rich and poor is getting bigger and bigger and imperialism and capitalism were making it 
worse.  He said these two forces were responsible for the poverty which was no longer a problem only for the developing 
world but also for the first world.  He further stated that the global crisis of capitalism and imperialism was negatively affecting 
growth, widening social inequality, increasing levels of poverty and worsening unemployment figures.  He therefore called for 
a radical shift in the approach.  
25  An example of these demonstrations is reported by the Daily Sun of Monday 3 September 2012.  The paper  
described this as “Man shot in protest for water”.  This paper reported that what this man wanted was clean water.  But what 
he got was death and no one knew who shot the unidentified man.  He was with a crowd of angry people from Taflkop in 
Limpopo who marched that Friday morning to demand clean water.  They blocked the main road leading to Groblersdal, 
threw stones at passing vehicles and tore down street signs.  Schoolchildren and workers were forced to join the march. 
These service delivery demonstrations seem to have found support even from the Deputy President of the country, Kgalema 
Motlanthe, who is reported by the Daily Sun of Friday 31 August 2012, which depicted this as “Blame capitalism for poverty – 
Motlanthe”, as having expressed sentiments in parliament that the poor were right to protest against service delivery. 
26  The most violent of which was the Marikana mine strike as reported by many newspapers around the country.   
The Daily Dispatch of Thursday 23 August 2012 depicted this as “EC’s Marikana death toll: 19.”  This paper reported that 
police last week opened fire on protesting miners armed with machetes and sticks, killing 34.  More than 70 were injured and 
259 arrested.  In total 44 people were killed in the week long dispute, including two police officers and two security guards.  
The Daily Sun of Thursday 23 August 2012 depicted this as “We are sorry.”  The paper reported that two weeks ago 34 
people died and 78 injured in violent clashes when about 3 000 rock drill operators entered into an illegal protest, demanding 
wage increase.  Their demand was for an increase from R4 000 to R12 500.  The paper further reported that President Zuma 
told the striking miners in Marikana outside Rustenburg that he believed that the massacre could have been avoided and that 
was the reason why he set up a judicial commission of inquiry to investigate.  The City Press of 16 September 2012, which 
portrayed this as “Beyond Marikana: the crisis”, reported that on 10 August 2012, about 3 000 workers launched a wildcat 
strike at Lonmin’s Marikana mine, demanding a salary of R12 5000.  Three days of clashes killed 10 people.  The paper 
further reported that on 16 August 2012, police and strikers clashed and 34 miners were shot dead.  The Sunday Times of 
28 October 2012 described this as “Ramaphosa to testify: wants to address Marikana Commission on claims he supported 
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One also finds this dichotomy in the health care context, namely between two sets of values; that is, those 
individualistic values which underlie patient-centred medicine and those which sustain families and 
communities.27  Hilde and James Lindemann Nelson argue that modern medicine’s overriding focus on the good 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
violence.”  It reported that businessman and ANC heavyweight Cyril Ramaphosa has asked to testify before the Marikana 
Commission in a bid to clear his name, following claims that he had a hand in events leading to the killing of 34 miners by 
police on 16 August 2012.  It further reported that President Zuma appointed the commission to investigate what led to the 
death of at least 44 people, 34 of whom were killed by police on August 16, during an illegal strike at Marikana.  The other 
reportedly violent strike was that of truck drivers.  The Daily Dispatch of Friday 28 September 2012 depicted this as “Petrol  
truck bombed on N6: vicious attack has been linked to ongoing drivers’ strike.”  The paper reported that a truck carrying 
40 000 litres of fuel exploded yesterday when it was petrol bombed on the N6 between East London and Stutterheim.  The 
driver survived and treated for burn wounds.  The Daily Sun of 9 October 2012, also described this as “Trucker strike blazes 
on: and so does crime wave.”  This paper reported that lorries on the East Rand were ablaze yesterday as the truck drivers’ 
strike raged on.  In Kempton Park, an electrical contractor’s truck was stoned and set on fire at 9 am.  At 9.30, a four-ton 
Isuzu bread truck was smashed with stones and burned in Boksburg.  All the drivers escaped unhurt.  The other, not widely 
reported strike was that of the forest workers.  The Times of Friday 6 July 2012 portrayed this as “Forest fires pinned on 
strike.”  The paper reported that a forestry strike had been linked to more than a 100 fires started across Limpopo and 
Mpumalanga.  The fires had been raging over the past three days following a deadlock between the government-owned 
South African Forestry Company Limited and the Food and Allied Worker’s Union.  The union was demanding a 15% wage 
increase while the company was offering an 8% increase.  The fires started on Monday on the company’s Komatiland 
plantation in Limpopo, the lowveld and the Highveld, damaging more than 600ha of forests.  Private plantation owners and 
farmers have also been targeted after racing to assist the company workers in extinguishing the blazes.  Emergency workers 
and private fire fighters from Tzaneen are were also believed to have been assaulted while trying to put out fires on Tuesday 
and Wednesday.  And, recently, the strike for higher wages hit the farming sector.  This was reported by the Daily Dispatch 
of Tuesday 20 November 2012, which depicted this as “Cape police monitoring farmworkers.”  This paper reported that the 
Coalition of Farm Worker Representatives said that it gave the government until 4 December 2012 to institute a wage of 
R150 a day and concede to worker demands.  The New Age of 26 Monday 2012, also described this as “WC farmers 
concerned.”  This paper also reported that earlier this month two people died and several farms were burnt in the Hex and 
Berg River Valleys in violence linked to action for higher wages.  The Department of Labour said that it would review the 
minimum wage for farm workers, currently at about R70 a day, in response to the strike action.  The workers said the 
industry sectoral determination needed to be finalised by December 4.  Farmworkers are demanding a daily wage of R150.                          
27  Parker 1, to illustrate an example of this conflict, points out that Hilde and James Lindemann Nelson recount the  
case of a man whose daughter is suffering from kidney failure.  The daughter is spending six hours, three times a week on a 
dialysis machine and the effects of this are becoming hard for her and her family to bear.  She has already had one kidney 
transplant which her body rejected and her doctors are unsure whether a second one would work but are willing to try if they 
can find a suitable donor.  After some tests the paediatrician privately tells the father that he is indeed compatible.  It may 
seem inconceivable that a father would refuse to donate his kidney to his daughter under such circumstances.  Yet he does 
refuse and justifies his decision not only on the basis that the outcome is uncertain but also on his concerns about the 
operation itself.  He is frightened and worried about what would happen to him and his other children if his remaining kidney 
were to fail.  He is ashamed to feel this way and cannot bear to refuse openly so he asks the doctor to tell the family that he 
is in fact not compatible.  His doctor, however, after having some sympathy for him, informs him that she cannot lie for him.  
After a silence, the father then says, ‘Ok then I’ll do it.  If they knew that I was compatible but wouldn’t donate my kidney, it 
would wreck the family.’  In order to understand such cases and the conflicts which characterise them it is important to 
recognise the subtle differences and conflicts between the values in families and those found in medicine.  The man who 
was afraid to donate his kidney thought he had failed his daughter because he was not willing to do everything he could to 
save her life; he thought he was being cowardly and bad father and perhaps he was.  However, another possibility he had 
not considered was that he was adopting the morality of medicine rather than honouring what’s valuable about families.  Both 
the father and the doctor believed that the only legitimate question they were answering here was, ‘What is in the best 
interest of the patient?’  Yet families are made up of a number of people, all of whose interests have to be honoured.  The 
single focus, therefore, on individual may be fine for medicine, but it’s less fine for families, who have their own, different, 
mechanisms for protecting their vulnerable members.  In times of illness, families, anxious, needy and swayed, are drawn 
into medicine’s overwhelming commitment to patient care.  Family members lose sight of the value of family life at these 
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of the individual patient has distorted the ways in which family members interact with one another and in 
particular with those who are sick.  They argue that at times of stress, families often adopt the individualistic 
values of the medical world and this leads them unintentionally to trample on the values and concerns which 
sustain families.28  On the other hand, they argue that families in their devotion to values which are family-
oriented, themselves sometimes have created distortions in medicine.  For instance, for couples who see their 
need to have a child and subfertility as a medical problem and families who want their relatives kept alive no 
matter what the likelihood that there will be any life other than simply the organic, place demands upon medicine 
which it is impossible to meet.29  The claim that there are important tensions between the values of patient-
centred medicine and those which sustain families and communities, reflects an on-going and important 
contemporary debate in health care ethics and in ethics more generally between individualistic approaches and 
those which have come to be known as communitarian.30  For liberal individualists, the human world is made up 
of individual people each with his or her own desires, interests and conception of the good, each with the ability 
to choose freely his or her own way of life.31  This means that they tend to explain moral problems in terms of 
the competing needs and interests of such individuals and they have, as a consequence, a tendency to focus on 
the differences between people, the variety of their needs and values, and their separateness, that is, they 
concentrate rather less upon what people have in common; their similarities, shared values, and projects and 
rather more on their diversity.32  The liberal individualist, therefore, interprets human relationships as the 
expression of individual needs and wishes and conceptualise moral problems in terms of ‘autonomy’, ‘rights’, 
‘justice’ etc.  This normally leads to a model of health care ethics focused on ‘patient-centred care’, ‘informed 
consent’ and the ‘best interests of the patient’.33  In this sense the liberal individualist approach can be said to 
resonate with one the most moral intuitions, for as Berlin suggests: ‘I wish my life and my decisions to depend 
on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind.  I wish to be the instrument of my own and not of other men’s 
acts of will.  I wish to be a subject, not an object, to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my 
own, not by causes.’34   
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
times because, like a fish who takes water for granted, they generally live within such values without being explicitly aware of 
it.         
28  Parker 2. 
29  Parker 2. 
30  Parker 3. 
31  Parker 3. 
32  Parker 3. 
33  Parker 3. 
34  Parker 3. 
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Liberal individualism and its focus on individuals, however, has come under criticism from many directions, for 
despite the advantages of the liberal individualist conception of the subject it can in some ways be seen to 
create more problems than those it solves.35  Some communitarians, such as Lindemann Nelsons, argues that 
the problem with individualism as an approach to ethics is that its focus on the individual means that it 
unavoidably undervalues the relationships between people, their shared interests and values and implies that 
families and other social entities can have no value other than that of the individuals of which they are 
constituted.36  That is, that the needs of families ought never to be put above those of individual family members, 
for from a liberal individualist perspective it makes no sense to attribute value to groups or to relationships.37  
The communitarians in general argue that this inevitably leads to a one dimensional view of the moral world and 
that from this individualist perspective the very possibility of people being the moral beings that they are in any 
sense at all is brought into question.38  Persons’ understanding of questions as specifically moral is only made 
by virtue of the fact that they are engaged in a world with others and are not individuals in the liberal individualist 
sense.  Communitarians suggest that only through such engagement, people come to understand the world and 
their relationships with others as ethical or moral.39  Therefore, if ethical problems are considered from an 
individualistic perspective, such a consideration is unavoidably incomplete, for there are aspects of all moral 
problems which are not susceptible to analysis in terms of individuals.40   
Confidentiality and individualism have also been criticised from the cultural point of view.41  This concerned the 
cultural origins of these concepts and the appropriateness of applying these in South Africa in the midst of an 
epidemic which has taken a very different form, in much less affluent social circumstances, to that of North 
America and Western Europe.42  Three main demographic differences presented themselves between HIV/AIDS 
in Africa on the other hand and in North America and Western Europe on the other.  Firstly, in South Africa, as in 
the rest of Africa, the epidemic is generally heterosexual.43  Secondly, most of those affected are relatively poor 
and do not have extensive, if any, formal education.  Thirdly, the figures in Africa are simply overwhelming.44 
                                                          
35  Parker 4. 
36  Parker 4. 
37  Parker 4. 
38  Parker 4. 
39  Parker 4. 
40  Parker 4. 
41  Cameron 15. 
42  Cameron 15. 
43  Cameron 15. 
44  Cameron 15. 
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Considering this background, it was perhaps not surprising that public health bureaucrats and others had 
expressed their impatience at the application of concepts they claimed may inhibit effective responses to the 
disease.45  The particular form the attack had taken is the suggestion that the notion of confidentiality is an alien 
import to Africa, foreign to the continent and its cultures.  The first claims along these lines came, ironically, not 
from a cultural ‘Africanist’ but from the (white) head of the apartheid government’s AIDS Unit in 1991, Dr 
Holmshaw.46  Attacking Western-style adherence to individualism as an import ‘introduced by outsiders dealing 
with Africa in a non-African context’, she claimed that in Africa, perceptions of community versus individuality 
exist but notions of confidentiality are irrelevant.47  More recently, in 1996, the (black) then chief executive, Dr 
Shisana, of the post-apartheid national Health Department advocated an ‘open disclosure policy’.48  She claimed 
that partner notification had not been implemented in South Africa because time had not been taken to discuss 
with communities whether the restrictive policy on disclosure to partners was hindering or enabling the spread of 
HIV infection.   
These comments provoked a storm in South Africa, with non-governmental organisations providing AIDS 
information and services expressing concern that abridgement of confidentiality would further stigmatise persons 
with HIV, already disadvantaged by ignorance and prejudice about HIV/AIDS.49   
The ‘Africanist’ challenge to confidentiality as a ‘Eurocentric’ import to Africa drew on an older and even deeper-
going criticism of privacy itself.  From a socialist and communitarian point of view, the very distinction between 
what is private and what is public has been mocked as a product of classical liberal ideology.50  Criticism of this 
kind suggested that the idea of a private sphere tends to place the individual outside society, minimising the 
scope for the notion of social responsibility.  This seems to foreshadow the essence of the ‘Africanist’ attack on 
confidentiality, which derived from what had been described as the communal dimension of all human existence 
in Africa.  On one account, this suggested that the well-known statement of Descartes, ‘I think, therefore I am’ 
(cogito, ergo sum), must in Africa be rendered as ‘I belong through kinship, therefore I am’ (cognatus, ergo sum) 
instead.51  This has led to calls for ‘shared confidentiality’, as opposed to rigidly individualised confidentiality, to 
                                                          
45  Cameron 15. 
46  Cameron 15. 
47  Cameron 15. 
48  Cameron 15. 
49  Cameron 15. 
50  Cameron 15. 
51  Elliot and Lemert 44, Cameron 15 and Ezekwonna FC African Communitarian Ethic: The Basis for the Moral  
Conscience and Autonomy of the Individual-Igbo Culture as a Case Study (2005, Bern: Peter Lang AG, European Academic 
Publishers) 67. 
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be applied in Africa.52  However, these calls for shared confidentiality on their own had been criticised, especially 
as they seemed to create the impression that individual autonomy of confidentiality is swallowed or submerged 
by aspirations of the community.53   
Cameron, for instance, argues that the fact that ‘information-sharing’ is a basic cultural value, or that a culture 
includes supportive responses of a communitarian nature does not mean and cannot mean either that someone 
who is part of that culture automatically waives his or her right to individual autonomy, or that the culture itself 
demands that respect for individual choice in relation to confidentiality must be overridden.54  Still less does 
insistence on confidentiality inhibit the enactment of prompt measures to discourage stigma, violence and 
discrimination, which are the true obstacles to free disclosures in a free environment.  This therefore means that 
public health concerns, as much as respect for individual autonomy, suggest that confidentiality, subject always 
to individual consent and excepted only for imperative public health necessities such as significant and real risk 
to another, should be a central value in the public health response to the epidemic.55  This leads to the 
conclusion that although individualism has been widely criticised, there seems that, as Gyekye and other writers 
argue, that there is a place for an individual even in a communitarian African context.56   
 
5.3 A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF UTILITARIANISM 
 
Utilitarianism is one of the most powerful and persuasive approaches to normative ethics in the history of 
philosophy.57  Utilitarianism is generally held to be the view that the morally right action is the action that 
produces the most good.58  This theory, therefore, is the form of consequentialism: the right action is understood 
entirely in terms of consequences.  What distinguishes utilitarianism from individualism has to do with the scope 
of the relevant consequences.59  In fact, as Ilori emphasises, utilitarianism, hedonism and Epicureanism are all 
                                                          
52  Cameron 15. 
53  Cameron 19, Ezekwonna 63, Gyekye K The Unexamined Life: Philosophy and The African Experience (1988,  
Accra: Ghana University Press) 31, Gyekye K An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme 
(1987, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 154. 
54  Cameron 19. 
55  Cameron 19. 
56  Gyekye 154 and Gyekye 31. 
57  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy The History of Utilitarianism http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism- 
history/ (visited 14 June 2012). 
58  Ilori JA Moral Philosophy in African Context 2ed (1994, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press Ltd) 25. 
59  Ilori 25 and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (visited 14  
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ethical theories which judge conduct as right or wrong, not on the basis of some inherent quality, as formalism, 
but in relationship to some end or goal that is considered good.60  According to utilitarianism, one ought to 
maximise the overall good, that is, consider the good of others as well as one’s own good.  Its roots are traced 
through the traditional utilitarians, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, who identified the good with pleasure.61  
So, like Epicurus, they were hedonists about value.62  They also held the view that people ought to maximise the 
good, that is, bring about the greatest amount of good for the greatest number.63   
Utilitarianism accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle and it holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of 
happiness.64  Mill accepted the general position of Bentham who used the phrase ‘the greatest happiness of the 
greatest number’.  For Bentham, nature had placed man under the guidance of two masters, pleasure and pain 
and according to him, man is a pleasure-seeking, pain avoiding creature.65  Bentham was influenced by both 
Hobbes’ account of human nature and Hume’s account of social utility.66  However, the important change that 
Mill brought into this Bentham’s theory of utilitarianism was a qualitative standard.  According to Mill, human 
beings with refined faculties are not satisfied with the pleasure of the body but they continue to seek the higher 
pleasure of the mind.67  Once a man has lived on higher level, he can never really wish to sink into a lower level 
of existence.  This is because of the sense of dignity.  It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied.68  Mill, therefore, maintained that the good of all men or the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
must be the standard of what is right in conduct.  To promote not individual pleasure but the greatest total 
happiness is the essence of Mill’s position.69  The utilitarians, therefore, stress the consequences of conduct.  
The morality of an act depends, not on the motive from which it originates, but on the effects on the society.  It 
therefore emphasises that truth is that which produces the greatest happiness for the greatest number of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
June 2012). 
60  Ilori 25. 
61  Coats AW “Utilitarianism, Oxford Idealism and Cambridge Economics” in Groenewegen P (ed) Economics and Ethics?  
(1996, London: Routledge) 94, Kahn J Reframing Educational Policy: Democracy, Community, and the Individual Volume 16 
(1996, New York and London) 9, Kirkpatrick 23 and Ilori 25. 
62  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (visited 14 June 2012). 
63  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (visited 14 June 2012). 
64  Ilori 25 and Kahn 9. 
65  Ilori 25, Kahn 11 and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/  
(visited 14 June 2012). 
66  Kahn 10 and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (visited 14  
June 2012). 
67  Kahn 11 and Ilori 26. 
68  Ilori 26 and Kahn 11. 
69  Ilori 26 and Kahn 11. 
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people.70  Utilitarianism is also known by its impartiality and agent-neutrality.  Everyone’s happiness counts the 
same and when one maximises the good, it is the good impartially considered.  However, all these features of 
this approach to moral evaluation and moral decision-making have proven to be somewhat controversial and 
subsequent controversies have led to changes in the classical theory.71  Utilitarianism, unlike individualism, 
depends on the consequences of the action, whether they are good or not.  If actions promote happiness, then 
they are good, but then they are wrong if they produce unhappiness.  Utilitarianism, also, unlike individualism is 
also concerned with the greatest happiness of the greatest number of people and not that of individuals.    
 
5.4 A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW OF COMMUNITARIANISM AND AFRICANISM 
 
5.4.1 Communitarianism 
The word ‘communitarianism’, also referred to as ‘communalism’,72 originates from ‘community’.73  Mwimnobi 
argues that although writers, such as Gyekye, use the terms ‘communitarianism’ and ‘communalism’ 
interchangeably to mean the same, no attempt is made to explain the exchangeable use of the terms.74  
Mwimnobi points out that the principles that underlie these concepts are different.75  Communalism is a very old 
idea used by great thinkers in Africa such as Nyerere and Senghor in relation to ‘African Socialism’.76  In this 
regard, for instance, Nyerere developed the concept of ‘Ujama’ to indicate the kind of principles that underlie the 
socio-political life of traditional African communities.  This term ‘Ujama’, plainly means ‘familyhood’.77  
Communitarianism, on the other hand, has been defined as the notion that a person, when born, finds himself or 
herself not in isolation but among other individuals and thus establishing the relational nature of a person.78   
                                                          
70  Ilori 26. 
71  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history/ (visited 14 June 2012). 
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  Gyekye 31 and Gyekye 12. 
73  Van Seters P “Communitarianism in Law and Society” in Van Seters P (ed) Communitarianism in Law and Society  
(2006, New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.) 1. See also Frohnen B The Communitarians and The Crisis of 
Modern Liberalism (1996, Kansas: University Press of Kansas) 150, who points out that according to communitarians good 
character comes from, as it fosters, good politics. 
74  Mwimnobi OS A Critical Exposition of Kwame Gyekye’s Communitarianism (unpublished MA Dissertation, 2003:  
Unisa) 22. 
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  Mwimnobi (unpublished MA Dissertation) 22. 
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  Mwimnobi (unpublished MA Dissertation) 22. 
77
  Mwimnobi (unpublished MA Dissertation) 22. 
78  Mwimnobi (unpublished MA Dissertation) 22.  See also Gyekye 155, who points out that, Aristotle proclaimed  
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Communitarianism has also been described as the doctrine that specifies that the group (that is the society) 
constitutes the focus of the activities of the individual members of the society.79  This doctrine places emphasis 
on the activity and success of the wider society rather than, though not necessarily at the expense of, or to the 
detriment of, the individual.80  Communitarianism has also been associated with morality, as it has been 
described as the notion that there are certain basic moral goals in life, to be realised in the course of natural life 
span, and whose realisation is to be supported by society at large.81  The distinction has to be drawn between 
three kinds of communitarianism which are philosophical, political and socio-legal communitarianism.82  These 
three may be seen as historical stages in the development of liberal communitarianism, especially as it relates to 
jurisprudential matters.  This debacle started around 1980 as an intellectual exercise strictly among 
philosophers.83  Subsequently, communitarianism grew into some political movement.  Then, in 1990s, a 
number of distinctly socio-logical studies dealing with law and community were published.84   
5.4.1.1 Philosophical communitarianism 
The protagonists of liberalism were led by John Rawls.85  The natural focus of liberalism, neoclassical as well as 
welfare liberalism is the autonomy and freedom of the individual.  Liberal principles of justice differ on one single 
theme: the priority to be given, always and under all circumstances, to individual rights of freedom.86  That is the 
reason liberals draw a sharp line between the idea of justice on the one hand, and the idea of the good life or 
the good society on the other.  The former is held to be independent from and the antecedent to the latter.  In 
Rawls’s own famous maxim: ‘The right is prior to the good’.  The state, therefore, ought to restrict its activities to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                   
many centuries ago that man is by nature a social animal and that it is impossible for him to live outside the society.  Akan 
thinkers agree that society is not only a necessary condition, but it is natural to man.  This notion is expressed in the proverb 
that ‘when a man descends from heaven, he descends into human society’.  The idea of man descending from heaven 
stems from the belief that man was created by the Supreme Being, Onyame, in heaven.  Thus, this proverb rejects the 
concept of the state of nature, as explicated by those eighteenth-century European philosophers who asserted the existence 
of an original presocial character of man.  In the state of nature, people lived in solitary and uncooperative lives, with 
undesirable consequences that in time led to the formation of society.   
79  Gyekye 155. 
80  Gyekye 155. 
81  Zwart Z “All You Need is Helath: Liberal and Communitarian Views on Allocation of Health Care Resources” in  
Parker M (ed) Ethics and Community in the Health Care Professions (1999, London and New York: Routledge) 33. 
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associated with the names of Friedrich Hayek, Michael Oakshott and Robert Nozick.  Apart from Rawls, welfare liberalism in 
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recently with Ronald Dworkin. 
86  Kirkpatrick 48 and Van Seters 2. 
178 
 
the realisation of principles of justice and to refrain from propagating, let alone, from imposing, the good.  In the 
liberal universe, the state is categorically neutral.87      
These central tenets of modern liberalism, the focus on moral autonomy; the separation of principles of justice 
from conceptions of the good life; the defence of a neutral state, became the target of a massive criticism by a 
number of diverse political philosophers, mainly American, who in the course of the 1980s became labelled as 
communitarians.88  There were four philosophers that were referred to as communitarians and these were 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer.89  Sandel directed his criticism of 
Rawls first at the axiomatic starting point of liberalism: the autonomous, free-floating individual.  Liberals such as 
Rawls ground their theory in a concept of the person that Sandel claimed was untenable: the person thought of 
as a unit or identity existing prior to and independent from his or her choice for certain values and ends.  This 
liberal conception of the person Sandel described as the ‘antecedently individuated’ or ‘unencumbered’ self.90  In 
contrast to this, Sandel saw a person as someone who is defined or constituted by the very values and ends he 
or she chooses.  Normally, that choice is be being made in the larger context of a community of whatever 
nature, and thus the idea of community was a necessary element in Sandel’s concept of the person.  The 
protagonists of philosophy MacIntyre, Taylor and Walzer, in the 1980s, voiced similar objections against the 
emotivist, isolated, atomistic individualism that they identified as a central deficiency in modern liberal thought 
and practice.91  All the four communitarians were united around a conception of human beings as integrally 
related to the communities of culture and language that they create, maintain and inhabit.  As biological and 
social constructs, human beings are decisively shaped by circumstances not of their own choosing, among 
which at least are their own family and community.92   This unavoidable relationship creates obligations and 
responsibilities for the individual that, unlike what is presupposed in liberal tradition, do not depend on free 
choice and explicit approval.  In this way in philosophical communitarianism the idea of personhood or human 
agency is conceived of as inseparable from the wider circles, the communities, in which the lives of individuals 
are always and inevitably lived.93  
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5.4.1.2 Political communitarianism 
Prompted by the communitarian urge in moral, political and legal philosophy, but clearly moving on a different, 
more practical plane in the United States, a new political movement was founded that called itself 
‘communitarian’, in the late 1980s.94  This movement, from its beginning, was associated with the visions of 
Amitai Etzioni, a professor of sociology at the Georgetown Washington University.  Etzioni had emphasised the 
need for a new balance between individual rights and social responsibilities.95 Etzioni also stressed the 
‘Responsive Communitarian Platform’, the importance of finding balances between individuals and groups; 
between rights and responsibilities; between institutions of state, market and civil society.96   
The American invention of political communitarianism was typically made into a successful export-article by 
primarily the remarkable talents of Etzioni.  He had tirelessly travelled around the world to address meetings and 
advise political leaders.  He had managed to generate worldwide interest in the idea of political 
communitarianism and this explains, at least to some extent, why communitarianism was involved in what 
subsequently grew out of New Labour, namely, the Third Way.97  It is also interesting to observe that Etzioni had 
not only styled his communitarian movement as a political movement but also as a ‘social movement’.98   
5.4.1.3 Socio-legal communitarianism   
Influenced by both philosophical and political communitarianism, over the past ten to fifteen years, a remarkably 
strong interest in community or communitarianism also surfaced in the field of socio-legal studies.99  Socio-legal 
communitarianism, however, was much broader as it had deep roots in the disciplinary of sociology.  The new 
communitarian perspective in socio-legal studies encompassed both the mysterious questions of philosophical 
communitarianism and the realistic policy problems of political communitarianism, but it also added to these a 
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strongly historical and sociological dimension.100  This type of sociological communitarianism is particularly 
manifested in the writings of three scholars who otherwise represented different positions on the spectrum of 
socio-legal studies. These were Joel Handler, Philip Selznick and Rodger Cotterrell.  Handler was interested in 
the idea of ‘strong’ community, which he distinguished from ‘instrumental’ community and ‘sentimental’ 
community.  The distinction between these types of community, according to Handler, actually formed the 
historical centrepiece of philosophical communitarianism, namely the Rawls-Sandel debate.101  Coterrell too was 
strongly interested in the projections of communitarian jurisprudence.  Unlike Handler, Cotterrell approached the 
subject from an angle of philosophical communitarianism, but distinctly from a sociological perspective.  He 
particularly employed the Durkheimian tradition by focusing on the essential continuities between law, morality 
and solidarity.102   
Though, admittedly, law cannot in any direct way create solidarity or community, Cotterrell argued that it could 
create conditions for human existence that symbolise a moral commitment of the community in its care for its 
members as individuals.  The main task of communitarian jurisprudence, then, was to explore sociologically the 
conditions under which law can become a principled component of social life which is a direct expression of 
community interests, structures and concerns.103  According to Cotterrell, the content of the concept of 
community was by no means self-evident.  On the contrary, he described the ultimate aim of his study to clarify 
the almost terminally vague idea of community.104  Cotterrell took a very different approach from the more 
orthodox approaches available in the sociological literature which derive the idea of community from the concept 
of Gemeinschaft.  He preferred to conceptualise the idea of community from the interplay of certain general 
orientations of social interactions and in this interactionist concept community, a key role was played by the 
notion of ‘trust’.105  Trust, or rather ‘mutual interpersonal trust’, according to Cotterrell, was the basic building 
block of community, the fundamental orientation that makes it possible.  He saw mutual interpersonal trust as 
the essence of community.  Cotterrell hence defined communities as patterns of interaction that involved a high 
degree of mutual interpersonal trust.106  In Cotterrell’s eyes, this theory of community largely determines the role 
of contemporary law, or ‘law-government’.  According to him, regulatory forms and institutions should be 
designed to foster and support relations of mutual trust within communities.  However, in modern conditions, this 
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kind of mutual interpersonal trust can be achieved only on a relatively local level or in relatively specific social 
fields.  Cotterrell built his communitarian jurisprudence on a fairly strong idea of social, political and legal 
pluralism.107   
Selznick’s theory regarding communitarian jurisprudence employed both the perspectives of philosophical 
communitarianism, such as Handler’s, and that of the sociological tradition by Cotterrell.108  However, unlike 
Handler, who embraced the concept of dialogic community and Cotterrell, who preferred an interactionist 
conceptualisation of community, Selznick stressed the importance of treating community as a variable aspect of 
group experience as, according to him, groups can be more or less full-blown communities and they can 
approximate community in different ways.  That was why Selznick wanted to define community much more 
comprehensively than either Handler or Cotterrell.109  According to him, a group is a community to the extent 
that it encompasses a broad range of activities and interests, and to the extent that participation implicates 
whole persons rather than segmental interests or activities.  However, on the basis of this inclusive definition of 
community, Selznick developed a theory of community that is much more discriminating and much stronger than 
those of Handler or Cotterrell.110  His theory built on the recurrent elements of community which are historicity, 
identity, mutuality, plurality, autonomy, participation and integration.  These seven elements represent the prime 
values of human life lived in the communities and this presumes anything but homogeneity.111  On the contrary, 
different types of community such as religious, political, occupational, institutional, international will have 
different mixes of the main elements.  Furthermore, the interplay of these elements itself creates variety and 
diversity.  While discussion of community habitually centers on the organic unity of Gemeinschaft, Selznick 
argued that living communities are plural as well as solidary, that is, communities are characterised by structural 
differentiation as well as by shared consciousness.  Thus, Selznick advanced a theory of community that is as 
pluralistic as that of Cotterrell.112  However, while Handler and Cotterrell relied on trust to hold a community 
together, Selznick had a broader view.  He saw not one but two sources of moral integration competing for pre-
eminence as foundation of community, and these were civility and piety.  The conflict between these very 
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different principles formed the heart of Selznick’s communitarian jurisprudence and their reconciliation he saw as 
a prime object of theory and policy.113   
What can be deduced from this review of communitarianism in socio-legal studies therefore can be summed out 
in three points that stand out.  Firstly, the importance of legal pluralism, that is, the deeply plural character of 
modern law, is recognised and accounted for in the perspective of socio-legal communitarianism.114  Secondly, 
the communitarian perspective emphasises the moral dimension, the moral underpinnings of law and directs the 
attention to the interdependence of law, solidarity and community.  Thirdly, these socio-logical communitarians 
acknowledged the primacy of community without diminishing the worth of values central to the liberal tradition of 
freedom, equality and rationality.115  Indeed, communitarianism and liberalism are joined in a point of view that 
has been clearly described, by Selznick himself, as communitarian liberalism.  Perhaps the most lasting 
contribution of socio-legal communitarianism may be seen in the way it helps transcend, dialectically resolve, the 
polarities that were popularised by philosophical liberals and communitarians some twenty-five years ago.116                        
5.4.2 Africanism 
In his description of African communitarianism, based on the Igbo culture as a case study, Ezekwonna 
maintains that there have been many accusations that the African community-oriented ethic swallows the 
individual, that his personal identity remains incognito.117  This could be an observer’s impression who is an 
outsider, but if one is in the system, he will discover that personhood in the African concept is not swallowed but 
complex.   Such criticism normally comes from Western views that have a different concept of a human 
person.118  The Igbo, or indeed the African, notion of the human person cannot be isolated from the community.  
It is only in relation with the community that the identity of the individual is noticeable.119  Without the 
communitarian relationship, there is no identity for the African person.  Further, that only together with others 
can one become a human person and achieve individual freedom, which, again should be exercised in a 
communitarian way.120  One advocate of the communitarian view, who was referred to as a strict communitarian 
thinker, is John Mbiti.121  According to Mbiti, in traditional life, the individual cannot and does not exist alone 
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except corporately and he owes his existence to other people, including those of past generations and his 
contemporaries.122  He is simply part of the whole.  The community must therefore make, create or produce the 
individual; for the individual depends on the corporate group.  Physical birth is not enough; the child must go 
through rites of incorporation so that it becomes fully integrated into the entire society.123  Mbiti later summed up 
the African view in the following pithy saying: ‘I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am’.124   
The other communitarian, who was influenced by Mbiti, is Ifeaanyi Menkiti.125  Menkiti argues that in an African 
context, society is supreme and primary, while individual identity is merely derivative.  He felt that in Africa, it is 
in the communal context and not the possession of some rationality, will or memory that defines the person. 
Personhood is viewed as temporal rather than as a given.126  Thus, one becomes a full person as one proceeds 
through one’s life and acquires various kinds of social merit or at least gains in wisdom and years. One’s identity 
as a person is critically contingent, at every stage of a web of social relations and with respect to the 
conventions and expectations of the larger community.127  Other proponents of African communitarianism, also 
referred to as advocates of African socialism, were Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor.128  In terms of their views, it 
is problematic for an African person to live alone or as an individual in Africa.  This is normally summed up in the 
Xhosa or Zulu saying that says: ‘umntu ngumtu ngabantu’, meaning that a person is a person with other 
persons.        
Proponents of Africanism therefore hold that active participation in the community life is what helps the individual 
to attain personhood and it must be emphasised that the mere belonging to the community does not make an 
African person but the interaction, the working together and acting with others help the person to achieve his 
personhood.129  It would hence be absurd for someone to conclude that the African community system makes 
people irresponsible and perpetually dependent on others.  Africans see a human person as being who is 
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inherently and to the core communal and who is deeply rooted in a social relationship and in no way as an 
isolated individual who acts alone.130   
African communitarianism has had its critics and many contemporary theorists have argued that Africa had and 
still has a robust notion of the individual, an individuality which did not become dissolved in the embrace of a 
fuzzy communalism.131  One such critic is Kaphagawami, whose work had drawn attention to the negative 
aspects of communalism, which he saw as deployed in Africa in the form of gerontocratic tyranny.132  According 
to him, the elders claimed to speak for the whole clan or tribe and their will was accepted as the general will.  
Nonetheless, Kaphagawami maintains that Africans, even in such authoritarian structures, were always aware of 
the autonomy and independence of individuals.133  Another critic of radical communitarianism is Kingongo, who 
argues that traditional African communalism was based on respect for the individual, but the socialist leadership 
of the modern Africa has perverted this communal notion into an ideology of radical communitarianism, the latter 
merely an ideological veil for the authoritarian rule of the people.134  Perhaps the most scathing and sustained 
criticism of the communitarian tradition comes from Kwame Gyekye, who alleges private property was after all 
existent in the African tradition.135  Gyekye, furthermore, sees a difference between African communitarianism, 
which is a socio-ethical doctrine, and European socialism, which is primarily an economic arrangement.136   
 
Gyekye, interestingly, appears to accept that the African community is communal or communitarian in nature.137  
Although describing the social order of African community as communal,138  he argues that it would be more 
correct to describe the African social order as amphibious, as it manifests features of both communality and 
individuality.139  He argues that to describe that order as simply communal is to prejudge the issue regarding the 
place given to individuality.140  The African social order is, strictly speaking, neither purely communalistic nor 
                                                          
130  Ezekwonna 64. 
131  Basu 7, Gyekye 154, Gyekye 31 and Ezekwonna 65. 
132  Basu 7. 
133  Basu 7. 
134  Basu 7. 
135  Basu 7. 
136  Basu 8. 
137  Gyekye 154 and Basu 8.  See also Gyekye 31, where he points out that, that the African social order was  
communal is perhaps undeniable.  
138  Gyekye 154 and Gyekye 31. 
139  Gyekye 154 and Gyekye 31. 
140  Gyekye 154, Gyekye 31, Basu 7 and Ezekwonna 65. 
185 
 
purely individualistic.  But the concept of communalism in African social thought is often misunderstood, as is 
the place of the individual in the communal social order.141  
In trying to justify his argument of an amphibious African social order, Gyekye argues that what scholars - 
usually from noncommunal, individualistic backgrounds and mentalities - say about communalism is that it offers 
no room for the expression of individuality, the assumption being that individuality is submerged by the 
communal apparatus; and that communalism is antithetical to individualism, meaning that the two cannot co-
exist.142  These judgments made by non-African scholars about the African socio-ethical doctrine of 
communalism seem to have been accepted in toto by the advocates of African socialism, such as Nkrumah, 
Senghor and Nyerere, in their anxiety to find anchorage for their ideological choice in the traditional African 
ideas about society.143   
To illustrate his argument that communalism does not submerge or swallow the individuality, Gyekye, uses the 
Akan proverb that says that ‘the clan is like a cluster of trees which, when seen afar, appear huddled together, 
but which would be seen to stand individually when closely approached.’144  This proverb emphasises the social 
reality of the individual. It articulates the notion that the individual has a separate identity and that, like the tree, 
some of whose branches may touch other trees, the individual is separately rooted and is not completely 
absorbed by the cluster.  Communality, therefore, does not obliterate or squeeze out individuality.145  In this he 
seems to be in agreement with Ezekwonna, who has also argued that as long as a person has every opportunity 
to be out-going and to be himself in African communities, his personhood is not swallowed up.146  Furthermore, 
to emphasise the fact that individualism is well understood in the African society, Gyekye, uses another proverb 
that says that ‘the clan is merely a multitude.’147  The proverb infers that the individual cannot always and 
perpetually depend on the clan or group for everything.  The saying thus intends to deepen the individual’s 
sense of responsibility for himself and it clearly suggests that the relevance and importance of the group are 
exaggerated by the people themselves.148   
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The individual’s sense of responsibility for himself or herself is in fact expressed explicitly in the maxim that says, 
‘it is by individual effort that we struggle for our heads’.149  This African social thought offers a clear 
unambiguous statement on the value of individuality, which is what this concept implies, even though it at the 
same time makes an equally unequivocal statement on the value of communality.150  The African thought does 
not see the two concepts of individualism and communalism as exclusive or antithetical.  It tries to steer clear of 
the Scylla of exaggerated individualism (as found in the West) and the Charybdis of exaggerated communalism 
(communism, as presently understood and practised in some parts of the world).151  According to Gyekye, 
therefore, African social thought seeks to avoid the excesses of the two systems, while allowing for a 
meaningful, albeit uneasy, interaction between the individual and the society.  He admits that one cannot be 
oblivious of the practical problems involved in the attempt to balance the two concepts.152  Gyekye further 
distinguishes what he calls moderate communitarianism, where well-individuated autonomous subjects live in 
harmonious community.153  This is contrasted with the argument advanced by Mbiti and Menkit, discussed 
above, that personhood is fully defined by a cultural community.154  This means that a relationship between an 
individual and a community is associative in character.  Such a relationship may be described as a set within a 
set, in the sense that all the elements of the big set are also found in the small set and it depicts a balanced 
character.155   
The meaning of personhood for Mbiti and Menkiti is limited.  The main idea that underpins the realisation of 
personhood, as perceived by these philosophers, is that of primordiality of community rights over the individual 
rights and accordingly, individual values and interests are de-emphasised.156   An individual, according to them, 
does not play any role towards the realisation of his or her personhood, but instead, personhood is wholly 
defined by a cultural community. In his attempt to explain the notion that underlies primordiality of the community 
rights over individual rights, Mbiti emphasises that in African societies, whatever happens to the whole group 
happens to the individual.157  This was summed up in his famous saying that says that ‘I am, because we are, 
and since we are, therefore, I am’.  This implies that ‘we are’ gives meaning to ‘I am’.  Subsequently, ‘I am’ 
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cannot exist independently on its own.158  Mwimnobi argues and maintains, perhaps correctly, that since an 
individual is not created as such by the community, it is problematic to argue that ‘I am’ entirely depends on ‘we 
are’ for existence.  He maintains that the individual does not entirely depend on community for his or her 
existence.  For Mbiti and Menkiti, the notion of radical communitarianism does take into consideration individual 
freedom to make choices.159  Gyekye, reacting against the notion of strict or radical communitarianism of Mbiti 
and Menkiti, proposes a moderate version of communitarianism,160 in terms of which the argument that 
personhood is absolutely conferred on the individual by the community is rejected.  An individual enjoys some 
inherent rights, despite the sociality of the human person which at once places him or her in a system of shared 
values and practices.  Personhood for him can only be defined partially, never completely by one’s membership 
of the community.161  His notion of moderate communitarianism, therefore, seems to support and promotes an 
open and democratic society.  It does not give ontological primacy to the community; rather, it holds that the 
attainment of personhood does not wholly depend on the communal structure.162  It accepts the reality of the 
individual autonomy as well as the relational and communal character of an individual.  It also ascribes equal 
moral standing to the community and individual.163  Gyekye’s moderate communitarianism describes many 
African societies or communities more accurately than the theories of Mbiti and Menkiti.  
 
5.5 ADDRESSING PROBLEMS OF HIV/AIDS AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INDIVIDUALISM, UTILITARIANISM, COMMUNITARIANISM AND AFRICANISM  
 
This study submits that the problems of HIV/AIDS and confidentiality would be best addressed in South Africa, 
as well in Africa, if cognisance is taken of the writings of Gyekye164  and Cameron.165  This means that a 
consideration of the complexity of confidentiality should be mindful of the nuanced understandings of 
individualism and communitarianism.166  South Africa’s population consists of diverse races and ethnic groups, 
with different backgrounds and cultures which makes the application of one school of thought, such as the 
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classical liberal idea of individualism in trying to address problems relating to confidentiality, inappropriate and 
irrelevant.  To put this into context: whilst an individual may be expected to share his or her HIV-positive status 
with his or her family, for instance, especially for emotional support and home based care reasons, such an 
individual should be allowed space to make his or her free will or choice about informing his or her family about 
his or her status.  Cameron explains that the last-mentioned ‘information-sharing’ is a basic cultural value, and 
the fact that a culture includes supportive responses of a communitarian nature does not and cannot mean that 
someone who is part of that culture automatically waives his or her right to individual autonomy, or that the 
culture itself demands that respect for individual choice in relation to confidentiality must be overridden.167  
Hence, the most appropriate response in order to address the problem of confidentiality in the context of 
HIV/AIDS, would be to apply the notions of both individualism and communitarianism.  Utilitarianism, also, to a 
certain extent may be considered.  For instance, it could be considered that a sexual partner who is diagnosed 
to be HIV-positive should consider it as being good of his or her sexual partner as well as his or her own good to 
inform such sexual partner about his or her status in order to protect that sexual partner from being infected with 
HIV.                   
 
5.6 WOULD MAKING HIV/AIDS A NOTIFIABLE DISEASE ADDRESS THE PROBLEM? 
 
5.6.1 The aims and process of notification in South Africa 
A ‘notifiable medical condition’ is defined by National Health Act as a medical condition that must be reported in 
terms of a statutory obligation.168  Indeed, despite the many shortcomings of a system of compulsory 
notifications of diseases, notifications are a generally accepted indicator of disease in a population and indeed 
an important source of information when reconstructing aspects of a population’s disease profile.169  Some of 
the most noticeable limitations of such a system are, amongst others, underreporting, duplication in reporting, a 
lack of uniform diagnostic criteria, all of which result in wrong diagnosis or resistance against reporting because 
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of the stigma attached to certain notifiable diseases.170  In developing countries, also, some of these limitations 
bear close relation to the ineffective administration of notifications, and as a result the data of these societies is 
less reliable.  However, despite these inadequacies, compulsory notifications of diseases in South African 
situation still yield useful information with regards to the population’s disease profile and it can also be accepted 
that much of the country’s health planning is based on these notifications and the trends so displayed.171  
Furthermore, another important indicator that needs to be mentioned concerning notifiable diseases is the case 
fatality rate (CFR), which refers to the percentage of all persons notified as having a specific disease who died 
from the disease.172  The case fatality rate is of importance because, amongst other things, it gives an indication 
of: (a) the relative extent to which cases and deaths of notifiable disease concerned are indeed reported; (b) the 
fatalities of the particular notifiable disease and (c) the measure of skill and success with which patients with this 
notifiable condition are treated and cared for, that is, the extent to which their lives are being saved.173   
It becomes clear that notification of diseases in South Africa, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, is 
important as it yields useful information with regards to the population’s disease profile and helps with the 
country’s health planning.174  HIV/AIDS, however, for various reasons which will be discussed below, has not 
been made a notifiable disease in South Africa. 
5.6.2 How do these aims compare with the situation in other countries? 
Early in its history, AIDS was added to long list of infectious diseases in the United States of America (USA), 
which had to be reported to public health authorities.175  The reasoning for such reporting was that the 
information about who had a disease and what risk factors they exhibited were essential for drawing conclusions 
on how the disease was transmitted and how transmission can be prevented.  Reporting also enabled specific 
infection control measures, such as contact tracing.176  Since the discovery of AIDS, the Centers for Disease 
Control (CDC) have been a major source of epidemiological information about the disease.  Based on this 
rationale, however, if some information is good, more information is presumably better, and CDC, in fact, had 
recommended that states consider making HIV infection, as determined by antibody testing, to be also a 
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reportable condition.177  As a result, six states already require reporting of HIV.  However, unlike the reporting of 
AIDS, the epidemiological value of these additional data, such as reporting of HIV, may be limited.178   For 
instance, unlike AIDS patients, only a small, relatively non-representative group of infected with HIV persons 
would be reported, that is, blood donors, military recruits and personnel, prisoners and those who voluntarily 
seek testing.  Some individuals would receive false-positive results and incorrectly be reported as infected.  
Others would avoid voluntary testing out of fear of breach of confidentiality and its subsequent ill effects.179  
According to Jasper, all states in the United States of America (USA) require AIDS reporting and the majority of 
states require some reporting for HIV.180  Bayer points out that clinical AIDS has been a reportable condition in 
every state in the USA since 1983.181  Bobinski and LeMaistre, in addition, observe that statutes governing HIV 
and AIDS information, including requirements for reporting information about the person infected to health 
authorities, differ from state to state.182  Some states require that HIV infection be reported only statistically, that 
is, by age, sex, and race.  Others require that the names and addresses those infected be reported.183   
There is differences in the measures of protection afforded to the information reported, eg provisions that 
enforce the reporting of AIDS and HIV; provisions for disclosure of information under certain circumstances and 
penalties for disclosure of information from public health records.  Florida, for instance, requires full reporting, 
that is, name, address, sex, age, and race in respect of AIDS or AIDS-related complex, but prohibits the 
reporting of HIV infection by name, address or identity numbers or symbols.  Colorado, on the other hand, 
requires attending doctors and laboratories to report fully to the state or local health departments any ‘diagnosis 
of AIDS, HIV-related illness or infection, including death from HIV infection.’184  Other states go beyond requiring 
the reporting of HIV/AIDS.  States such Minnesota, for instance, extend the requirements to the reporting of any 
person who may be a ‘health threat to others’ and Georgia requires the reporting of any other person the 
physician or administrator reasonably believe to be at risk of being infected by the patient.185  However, privacy 
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and confidentiality regulations concerning the storage, access and uses of such information vary among 
jurisdictions, which is the reason why there was an increased need for uniformity among state confidentiality 
protections.186   
Furthermore, since the inception of HIV testing, there has been a sharp debate about whether the names of all 
infected persons should be reported to confidential registries of public health departments.  Gay groups had 
opposed HIV reporting because of concern about privacy and confidentiality.187  Also, many public health 
officials opposed such a move because of the potential effect on the willingness of people to seek HIV testing 
and therapy voluntarily.188  By 1991, therefore, only a few states, typically those with relatively few AIDS cases, 
had required such reporting.189  It has been observed that being an infectious disease, HIV/AIDS by its nature 
should be reported as a public health concern. Some balance has to be struck between the right to 
confidentiality of the individual and the common good of the public.190     
As a matter of policy, therefore, the American Medical Association (AMA) strongly recommended that all states 
adopt requirements for confidential HIV reporting to appropriate public health authorities for the purpose of 
contact tracing and partner notification.191  It has been argued that HIV status and reporting requirements raise 
legal issues related to patient confidentiality.192  Legal protection of patient privacy and confidentiality depend on 
whether or not public concern outweighs the interest in preserving the doctor-patient privilege.  The balancing of 
this interest is a particular challenge when it comes to privacy concerns associated with HIV status.193  Bobinski 
and LeMaistre explain that although the reporting of communicable diseases has long been upheld, the 
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reporting of HIV/AIDS has long been criticised for deterring patients from seeking medical treatment;194 violating 
the doctor-patient relationship; advancing discrimination against those individuals reported and ultimately 
causing the AIDS disease to become more widespread rather than fulfilling the purpose of containing the 
disease.195  Despite all the criticism, required reporting of HIV/AIDS allows the government to track the 
epidemiology of the disease and provides a mechanism for follow-up behaviour modification, research and 
notification of latest treatments.196   
5.6.3 What about contact tracing and partner notification? 
As already mentioned above, reporting of a disease help specific infection control measures, such as contact 
tracing.197  Indeed, attempting to identify, notify, and treat the sexual contacts of diseased individuals is a 
common method for controlling sexually transmitted diseases such syphilis.198  It has therefore been 
recommended by many writers that this approach be also applied for controlling the heterosexual transmission 
of AIDS.199  Tracing is thought to be cost-effective for heterosexual but not for homosexual contacts, because of 
the lower prevalence of the disease among heterosexuals and the presumed smaller number of sexual contacts.  
However, because HIV can be carried for a long period of time, members of either group may have had many 
sexual contacts.200  Notifying a few of these contacts, therefore, may have little overall effect on the spread of 
the virus.  Contacts identified could be tested and counselled, but unlike syphilis patients, not cured.  The other 
important difference between syphilis and AIDS is the issue of the stigma.  Syphilis does not confer the same 
stigma as AIDS does today.201  Notification of contacts, therefore, severely compromises the confidentiality of a 
diagnosis of AIDS or HIV infection, since fearful or angry contacts may have no hesitations about spreading this 
information within the community.  In such circumstances, therefore, contact tracing may be a powerful deterrent 
to seeking voluntary testing.  If that is the case, the expected benefits of contact tracing of heterosexuals, 
including the reduction of AIDS in children, may not be realised.202  Even if HIV transmission could be prevented 
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in some cases, it is not clear that this would justify the concomitant loss of confidentiality and the subsequent 
risk of serious adverse consequences.   
A more effective approach may be to urge infected persons themselves to inform their sexual contacts 
themselves and to be sure that testing and counselling are available for those.203   Contact tracing has also been 
associated with partner notification.204  Indeed, as Dickinson avers, there have been increasing pressures for 
notifying spouses or sexual partners of an individual’s HIV-positive status and for tracing previous contacts.205  
However, contact tracing, a long-time public health tool, has the limitation that it relies heavily on a voluntary, 
accurate response from the HIV-positive individual.  To the extent that the individual fears the consequences of 
disclosure or the system becomes punitive, disclosures of contacts will decrease.206  And to the extent that the 
individual cannot accurately report past sexual contacts, the contact tracing programme is limited.207  Many 
states in the USA, therefore, have contact tracing or partner notification.208  In some states such as those in 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine and Michigan, persons who are HIV infected are encouraged to notify their own 
partners, and state assistance is provided if requested.  However, in some states, such as Colorado, Idaho and 
North Corolina, named partners are contacted by state officials if the HIV-infected person does not agree to 
notify them.209  All states with such programs protect the confidentiality of the infected persons.210                
5.6.4 Should HIV/AIDS be made notifiable in South Africa? 
Surveillance has been said to be a critical component of any disease control strategy.211  Surveillance data 
provide the basis for planning, targeting, monitoring and evaluating disease control public health measures.  
While surveillance can be undertaken in various ways, making a condition legally notifiable is one of the 
commonest ways of collecting surveillance information where health care workers have a legal duty to inform the 
health authorities when a patient is found to have the condition.212  This is normally referred to as passive 
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surveillance, as it depends on health care workers involved in patient care taking the initiative to notify, while the 
health authorities are ‘passive’ recipients of the information.213   
The former South African Minister of Health, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, indicated her intention, in September 
1997, to make AIDS a notifiable disease.  Reasons provided for this request were that it would be possible to 
collect information on how many people have AIDS disease or have died from AIDS; to determine how AIDS 
manifests itself, how it is transmitted in the population and what the risk factors for AIDS are.  The information 
collected would be used for surveillance of the disease, identification of risk factors, planning of prevention, 
treatment and supply of medicines, as well as monitoring the epidemic.214   
This policy, however, was widely criticised.  The criticism was based on the fact that, firstly, from a human rights 
perspective, concern has been expressed about the potential use or misuse of lists of names of HIV-positive 
people and secondly, that concern has been expressed that notifiable conditions are so notoriously under-
reported that little meaningful information is likely to come from this source.215  However, Abdool Karim argues 
that whilst both these points of criticism have some merit, they are insufficient grounds against making AIDS 
notifiable.216  The first concern regarding name reporting may be addressed by a reporting system which does 
not include names, and as on the other hand the unnamed reporting is also more prone to duplicate reports, a 
system of confidential named reporting is another option.217  The second concern regarding the current 
notification system producing little information of value due to serious under-reporting, is borne out of 
experience.  For instance, a common illness such as hepatitis B is hopelessly under-reported and fluctuating 
reporting rates create artefact epidemics.  This concern may be addressed by the fact that, instead of viewing 
under-reporting as a reason for not making AIDS notifiable, the opposite approach may be more useful, that is, 
using AIDS notification to improve the entire notification system with the specific aim of rebuilding the 
foundations of the notification system in order to reduce under-reporting to acceptable levels, or at least to a 
stable reporting rate so that trends can be interpreted.218 
Interestingly, although explaining why he disagrees with the two most commonly used arguments against AIDS 
notification, Karim argues that the policy of making AIDS a notifiable disease was, in any event, inappropriate for 
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South Africa.219 He provides the following reasons for this argument:  Firstly, that meaningful estimates of AIDS 
incidence and mortality rates cannot be obtained from AIDS notification data, as AIDS is complex diagnostic 
condition which normally involves making a diagnosis of an AIDS indicator disease in the presence of a positive 
HIV test. 220  However, the presence of an indicator disease is not enough for a diagnosis of AIDS, since some 
indicator diseases, such as tuberculosis, are common in HIV-negative patients as well.  To get a reasonable 
estimate of AIDS incidence or mortality, therefore, all patients diagnosed with AIDS indicator diseases must 
routinely be tested for HIV, with such HIV test carried out for a surveillance requirement and not for clinical 
indication.221  The institution of widespread routine HIV testing for all patients with and deaths from AIDS 
indicator diseases was questionable, since it may not be the best use of AIDS prevention resources at a time 
when it was claimed that South Africa could not afford zidovudine (AZT) for pregnant women.  At that time, 
routine testing of patients who had been diagnosed with or have died of AIDS indicator diseases, did not 
occur.222  However, even with 100% reporting of currently diagnosed patients with and deaths from AIDS, 
analyses of these data to obtain AIDS incidence and mortality rates would produce estimates that would be at 
worst misleading and at best uninformative.223  Hence, Karim argues that meaningful estimates of AIDS 
incidence and mortality rates cannot be obtained from AIDS notification data.224  Secondly, even if notification 
data did not provide reasonable incidence or prevalence rates, they can provide useful information on temporal 
trends.  The preconditions, however, are stable reporting rates, a fixed definition of AIDS and stability in the 
proportion of patients and deaths being tested for HIV.225  Therefore, while it is possible that some of the 
preconditions for the analysis of the trends may be met, it is more likely that the trends may be misleading due 
to varying reporting and HIV testing rates.226   
Thirdly, since AIDS manifests, on average, about seven years after acquirement of HIV, risk factors for HIV, 
which are identified at present would be those applicable about seven years ago.  Risk factors for AIDS, for 
instance, factors which influence progression to AIDS, are very unlikely to be identified by routine surveillance 
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data, since detailed clinical and laboratory data will be required for this purpose.227  Fourthly, that AIDS-related 
health service utilisation includes inpatient admissions and outpatient visits.  Past experience with Hepatitis B 
reporting confirmed that notification rates for outpatients were very low, since notification had to occur in the 
follow-up visit when the HIV result is available.228  AIDS-related inpatient utilisation is an indication of health 
service capacity rather than any real disease burden.  Estimating the proportion of hospital admissions that are 
AIDS-related, requires a numerator, that is, AIDS admissions, which can only be obtained if all inpatients are 
routinely tested for HIV.229   
Limited HIV testing of only those inpatients with AIDS indicator diseases is an alternative, though this is less 
reliable due to the universal presentation of AIDS in the South African setting.  AIDS notification is therefore 
unlikely to provide useful information on outpatient or inpatient health service utilisation for AIDS.230  Finally, 
alternatively, instead of attempting to collect data on every AIDS patient in South Africa, a more reliable and less 
costly option is to undertake sentinel AIDS surveillance.  This may involve selected sites in each province that 
will be responsible for routine AIDS surveillance in both outpatients and inpatients.231  Reporting rates and data 
quality can be closely monitored to ensure that trends will be interpretable.  Since sentinel surveillance involves 
only a few representative sites, more detailed data can be collected to answer specific risk factor questions and 
denotification process can be set, making the calculation of case fatality rates possible.232  While AIDS 
surveillance is essential for planning and monitoring, however, the policy of making AIDS notifiable is 
inappropriate for South Africa and will not produce any of the outcomes expressed in the justification of this 
policy.  Instead, well-planned sentinel surveillance with a limited number of representative sites could produce 
most of the information required by AIDS policy makers.233  This may explain why HIV and AIDS are still not 
notifiable diseases in South Africa. 
However, for those people who are for notifiability of HIV/AIDS, contact identification and notification are one of 
best systems to control a communicable disease.234  According to Spencer, case isolation, quarantine, contact 
identification, notification and the provision of treatment underpin the effective public health to a serious 
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communicable disease.235  South Africa, with regard to the prevention of HIV, took its lead from Europe and 
North America where HIV exceptionalism had taken root.  Notification and identification were deemed to be an 
infringement of the individual’s rights and likely to drive the epidemic underground.236  Maybe the fact that in the 
earliest days the South African epidemic was focused on the white, middle-class gay community and thus not 
unlike that of Europe and USA, had prompted this position.  Without notification, therefore, the South African 
government has been able to query prevalence data and contradict research findings.237  In contrast, Cuba’s 
approach had been dramatically successful: the HIV prevalence in Cuba is reported to be currently 0.03%, with 
only 4 000 infected in a population of more than 13 million.238  It took a traditional public health approach 
incorporating isolation, quarantine and notification of exposed partners.239  The other proponents of notification, 
namely De Cock, Mbori-Ngacha and Marum, advocate that Africa would now benefit most from an approach to 
HIV/AIDS based on a public health model that includes mandatory, voluntary counselling, testing and partner 
notification; routine HIV testing in prevention services such as prevention of mother-to-child transmission and 
treatment for sexually transmitted infections; routine diagnostic HIV testing for patients seeking medical 
treatment and enhanced access to HIV/AIDS care.240   
They further argue that some approaches to HIV/AIDS are poorly adapted to the crisis in Africa because the 
issue has not been defined as and addressed as an infectious disease emergency.241  That a change in the 
philosophy is necessary to produce a rapid and substantial effect on the African epidemic and to limit its 
devastation and that HIV/AIDS prevention in Africa has been underfunded; greatly increased resources and 
strengthened infrastructure are required to tackle the issue.  And further, that the emphasis on human rights in 
HIV/AIDS prevention seems to have reduced the importance of public health and social justice, which offer a 
framework for prevention efforts in Africa that might be more relevant to people’s daily lives and more likely to be 
effective.242  Finally, that on the basis of the epidemiological data, HIV/AIDS should be considered as the 
greatest threat to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and prosperity in many of African countries.  
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Interventions must be quantitatively and qualitatively commensurate with the magnitude of the threat posed by 
the disease.243      
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
 
It has been shown that the schools of thoughts discussed above are important for a better understanding of 
issues relating to confidentiality and privacy in the context of HIV/AIDS.  However, in South Africa, as is also the 
case in many African societies, both individualism and communitarianism should be considered in addressing 
the protection of privacy and confidentiality, and to a certain extent, also utilitarianism. Classical liberal notions of 
privacy and confidentiality emphasise an individualistic understanding of confidentiality, and not a notion of 
shared confidentiality. This chapter has also shown that, although public health systems of disease control, such 
as notifiability or reporting, are often criticised for not being appropriate for South Africa, the time may perhaps 
have come to reconsider this issue.244 Africa, and also South Africa, could perhaps benefit from an approach to 
HIV/AIDS based on a public health model that includes mandatory, voluntary counselling, testing and partner 
notification; routine HIV testing in prevention services such as prevention of mother-to-child transmission and 
treatment for sexually transmitted infections; routine diagnostic HIV testing for patients seeking medical 
treatment and enhanced access to HIV/AIDS care.245  Measures of this nature will need to be carefully framed, 
considering a range of fundamental human rights that may come into play. In the final instance, a balance will 
need to be struck between protecting confidential information and protecting the interests of the public and other 
third parties. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been claimed that HIV/AIDS started in Africa as a rumour, soon became a disease, was later realised 
to be an epidemic, and has now become accepted as a tragedy.1  HIV has also been held to be a public 
health emergency, pronounced as an epidemic by most and a pandemic by many.2  Since its origins, 
probably as early as 1884,3 Africa and especially the Sub-Saharan region remain the most severely 
affected by HIV/AIDS. It was estimated that approximately 2.2 million Sub-Saharan Africans died of AIDS in 
2003 alone.4  At the end of 2007, around 5.7 million South Africans were believed to be living with HIV.5  In 
2008, UNAIDS and the World Health Organisation estimated that AIDS claimed 350 000 lives in South 
Africa in 2007 alone, which translates into 1000 people who died of AIDS-related illnesses that year.6   
The devastation spelt out by these figures is clear. The former president, Nelson Mandela, once summed 
this up by stating that in Africa, AIDS has claimed more lives than the sum total of all wars, famines and 
floods and that AIDS was hence no longer a disease, but a human rights issue.7 Effective interventions are 
urgently required to curb the spread and destruction that HIV/AIDS have caused.  Such interventions 
should proceed from the understanding that persons living with HIV and AIDS in South Africa still face 
severe prejudice, accompanied by violence, stigma, discrimination, victimisation and ostracism.  The 
cumulative effect of this stigma, discrimination and victimisation of persons living with HIV/AIDS, 
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undermines efforts to curb the spread of HIV.  Those who suspect that they may be HIV-positive may be 
reluctant to have themselves tested for fear that they may be stigmatised, discriminated against or 
victimised.  These factors, in turn, enhance silence and concealment in that those who may get tested and 
subsequently test positive, may in fear of the shame that goes with having HIV, prefer to conceal their HIV 
status.8   
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This study investigated the right to confidentiality in the context of HIV/AIDS through an interdisciplinary 
lens.   This study indicates that whilst confidentiality is important and should be preserved in order to 
protect persons living with HIV/AIDS against stigmatisation, discrimination and victimisation, this should be 
balanced by other equally important interests, such as the protection of public health and individual third 
parties who may be affected by the intentional or negligent infection of others with HIV.   
As the consideration of the legal issues relating to confidentiality and privacy cannot be divorced from the 
social context in which HIV/AIDS plays out in South African communities, the study closely looked at how 
victimisation, discrimination and stigmatisation manifest in the lives of persons living with HIV/AIDS. This 
was followed by a critical exploration of the present legal and ethical framework governing privacy and 
confidentiality, including medical confidentiality, as well as the duty to disclose a positive HIV-status, in the 
context of HIV/AIDS. The duty to disclose HIV status is considered not only from the side of the infected 
individual, but also with regard to health care practitioners. Possible limitations on the right to privacy in this 
context are also examined, which include, amongst others, a consideration of partner notification and 
making HIV/AIDS notifiable diseases in South Africa. This discussion cannot be complete without a 
discussion of the criminalisation of the intentional transmission of HIV. 
The study suggested that it is imperative that legal interventions aimed at curbing the spread of HIV will 
need to be mindful of the unique social, cultural and economic forces that impact on the duty to disclose a 
positive HIV-status to partners and other affected third parties. In this regard, the thesis also explored 
socio-cultural factors that underpin consensual sexual relationships in African communities generally. 
                                                          
8  Cameron “Legal and Human Rights responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic” (lecture, 12 October 2005) 2006 Stell LR 37. 
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These factors impact significantly on infected individuals’ decision to disclose their HIV status. It is 
submitted present efforts to address the spread of HIV are not always mindful of these unique dynamics. 
Insights gained from philosophical theories relating to individualism, communitarianism and utilitarianism 
are valuable tools in facilitating a clearer understanding of relevant social and cultural factors that keep 
South African society locked in the present stalemate with regard to the disclosure of HIV status. These 
theories unlock some of the reasons why the traditional Western (individualistic) notion of confidentiality 
remains problematical in many African communities. Shared confidentiality is tentatively suggested as a 
more nuanced expression of confidentiality, which seems a better ‘fit’ for the diverse South African 
population.  
The value and contribution of this thesis lies in the fresh angle that it takes in examining legal and ethical 
issues relating to confidentiality and privacy in the context of HIV and AIDS, which is informed by relevant 
social and cultural issues not always considered in conventional discussion on the topic. In addition, 
philosophical theories more appropriate for the South African context (e.g. strands of communitarianism) 
are also considered in this thesis, providing a more contextualised and nuanced understanding of 
confidentiality from a legal point of view. 
It has been contended that the societal stigma associated with HIV/AIDS has lessened somewhat and that 
therefore the over-riding privacy concerns should be re-evaluated.9  It is now time for South Africa, as well 
as Africa, to consider applying the public health systems such as notifiability of HIV/AIDS and partner 
notification, especially if these may help to further reduce spread of the disease and hence strengthen the 
fight against the epidemic.  In addition, voluntary counseling and testing; routine HIV testing in prevention 
services such as prevention of mother-to-child transmission and treatment for sexually transmitted 
infections; routine diagnostic HIV testing for patients seeking medical treatment and enhanced access to 
HIV/AIDS care are all corollary measures that will assist in addressing the spread of HIV.10   
 
 
                                                          
9  Browne-Marshall 2012 Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy 423. 
10  De Cock, Mbori-Ngacha and Marum 2002 The Lancet 69 and Spencer 2006 The Southern African Journal of HIV  
Medicine 51 and De Cock KM, Mbori-Ngacha D and Marum E “A serostatus-based approach to HIV/AIDS prevention 
and care in Africa” 2003 (362) The Lancet 1847-1849. 
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